University of New Hampshire

University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Doctoral Dissertations

Student Scholarship

Fall 2010

Essays on environmental regulations and performance of firms
Shrawantee Saha
University of New Hampshire, Durham

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/dissertation

Recommended Citation
Saha, Shrawantee, "Essays on environmental regulations and performance of firms" (2010). Doctoral
Dissertations. 519.
https://scholars.unh.edu/dissertation/519

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of New
Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact
Scholarly.Communication@unh.edu.

ESSAYS ON ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS
BY

SHRAWANTEE SAHA

BA, Serampore College in India, 1998
MS, University of Calcutta in India, 2000
MA, University of New Hampshire, 2003
DISSERTATION

Submitted to the University of New Hampshire
in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Economics

September, 2010

UMI Number: 3430773

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMT
Dissertation Publishing
UMI 3430773

Copyright 2010 by ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

uest
ProQuest LLC

789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346

Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

This dissertation has been examined and approved.

Dissertation Director, Robert D. Mohr,
Associate Professor of Economics

Bruce T. Elmslie,
Professor of Economics

. ^.>-

^M

i

J ?

lohn M. Halstead,

Professor of Natural Resources

Ju-Çfefn Huang,
Associate Professor of Economics

¿2n*v
Le Wang,
Assistant Professor of Economics

S-lb-lo
Date

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my dissertation advisor,
Robert Mohr, for his excellent guidance in giving shape to my research questions
and invaluable help in successfully completing this dissertation. He has been very
encouraging and understanding during the entire process. It was an absolute
pleasure working with him.
Thanks are due to Bruce Elmslie, John Halstead, Ju-Chin Huang and Le Wang
for their insightful comments that helped improve the quality of this research. Le
Wang, Karen Conway and Reagan Baughman have been extremely gracious in
teaching new empirical techniques to overcome some hurdles related to this project.
A very special thanks to Sinthy Kounlasa for all the help she has provided over the
years. I am grateful to the Department of Economics and the Graduate School at the
University of New Hampshire for supporting my graduate studies through
assistantships, travel grants, Summer TA Fellowships and the UNH Graduate School
Dissertation Fellowship.

in

PREFACE

This dissertation consists of three essays that study the effect of external
pressure and internal awareness on a firm's environmental performance, under
information-based environmental regulations.
The first essay, "Neighborhood Characteristics, Media Attention and the USEnvironmental Protection Agency's Toxic Release Inventory Program", explores the
response of the national print media to the first wave of the Toxic Release Inventory
(TRI] filings. It studies the degree to which neighborhood characteristics like racial
composition and income status associate with the number of newspaper articles
written about a polluting establishment, controlling for the volume of pollution,
industry and observable establishment-level characteristics. The measure of media
reports, gathered from the LEXIS-NEXIS database, identifies newspaper articles that
mention specific polluting facilities in reference to the TRI program. Regression
results, based on 1989 media reports that corresponded to the first release of TRl
data, suggest that neighborhoods with a higher percentage of non-white population
are more likely to be included in media reports, but the results are not consistently
statistically significant across four different measures of media attention. Richer
neighborhoods are positively and significantly associated with media attention.
The second essay, "Firm's Response to Media Attention under USEnvironmental Protection Agency's Toxic Release Inventory Program", builds on the
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first one and asks whether initial media attention affects subsequent pollution

behaviors. This essay examines the relationship between media attention and
pollution behavior of TRI firms. Using a difference-in-differences approach, 1 find
that firms with media attention are more likely to reduce emissions compared to
those without media attention and the results are statistically significant. However,

a two-stage estimation technique does not reveal any statistically significant causal
effect of media attention, and the signs of the treatment effect are mixed. A

matching technique produces a similarly insignificant treatment effect of media
attention. Hence, while firms with media attention might behave differently in

reducing future toxic releases, this study does not find evidence that such attention
may cause reductions in toxic releases.

The last essay (co-authored with Robert D. Mohr) is centered on a
controversial issue in environmental economics, the "Porter Hypothesis". The

Porter Hypothesis argues that environmental regulations benefit firms by fostering
innovation. This paper derives four examples consistent with this idea. Each
example highlights either the distribution of benefits or costs, or the presence of
some additional distortion, other than pollution. To emphasize that numerous such

scenarios exist, examples are organized according to the list of market failures.
Adding any one market failure creates the possibility that firms benefit from
regulations. While each example can be fully consistent with the Porter Hypothesis,
it is also possible that regulations benefit firms even without fostering innovation, a
result that would be empirically difficult to distinguish from the Porter Hypothesis.
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ABSTRACT

ESSAYS ON ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS

by
Shrawantee Saha

University of New Hampshire, September, 2010
There has been a surge in the development of new, non-traditional and innovative
approaches to address environmental problems in the last three decades of U.S
environmental policies.

These new approaches affect polluting behavior via

instruments other than taxes, permits or direct imperatives. They rely heavily on
active engagement, collaboration and information sharing among firms and industry
peers.

This dissertation adds to our current understanding of these newer

approaches by studying how external pressures and internal awareness affect a
firm's polluting behavior. Two essays focus solely on the role of the print media, an
external pressure to firms, under the U.S Toxic Release Inventory program. It first
studies the association of media attention with socio-economic characteristics to

help explain some findings associated with "environmental justice". It then studies
whether such external pressure imposes reputation costs on a firm so that it may
change subsequent toxic releases. The last essay focuses on internal awareness and
considers a hypothesis whereby certain flexible forms of environmental regulations
can benefit regulated firms by fostering innovation. It is known as the Porter
hypothesis. Regulations typically impose costs thereby decreasing a firm's profit

xi

increasing opportunities. But this essay derives four examples consistent with the
Porter hypothesis, within the standard assumptions of economic theory.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Introduction

The last two decades have seen some notable trends in the development of
environmental policy in the United States and across the globe. These include a
greater emphasis on market-based instruments to control pollution, the emergence
of policies to address global climate change, and a greater emphasis on recycling
and waste management. Associated with these trends, there has also been a surge
in the development of new and innovative approaches to address environmental
problems. These new approaches complement existing policies by affecting the
polluting behavior of firms via instruments other than taxes, permits or direct
imperatives.

Instead, these new policies attempt to improve environmental

outcomes by actively engaging firms to reduce pollution, to collaborate with
industry peers or to provide information about their polluting activities.
The economics literature has only gradually recognized this shift. The vast
majority of theoretical and empirical work focuses on the more traditional, and
better understood, environmental policies. While voluntary, collaborative and
information-based policy tools have increasingly been used to address
environmental issues, the effectiveness of such programs is often questioned and
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the impact of such programs is not well understood (Tietenberg 1998, Arimura et al.
2008, Brouhle et al. 2009). Only in the last decade has the literature on such
voluntary, collaborative and information-based environmental policies gained
significant momentum. The topics still lack in an accepted set of theoretical and
empirical conclusions. This dissertation adds to that current understanding by
providing three new research essays on information-based environmental
regulations.
This dissertation contributes to the literature on information-based policies

by arguing that information provision policies can affect the behavior and
environmental performance of a firm by creating external pressures and raising
internal awareness. External pressure comes in the form of community activists,
shareholders, press, regulators, members of the supply chain, or even ordinary
citizens demanding changes in the environmental performance of a firm (Tietenberg
1998, Sunstein 1999, Reinhardt 2000, Fung and O'Rourke 2000, Bennear and
Olmstead 2008). Internal awareness can arise because an information provision
policy forces facility managers to track and account for pollutants (Porter and van
der Linde 1995, Hart 1997, Karkkainen 2001). Since pollutants can represent
potentially-valuable production inputs that might be conserved, used more
efficiently, or recycled, facility managers may discover opportunities to reduce
releases of toxic pollutants in a way that imposes little or no cost. In fact, a number
of case studies highlight scenarios where increased internal awareness
simultaneously led to improved environmental performance and improved
productivity for the facility. (Porter 1991, Porter and van der Linde 1995).
2

The new research in this dissertation consists of three separate studies,

which are presented in chapters 2 through 4. The first two studies are empirical
and focus on the external pressure associated with one of the most prominent
information provision policies in the U. S, the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). Chapter
2 studies a key source of external pressure: the role of the print media. It studies
the degree to which neighborhood characteristics like racial composition and
income status associate with print media attention. The goal is to study how the
media responded to pollution news that may help explain some findings associated
with "environmental justice", the concept that firms pollute more in poor and
minority neighborhoods. If the media are less likely to report about toxic releases
in such neighborhoods, and firms perceive negative publicity as a cost, then firms in
poor or minority neighborhoods have an incentive to pollute more.

This

understanding of the behavior of the media not only sheds light on issues related to
environmental justice, but also sets the stage to explore firm responses to media
attention in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 studies how polluting facilities react after their
TRI emissions are discussed in the print media. If media attention imposes costs on
the firm, the firm may have an incentive to change its subsequent behaviors. This
chapter studies how TRl-related media attention is associated with a firm's
subsequent toxic releases.
Chapter 4 is a theoretical work that focuses on internal awareness. It
considers a hypothesis put forward by Michael Porter, who argues that information
provision policies as well as other flexible forms of environmental regulation can
lead to new innovations and even benefit regulated firms. The idea is that when
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faced with regulations, sufficiently flexible firms can mitigate or even fully offset the
regulatory costs by finding creative ways to solve their environmental problems. A
good candidate for such "properly designed" environmental regulation is an
information provision policy like the U.S Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). Porter
emphasizes that "regulation focused on information gathering can achieve major

benefits by raising corporate awareness" (Porter and van der Linde 1995).
Referring specifically to the TRI, he argues that "information gathering often leads to
environmental improvements without mandating pollution reductions, sometimes
even at lower costs." (p. 100, Porter and van der Linde 1995).
Economists, like Palmer, Oates and Portney (1995), argue that environmental

regulations, which are traditionally evaluated by comparing social costs and
benefits, typically cannot generate such private benefits to firms. Regulations

impose costs, and stricter regulations will only add greater constraints to the firm's
profit increasing opportunities. But economic theory allows for a variety of ways
where firms can benefit from stricter regulations.

Critics have categorically

overlooked such instances. Chapter 4 derives four examples consistent with the

Porter hypothesis and explains these examples within the same framework that
critics use to refute the Porter hypothesis. The results of the four examples are

applicable not only to information-based policies like the Toxic Release Inventory
but also to a broader set of environmental policies like market-based instruments
(emission fees, auctioned or non-auctioned permits).
The rest of this chapter is devoted to a review of the literature on the main

topics that are presented in the three essays of the dissertation, and explains how
4

the research presented here builds upon and extends that prior literature.
Specifically, the dissertation brings together and contributes to two key strands of
the prior literature. The first one is the literature on the voluntary, collaborative
and information-based environmental policies. This literature provides the context
for Chapters 2 and 3 of the dissertation. These chapters extend our understanding
of how firms respond to these new approaches of environmental regulation. These
chapters specifically study the role of the print media in influencing firm behaviors
under information provision policies. By studying the role of the print media and its
association with socio-economic characteristics, Chapter 2 sheds light on
"environmental justice" related issues, which was never studied from the standpoint
of media activities. Chapter 3 studies the role of the print media in influencing
subsequent pollution behavior. To my knowledge, only one other study analyses the
effect of media attention on polluting behavior of firms. Since chapters 2 and 3
focus solely on information-based policies, the literature review will focus on results
that allow us to understand firm responses under this policy. The literature review,
however, will first present a broad overview of the voluntary, collaborative and
information-based policies. This will help to understand how these policies work
and how these types of polices may affect firm behavior.
The second literature that this dissertation contributes to is the literature on

environmental competitiveness. The focus here is on the Porter hypothesis. The
different examples presented in chapter 4 helps organize much of the existing
literature on the Porter hypothesis and draws the examples from previously
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published research. The review presented surveys the literature related to the
Porter hypothesis with a focus on the theoretical contributions.
The rest of this chapter is divided into five sections. The first section is
devoted to an overview of the voluntary, collaborative and information-based
environmental policies.

The second section presents the US. Toxic Release

Inventory program: its historical background, and some of the strengths and
limitations of this program. The third section discusses the TRI program and its
association with media attention and environmental justice related issues. This
section also provides a brief preview of Chapter 2. The fourth section discusses the
TRI and firm responses literature and highlights the question addressed in Chapter
3. The last section extensively surveys the theoretical literature on the Porter
hypothesis and also touches upon the empirical literature on the hypothesis.

1.2

Voluntary. Collaborative and Information-based Environmental Policies
The innovative methods of environmental protection developed in the last

two decades can be broadly categorized into voluntary, collaborative and
information-based policies. Voluntary approaches, like U.S. Energy Star program,
are programs that ask firms to voluntarily improve their environmental
performance in exchange of benefits like recognitions, cost savings and regulatory
relief (Bruijn and Norberg-Bohm 2005). Collaborative approaches, like the power
sector's collaboration with U.S. Department of Energy, require explicit interaction
between the private sector, the government, members in the supply chain (both
with upstream suppliers and downstream customers) in the decision making
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process to meet environmental targets (Vachon and Klassen 2008]. Mandatory
information disclosure policies, like uniform eco-labeling of household appliances,
rely on information affecting a host of intermediate actors like the press, local
communities, consumers, 'peer firms, investors and the polluting firms themselves
(Beierle 2003). Even though the voluntary and collaborative approaches do not
mandate information dissemination, information sharing becomes an integral part
of these policies in order to promote transparency in negotiations and monitoring of
firm activities. In fact, voluntary and collaborative approaches are often considered
complementary to information-based regulations.
Although these three approaches affect firm's polluting behaviors in different
and unconventional ways, the main goal is to stimulate superior environmental
performances via active involvement of the regulators, firms, and consumers. Such
initiatives may lead to better solutions for the environment by building new
relationships among the stakeholders, actively engaging the industry in the learning
process, creating capabilities within firms, and creating first movers who would
invest in business strategies to improve environmental performance (Bruijn and
Norberg-Bohm 2005).
In voluntary approaches or agreements, a firm or group of firms voluntarily
commit to make efforts towards meeting environmental targets, which are mostly
set beyond regulatory compliance. Even though they are voluntary commitments,
some commitments may be binding as they come under the threat of alternative
legislative intervention. Depending on the degree of regulatory intervention, three
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types of voluntary agreements are identified (GIachant 2007). If firms agree to
make abatement efforts to meet goals set by the regulator, they are known as public
voluntary agreements. A classic example in this context is the EPA's first voluntary

program, the 33-50 that was introduced in 1991. Under this program, EPA asked
manufacturing establishments that were reporting to the TRI to take additional
steps to reduce the aggregate emissions of 17 target chemicals by 33% in 1992 and
50% by 1995 (Gamper-Rabindran 2006).

A negotiated agreement is a type of voluntary agreement where firms and
regulators jointly devise the commitments through bargaining. For example, in the
1990s the European Commission negotiated agreements with European, Japanese
and Korean car manufactures to reduce new car CO2 emissions (GIachant 2007).
The third type of voluntary agreement is self-regulation or unilateral commitments.
Here the polluter takes the initiative to control his environmental actions without

any regulatory influence. It is a voluntary initiative, rather than an agreement.
Chemical industries in 52 countries under the Responsible Care program have

voluntarily taken the initiative to work through their national associations and
companies to continuously improve their health, safety and environmental
performance, and to communicate with stakeholders about their products and
processes (Responsible Care 2010)1.

' A detailed survey of case studies on voluntary agreements is presented in Morgenstern and Pizer
(2007) which specifically reports on voluntary agreements related to climate change. The OECD
report (2003) and Bruijn and Norberg-Bohm (2005) cover a host of other voluntary agreements in
the U.S and Europe. A survey of voluntary and information disclosure programs in developing
countries is presented in Blackman (2009).
8

Collaborative approaches to environmental protection are defined as "direct
involvement of an organization with its suppliers and customers in planning jointly
for environmental management and environmental solutions" (Vachon and Klassen
2008). For example, Vachon and Klassen (2008) cite the case of Custom Print, a
commercial printer located in Virginia, which reduced its wasted chemicals by
working closely with its chemical suppliers (upstream in the supply chain). A
thorough audit of its inputs inventory identified huge chemical stocks that were
underutilized before expiration date and hence wasted.

Collaboration with

suppliers from the chemical industry improved utilization and lessened such wastes
(EPA 1996).

Collaboration between stakeholders can improve organizational

capabilities and may translate into better environmental performance due to lower
costs or improved resource productivity as suggested by Michael Porter.
Information

provision or disclosure programs

use

environmental

information as a strategy for improving environmental performance. The strategy is
that disclosure of environmental information will trigger a complex web of
communication and action among environmental groups, press, local communities,
consumers, investors that may pressurize polluting firms to improve environmental
performance. Negative recognition, an external pressure produced under such
programs, can affect public awareness of a firm's actions which, in turn, can
motivate the firm to change its environmental behaviors.

Hamilton (1995a),

Hamilton and Viscusi (1999) and Konar and Cohen (1997) all show that external
non-regulatory pressure can affect firms financially: firms on the TRI list suffer
significant losses in the stock market. Apart from external pressures, information9

based policies also generate internal awareness about the way firms work.
Information gathering may make them aware of some unutilized resources which
can otherwise be allocated more efficiently.
The EPA's TRI is the most prominent and most studied information
disclosure program. However, results from research about the TRl may have
broader applicability. The success of the TRI led to the introduction of several other
information disclosure programs in the United States. The Energy Policy Act of 1992
and 1996 required that household appliances like fluorescent and incandescent
lamps, certain types of rechargeable batteries, showerheads, faucets and toilets
must carry labels with information on energy efficiency, estimated annual energy
costs, and water flow information. Safe Drinking Water Amendments in 1996
require that all community drinking water systems to mail their customers an
annual report on the quality of water and level of contaminants (Portney and
Stavins 2000).
Information disclosure programs have also been introduced in developing
countries and for specific industries. Some of the prominent information-based
programs in the developing countries are Program for Pollution Control Evaluation
and Rating (PROPER) in Indonesia, and India's Green Rating Project. Lesser known

but other prominent initiatives in the U.S. chemical industry are the Chemical Risk
Management Plans, Materials Accounting and the Sector Facility Indexing Project2.
Chemical risk management plans provides detailed information on chemical

2 A detailed survey of these programs is presented in Beierle (2003).
10

accident risks and prevention.

The Materials Accounting program provides

information on how chemicals traveled through process at industrial facilities. The
Sector Facility Indexing Project consolidates enforcement, compliance and other
data into a package of environmental performance indicators.

1.3

Toxic Release Inventory

1.3.1 Background
The most prominent and structured information disclosure program in the
United States is the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). A variety of federal and state
laws since the 1960s attempted to collect information about toxic chemicals from

corporations, government and other organizations. These laws were part of a
broader effort to assess the risks associated with such toxics, and impose bans and
limits on their use. But there were concerns that such information would reveal

business trade secrets and may not create the right incentives for businesses to

reduce pollution. By the early 1980s, the idea that a community has the right to
know about toxic pollution in their neighborhood started gaining national
awareness. Such attention was further intensified by major chemical accidents in

the early 1980s. The Bhopal gas tragedy in 1984 in one of Union Carbide's chemical
plants in Bhopal, India, and other less serious chemical leaks at Union Carbide's
plant in Union, West Virginia in the next two years raised public concern about
potential dangers of accidental pollution. In response to these concerns, Congress
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passed the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act in 1986 which
aimed at protecting public against chemical accidents3.
The Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) is a provision under this Act. Under this
provision, detailed information about the toxic releases and transfers of
manufacturing facilities (under certain Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
codes) are routinely made publicly available via a database maintained by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)4. This database is known as the Toxic
Release Inventory database. This database contains information about release of
toxic chemicals for each calendar year, by facility and by chemical. At the time of
inception, manufacturing facilities that employed more than 10 full-time employees
and manufactured or processed more than 25,000 pounds, or used more than
10,000 pounds of the 320 listed chemicals had to report to the EPA annually via a
standardized form known as Form-R. Once establishments collect this information,

it is sent to the EPA, where it takes about two years to clean the data and put them
into publicly accessible databases.
The TRI, since its inception in 1988, has gone through some major changes.
One important change is in the list of chemicals, which has expanded over time to
include some carcinogenic and persistent bioaccumulative chemicals (PBT).
Currently the list contains 600 listed chemicals. Seven new industry sectors have
been added in 1998, thereby expanding the scope of the program to other polluting
industries. While there has been no change in the frequency of reporting, in 2006
3 For a detailed survey on the background of the TRI refer to Greenwood and Sachdev (1999).

4 Federal facilities are not required to report to the TRI.
12

the Bush administration proposed changing the reporting requirement from annual
to biennial, in order to save administrative costs. There were also talks about

raising the threshold of the toxic chemicals. The goals for these changes were to
save millions of dollars in administrative costs by the EPA and information
gathering costs on the part of the companies. Even though the proposal was
rescinded in 2009, it did underscore the large gaps in understanding the effects of
this program.

1.3.2 Strengths and Drawbacks of the TRI
The TRI's claim to success is that the program led to significant drop in the
release of toxic chemicals, nearly half in ten years compared to 1988, the baseline
year (EPA 2000, Marchi and Hamilton 2006). Most of these cuts were observed in
the first three years of its inception. However, the success story is rather complex
and highlights the strengths and limitations of the program.

While the toxic

releases have decreased, toxic waste generation has increased (Poje and Horowitz
1990, Daniels and Friedman 1999) 5.

While there were decreases in carcinogens,

there were changes in geographical areas where these toxic releases were
concentrated (Hamilton 1999, Hamilton and Viscusi 1999).

As Chapter 3 will

highlight, it is very difficult to know if this decline is causally linked to the
implementation of the program.

3 The relationship between toxic wastes and TRI releases is that 10 percent of toxic wastes are
released while the rest is either recycled (45%) or treated (25%) or burned for energy recovery
(16%) (Graham and Miller 2001).
13

The program's strength lies in the rather unconventional ways in which it
provides incentives to businesses to change their polluting behavior.

Since

businesses are required to gather information about their toxic releases from all
establishments and from all mediums into which toxics were released, it gives

company executives the chance to get a complete picture of the toxic pollution
created by their company and their internal waste management practices. Under
normal circumstances, information about waste disposal and costs associated with
it might be entered as overhead costs, filed away and never evaluated.
Since the summary of toxic releases had to be sent to the EPA for public
dissemination, it inevitably produced national and local level awareness about top
polluters. Lists of top polluters were generated, local and national· newspapers
covered news on the TRI polluters or defaulters who failed to report to the TRI, and
it created incentives for citizen action at several levels. In general, it created public
pressure that was external to the firm. Companies now had a chance to evaluate
their relationship with peer firms, surrounding communities, local pressure groups
and the press to minimize this public reaction (Graham and Miller 2001).
Stakeholder and investor reactions also warranted them of their public image as
potential polluters and the associated negative recognition costs.
The program also has some limitations. Under the provisions made by the
program, only big manufacturing establishments report to the TRI. Even though
seven industry sectors were added in 1995, they belonged to the manufacturing
sectors. Mobile sources of toxic pollution like cars and trucks or small businesses

14

may also be highly polluting but they are not required by the program to report to
the TRI (Graham and Miller 2001, Daniels and Friedman 1999). The list of toxic
chemicals is rather small. There are more than 300 harmful substances that are

generated by industrial activities in the United States. But only a small fraction of
these chemicals are subject to reporting (Daniels and Friedman 1999).
Perhaps the biggest limitation about the TRI database is that the toxic
releases are self-reported. It raises questions about non-compliance and accuracy of
the data. Nearly one-third of establishments that were required to report under the
TRI program did not file reports in the first wave of TRI reports. Several outreach
efforts by Minnesota environmental regulators in 1990 forced one-fourth of noncomplying Minnesota facilities to report to the TRI, but these facilities accounted for
a small percentage of the total toxic releases in Minnesota (Brehm and Hamilton
1996). This study concluded that this type of non-compliance was prevalent in the
early years of the TRI program and that such non-compliance can be attributed to
ignorance of reporting requirement rather than "strategic evasion" (Brehm and
Hamilton 1996). Under the TRI program, there are provisions for environmental
compliance inspections and civil penalty from violation of the reporting
requirements. But legislative standards are not available to check the accuracy of
the reported data.
The self-reported nature of the program and lack of regulatory monitoring
raises questions about the accuracy of thè reported data.

Researchers and

environmental groups have argued that there are potential for firms to overestimate

15

or underestimate the TRI figures. Poje and Horowitz (1990) and US EPA (1993]
survey analysis show that while half the changes in TRI figures came from real
changes in toxic releases, the rest came from changes in reporting requirements,
changes in production volume and changes in paperwork.
Site survey studies by EPA to verify the accuracy of the reported TRI data
revealed that in the early years of the TRI program some establishments had
difficulties in determining whether their chemical use surpassed the threshold or
how to measure their chemical uses. In such instances, most establishments have

used guesswork in reporting (US EPA 1990, US EPA 1998a, US EPA 1998b). Such
guesswork may have led to an overestimate or underestimate of the reported
figures, thereby introducing potential inaccuracies in the TRI data.

EPA, in

subsequent years, removed the 1987 TRI reports from the database.
Several research methods are available to check the accuracy of such selfreported data (Marchi and Hamilton 2006). A comparison of change in average TRI
emissions in 1988-1990 with the same in 1998-2000 reveal that large reductions in

firm-reported TRI chemicals, like nitric acid and lead, are not supported by EPA's
chemical monitoring data (Marchi and Hamilton 2006). Despite the limitations in
the data, the TRl database is the most comprehensive source of information about
toxic releases and it has been extensively used by researchers. EPA conducts data

quality audits on a regular basis that are helping to improve the quality of the TRI
data.
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Another weakness of the TRI program is that the listed chemicals and the
way the toxic releases are reported in the database do not reflect the toxicity or the
harmfulness of the chemicals (Daniels and Friedman 1999, Szasz and Meuser 1997).
The total volume of toxic releases or changes in the volumes of toxic releases is not
informative about the public health hazards. It would be more informative, for the
general public, health officials and researchers, to have some idea about the toxicity
of the chemicals or the risks associated with exposure to these listed chemicals.
Also since reporting does not collect information about chemical use (to protect
trade secrets), there is no incentive to reduce waste at the source, which is
considered more efficient than "end-of-pipe" reductions (Graham and Miller 2001,
Daniels and Friedman 1999, Poje and Horowitz 1990).
In highlighting some of the design limitations of the TRI, Graham and Miller
(2001) points out that given the structure of the program, establishments may
resort to quick fixes rather than finding permanent solutions to their pollution
problems in order to stay off the list of top polluters and avoid negative publicity
costs. Resorting to quick fixes in the face of external pressures may help explain
some unfavorable environmental outcomes associated with this program.
Under the TRI program, firms are not restricted by the medium into which
they release their toxic chemicals or how much each TRI facility can release. Firms,
therefore, can release their toxic chemicals into the air, water, land or transfer them

offsite. Such flexibility in the disposal of toxic releases can lead to unfavorable
outcomes. Reports from the US Government Accounting Office (US GAO) and United
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Christ of Church (UCC) in the early 80s showed that there was an unfavorable trend
in the distribution of toxic releases. GAO and UCC not only document the trend in
the distribution of toxic releases but the reports also show that poor and minority
communities were associated with exposure to large volumes of toxic releases. The
literature uses the term "environmental justice" to identify such occurrences.

1.4

Toxic Release Inventory. Environmental ¡ustice and Media Attention
The roots of the environmental justice movement can be traced back to the

Civil Rights Movement in the United States between 1950s and 1970s. The Civil
Rights Movement pressed for social changes to abolish discrimination against the
racial minorities through grassroots activism. Similar methods of persuasion were
used to raise awareness about environmental issues related to the poor and racial
minorities.

The landmark event that laid the foundation of the environmental

justice movement in the United States was the dumping of PCBs in a landfill in
Warren County, North Carolina (Szasz 1994).

Thousands of gallons of PCB-

contaminated transformer oil that were well beyond the proposed landfill capacity
were dumped along hazardous waste landfill in this county. The population of
Warren County, who were predominantly poor African Americans, protested this
continued landfill via organized meetings, lawsuits and protests that led to civil
unrest and mass arrests in 1982. Similar grassroots environmental activism was

experienced in the Love Canal disaster in New York in the late 1970s (Cole and
Foster 2001).

Protests following the discovery that houses were built on toxic

waste dumps led to the evacuation and relocation of residents of Love Canal. These
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and similar other incidents at the grassroots grew from local conflicts to issues of
national and international interest.

The leaders of these civil confrontations were longtime Civil Rights activists,
were mainly church-based and had pioneered important findings about the unequal
distribution of environmental damages among the minorities. In 1983, following
the request of a leader of the Black Congressional Caucus, Walter Fauntroy (who
was then a Warren County arrestee), the US Government Accounting Office (US
GAO) conducted a study to examine the demographics of communities near large
commercial hazardous waste landfills in the United States (Foster and Cole 2001).
The GAO study revealed that three out of four landfills were located in
predominantly black communities (US GAO 1983). Robert Bullard's work on land
use patterns in Houston, Texas revealed that 21 out of 25 of Houston's garbage
dumps were located in black neighborhoods in the late 1970s (Bullard 1983).
United Church of Christ (UCC) published a report in 1987, Toxic Wastes and Race in
the United States, which concluded that "indeed, race has been a factor in the

location of commercial hazardous waste facilities in the United States" (p. 15, UCC
1987).

A review of the literature on environmental justice revealed that the above
three works are typically listed as the seminal work that set the stage for future
research in this field.

It is mainly due to their relevance to the Warren County

incidents in 1978 and also the timing of their publication. But some isolated studies
conducted in the 1970s show that scholarly interest in environmental inequality
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existed even prior to the 1980s. These works, mostly conducted by economists,
study the relationship between poverty and exposure to polluted air. Freeman
(1972), Zupan (1973), Berry (1977), Asch and Seneca (1978), Gianessi et al. (1979),
all show a consistent pattern in the relationship between social groups and their
exposure to polluted air.
The findings of the three seminal works: the US GAO report (1983), Bullard
(1983) and the UCC reports (1987), triggered broader scholarly interest in the area
of environmental inequality. In 1990 a group of academicians, headed by Robert
Bullard and Bunyan Bryant, organized a Conference on the Race and the Incidence
of Environmental Hazards at the University of Michigan. The goal was to bring
together and share the latest findings of researchers, professors, activists and state
and federal officials on the issue of environmental inequality. In an article that
reviews the studies presented at this conference, Bryant and Mohai (1992) conclude
that the inequitable distribution of pollution can be attributed to both income level
and racial composition, but race has been found to be major determinant of such
inequitable distribution of pollution.
The discussions at this Michigan conference, and later correspondences
between federal officials at the U. S Department of Health and Human Services, U.S
Environmental Protection Agency and members of the conference led to the
creation of EPA's Work Group on Environmental Equity. This work group was later
renamed as the Office of Environmental Justice in 1993 (Cole and Foster 2001).
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A significant body of scholarly work on environmental justice proliferated in
the 199.0s with parallel studies by economists, sociologists, demographers, political
scientists and geographers. This period saw the emergence of a multi disciplinary
interest in environmental inequality research. Some notable works in the field of
sociology between 1987 and 1999 by Frey 1987, Frisbie and Kasarda 1988, Capek
1993, Massey and Denton 1993, Bullard 1995, Cable 1995, Pollock and Vittas 1995,
Hurley 1995, Markham and Rufa 1997, Boer et al. 1997, and Ringquist 1997, Szasz
and Meuser 1997, Daniels and Friedman 1999 provide in-depth discussions on the
how the concept of environmental justice evolved over time, its historical
background, and provide consistent evidence of environmental inequality through
their empirical work and case studies.
During the same period, economists' interest in this topic can be witnessed
from the works of Smith and Devousges 1986, Gregory and Smith 1990, Zimmerman
1993, Perlin et al. 1995, Kohlhase 1991, Hird 1993, Been 1994, Krieg 1995,

Hamilton 1995b, Kriesel et al 1996, Been and Gupta 1997, Brooks and Sethi 1997,
Arora and Cason 1999. Compared to the 70s work by economists, these studies
were more sophisticated in their approach; partly due to the advances in the field
and partly due to the availability of comprehensive datasets on pollution like the US
EPA's Toxic Release Inventory. But the results on the evidence of environmental
inequalities were consistent between the older and newer studies.
Studies by Stafford 1985, Langford and Unwin 1994, Bowen et al. 1995,
Glickman et al. 1995, Pulido 1996, Pulido et al. 1996, Cutter et al. 1996, Chakraborty
and Armstrong 1997, McMaster et al. 1997, Scott et al. 1997 show the growing
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interest among geographers and demographers in environmental justice. These
studies emphasize the importance of geographical units in analyzing environmental
inequality related issues, since studies conducted at different levels of spatial
measures have revealed contrasting results.
While most studies in the 1980s showed a strong correlation between socioeconomic characteristics and exposure to pollution, researchers in the 1990s
started questioning the history of the host community at the timing of siting.

It

seemed rather important to explore this history as it is plausible that the
demographics may have changed overtime (due to migration, market forces, job
creation, cheaper amenities), since industrial activity started in the host community.
The 1990s and the 2000s saw a surge in the number of studies that explored the
question of time of siting, as it holds clues to why some communities are subject to
inequitable distribution of pollution.
Prominent among such studies is a study by Been (1994), which re-examined
the studies of Bullard (1983) and the GAO report (1983).

His re-examination

confirmed the results of both these studies, and also highlighted that at the time of
the siting the host communities were predominantly non-white (Been 1994). In
subsequent years, similar studies on the time of siting and prevalence of
environmental justice find that racial composition of neighborhoods cannot explain
firm location decisions, but this decision is often influenced by the income status
and the political mobilization of the neighborhood (Wolverton 2009, Davidson and
Anderton 2000, Been and Gupta 1997, Kriesel et al. 1996). This view is also
supported by Hamilton (1995b) and Gamper-Rabindran (2006) who found that
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voter participation, and economie status, but not race influence broader measures of
environmental outcomes. Arora and Cason (1999) and Fricker and Hengartner
(2001), however, found that either racial composition or a combination of both race
and income status might be important factors in determining the distribution of TRI
emissions. They found significant increases in toxic releases in the South, and nonurban areas, with a pre-dominantly higher percentage of ethnic minorities.
Chapter 2 extends this literature on environmental justice and TRI with a
focus on the role of the print media. One of the design limitations of the TRI is that
firms may resort to quick fixes to avoid the costs associated with non-regulatory
external pressures, like the press and media attention, instead of investing in more
permanent solutions. I hypothesize that if media attention is associated with
neighborhood characteristics, then firms may resort to fixes like redistributing their
production (and hence, toxic releases) among the establishments to minimize the
costs of public reaction. Firms may decide to pollute more in neighborhoods where
the cost of external pressures, like media attention, are minimized.
This chapter explores the response of the national print media to the first
wave of the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) filings. It studies the degree to which
neighborhood characteristics like racial composition and income status associate
with the number of newspaper articles written about a polluting establishment,
controlling for the volume of pollution, industry and observable establishment
characteristics. The measure of media reports, gathered from the Lexis-Nexis
database, identifies newspaper articles that mention specific polluting facilities in
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reference to the TRI program. Regression results, based on 1989 media reports that
corresponded to the first release of TRl data, suggest that neighborhoods with a
higher percentage of non-white population are more likely to be included in media
reports, but the results are not consistently statistically significant across four
different measures of media attention. Richer neighborhoods while positively
associated with media attention are statistically significant.

1.5

Toxic Release Inventory and Firm Responses

External pressures under information-based environmental policies can
manifest itself as community pressures, investor reaction, consumer reaction and
media activity (Tietenberg 1995, 1998). These public pressures are expected to
impose costs on the firms so that they alter their polluting behavior. The empirical
literature on public disclosure programs has mainly focused on the capital market to
evaluate the effectiveness of such programs. Capital market reaction to public
disclosure of environmental performance shows that these markets are quite
sensitive to environmental news. Capital markets respond positively or negatively
depending on whether the environmental performances of the companies were
superior or poor.

Empirical studies on the capital market reaction to environmental news or
public disclosure show that it affects stock market prices. Hamilton (1995a) shows
that public provision of TRI reports is "news" to both journalists and investors. Big
TRI polluters caught the attention of media, and these big polluters also experienced
significant losses at the stock market. According to this study, TRI firms experienced
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an estimated loss of $4.1 million on the day the TRI figures were published for the
first time. Cañón-de-Francia et al. (2008) study the first European public disclosure
program, European Pollutant Emission Register (EPER) and the effect of
information disclosure under this program on the reaction of shareholders. They
conclude that like the U. S TRI program, new pollution information under the EPER
program has a significant negative impact on the market value of listed firms.
LaPlante and Lanoie (1994) study how shareholders of Canadian firms update their
expectations following the announcement of environmental incidences, lawsuits and
settlement of lawsuits on the firm's equity value, and finds a shareholders react
negatively to such incidences and equity values drop.
Stock market reactions can subsequently affect firm's pollution behavior.
Khanna et al. (1998) examine the effect of investor reactions to environmental
information on firm's subsequent performance. They find that repeated disclosure
of environmental information results in significant losses to these firms and that
they subsequently change the way they dispose toxic chemicals. Konar and Cohen
(1997) finds that firms with the largest stock price decline on the day the TRI
reports became public subsequently reduced emissions more than their industry
peers. These studies highlight that external pressures like investor reaction can
affect firm's output decisions.
While the focus has largely been on the stock market reaction to public
disclosure, some studies explore the association between public disclosure and the
goods market. Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) find that firms under public
disclosure programs may over-comply with regulations to attract "green
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consumers". Firms attempting to "to gain more contact with final consumers" have
also been found to enroll in the 33-50 program under the TRI provision (Khanna
and Damon 1999, Arora and Cason 1996).
Chapter 3 extends this literature that study how external pressures under
information-based policies influence firm level polluting behavior. The role of the
media in exerting external pressures to alter a firm's Output decision is largely
unexplored. Dasgupta et al. (2006b) is the only study to my knowledge that
highlights the role of media attention on a firm's environmental performance. Using
survey data from industrial facilities in South Korea, they show that environmental
news and a firm's awareness of such media attention are important predictors of
firm's performance. Media activity can impose negative publicity cost and such
costs can alter a firm's behavior

Chapter 3 examines the relationship between media attention and pollution
behavior of Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) firms. I find that firms with media
attention are more likely to reduce emissions compared to those without media
attention and the results are statistically significant. However, the results do not
reveal any statistically significant causal effect of media attention. I find that firms
with media attention might behave differently in reducing future toxic releases, but
there is no evidence that such attention may cause reductions in releases.

1.6

Environmental Competitiveness and Porter Hypothesis

The conventional view of the relationship between environmental regulations
and competiveness of firms is that regulations impose costs on firms which leads to
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a loss of competiveness. With a regulation, resources need to be, diverted towards
meeting environmental standards, thereby raising the direct expenditures on
pollution reduction and the indirect cost of paying higher prices for inputs affected
by regulation. These higher costs are reflected in higher prices of the firm's product
and hence, a loss of competitiveness.

In an international trade setting, stringent regulatory standards for the
domestic firm impose costs on domestic firms. These high costs result in higher
prices for goods produced by domestic firms compared to other countries with lax
environmental standards. This loss of competitiveness in the international markets
is reflected in shifts of the trade flow, where exports of the regulated good decline
over time and imports increase, thereby adversely affecting the net exports of the
domestic country. Given the spatial nature of competition, strict regulation may also
lead to a movement of production capacities from the domestic to foreign locales
where the production costs are low and firms have a better access to markets Qaffe
et al. 1995).
Loss of competition can also be reflected in productivity losses in the exporting
sectors. Since resources are now used to produce environmental quality, (not
output) and typically environmental quality is not included in measures of
productivity, it is expected that stringent regulations will lead to loss of
competitiveness Qaffe et al. 1995). Loss of U.S competiveness in the international
market in the 1990s, especially in goods produced in the pollution-intensive sectors,
led to concerns about the high environmental standards set by the United States.
The conventional view was that relaxing the standards might help improve
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competitiveness.

So, when it came to signing the Kyoto protocol, where the goal

was to systematically reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, the U.S signed the
amendment along with all other nations but failed to ratify it.
This conventional view on environmental competitiveness and regulations was
challenged by Michael Porter, a business professor at Harvard University, in the
early 1990s.

In Scientific America (1991), he suggested that more stringent

regulations can improve international competitiveness.

His argument is that

stringent regulations do impose costs and make firms less competitive, but only if
the regulation involves "optimizing within fixed constraints" (Porter and van der
Linde 1995). Instead, if the focus is on outcomes and not setting standards, firms
will have greater flexibility in deciding how to control pollution. This flexibility, in
turn, may help firms to locate new cost reducing or revenue improving
opportunities.

According to Porter, pollution "is a manifestation of economic waste and
involves unnecessary or incomplete utilization of resources... (hence) reducing
pollution is often coincident with improving productivity with which resources are
used." (p. 105, Porter and van der Linde 1995). If firms are given the flexibility to
decide how to control pollution, then it may encourage firms to reduce expenditures
on materials, energy and service usage, stimulate them to "re-engineer their
technology" and such innovation may offset the cost of compliance and may even
generate private benefits to firms (Porter 1991).
The environmental-competitiveness debate drew attention from leading
environmental economists. A typical economic model assumes that firms maximize
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profits under the assumption of perfect information and all possible avenues of
innovation have already been explored, at least to the point where a priori
profitable innovations are identified. In such a scenario, stringent regulation will
surely raise costs and hamper a firm's competitiveness. Palmer, Oates and Portney
(1995), for example, illustrate this by using a simple theoretical model where they
show that if new and efficient technologies are available to the firms before
stringent regulations are imposed and they do not adopt such technologies, then
stringency would not change the adoption decision and generate higher profits.
Porter argues that his view of competiveness is rather "dynamic" than "static".
In a dynamic framework, there is "incomplete information, organizational inertia
and control problems" which result in firms underutilizing their resources (Porter
1995). Thus, Porter claims that stringent regulations will push firms towards
discovering ways to eliminate resource inefficiencies and improve organizational
inertias which would lower production costs and improve competitiveness. He
supports his conclusion with case studies which show that stricter standards force
firms to explore new and efficient avenues to meet their environmental obligations
and in the process generate benefits.
Case studies, both from Porter's examples and others, highlight the range of
applicability of the hypothesis.

Robbins Company, a jewelry company in

Massachusetts, was facing violation charges for discharging dirty water beyond
what permits allowed and was on the verge of a closure. The company adopted a
zero-discharge system for handling water used in plating jewelry. This system not
only reduced water discharge, but also improved the quality of its plating with
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fewer rejects (Beruhe et al. 1992). While implementing ISO 14001, General Motors
managers at its Flint plant in Michigan realized that they could have saved
approximately $250,000 by systematically shutting down machines during
weekends or holidays (El Bizat 2006]. With the switch to SO2 allowance trading
from technological standards, U.S firms not only experienced reduced compliance
costs, but it also stimulated innovation and organizational changes and improved
competition in their inputs market (Burtraw 2000).
Given that Porter's hypothesis was based on case studies, critics argued that a
scenario consistent with the hypothesis could be an exception to the rule. While
Porter's view was well received in the business community, it drew criticisms from
economists mostly because they were opposed to the idea that firms operate suboptimally and that a strict regulation would force them to explore such
inefficiencies. In spite of the initially skeptical response by economists, several
theoretical papers do show that regulations may improve competiveness by
correcting more than one market failure at a time. These instances may be very
restrictive, but they show that theoretically results consistent with the Porter
hypothesis are plausible.
Barrett (1994) and Simpson and Bradford (1996) show that strategic behavior
between firms or between firms and regulators in the face of strict environmental
standards can produce results consistent with the hypothesis. Under restrictive
conditions, they show that imposing strict environmental standards may provide
strategic advantage to firms to invest in research and development to reduce
marginal costs. These cost reduction avenues may generate profits.
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Rege [2000] explores the possibility that addressing asymmetric information
about the environmental quality of goods may result in a scenario consistent with
the Porter hypothesis. She shows that regulations which force firms to provide
credible information about the environmental quality of their products, like ecolabeling, can enhance competitiveness by increasing consumer's awareness about
green products and enhancing their willingness to pay for such products. Ambec
and Baria (2002) develop a similar principle-agent model where firm managers
have private information about the outcomes of a research and development
investment. In such a scenario shareholders must pay a rent to extract that
information. Such "information rent" reduces the incentive to invest in research and

development (Ambec and Baria 2002). Regulation is shown to reduce this rent and
increase investment in research and development and create a scenario consistent
with the Porter hypothesis.
Xepapadeas and Zeeuw (1999) examine the effect of emission tax on the
composition of capital. They show that emission taxes may lead to a change in the
composition of capital whereby old vintage capital may retire. This improves the
average productivity of capital, a scenario conducive to generate results similar to
the Porter hypothesis. Mohr (2002) points out that with accumulated experience
firms may develop new environmental technologies that have non-excludible
benefits. No single firm would be willing to adopt this new technology though, as
the learning cost of the first adopter will be higher than the followers. A stringent
regulation in such a scenario may force adoption and generate a scenario consistent
with the Porter hypothesis.
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Greaker (2006) points out that innovation will led to the development of new
markets upstream in the supply chain, where the high cost of adoption will bar
entry into these markets. With regulation and entry, the cost of adoption in these
new, upstream markets will drop, thereby increasing the supply of abatement

equipments and lowering its price to customers (firms] downstream. Andre' et al
(2009) uses a framework similar to Mohr (2002) where firms are strategically
unwilling to adopt a technology to produce green goods, as the first-mover loses
competition to producers of similar, non-green goods. But a regulation will force
firms to adopt the technology, and at the same time, gain from the consumer's high
willingness to pay for such products, a scenario similar to Rege (2000).
A common feature of these theoretical instances is that in order to generate a
scenario consistent with the Porter hypothesis there should be presence of
additional market failures, apart from pollution (Hart 2004). Chapter 4 uses the
intuition behind the different theoretical examples discussed above and introduces
market failures into the same model that critics used to refute the Porter hypothesis.
The examples discussed in chapter 4 generate results consistent with the
hypothesis.

Adding a market failure, like imperfect competition, negative

production externalities, asymmetric information and public goods, creates the
possibility that firms benefit from regulations. While each example can be fully
consistent with the Porter Hypothesis, Chapter 4 highlights that it is also possible

that regulations benefit firms even without fostering innovation, a result that would
be empirically difficult to distinguish from the Porter Hypothesis.
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Although this dissertation does not explore the Porter hypothesis empirically,
it sets the stage for future research in this direction. The empirical literature on the
Porter hypothesis is growing rapidly. Most empirical papers that claim to be a test
of the Porter hypothesis may not be a direct test of the hypothesis. Our definition of
the Porter hypothesis in Chapter 4 rests on two important factors. First, a strict
environmental standard should promote innovation.

Second, such innovation

should partly or fully offset the cost of complying with the regulation, thereby
creating the possibility of generating profits.
Most of the empirical literature on the Porter hypothesis tests parts of these
links or directly studies the effect of regulation on profitability. Ambec and Lanoie
(2008) make this distinction clear and classify the empirical literature into two
broad sets. One set studies the effect of environmental regulations on innovation,
and the other set studies the effect of environmental regulations on firm's
performance, using productivity or costs as a measure of a firm's financial
performance. There are very few studies that test that full causal link of the Porter
hypothesis.
Studies on the effect of environmental regulations on the innovation or
innovation related activities find that stringent regulations enhance innovation. The
degree of association between regulation and innovation may be weak but, in
general, there is a positive link. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) find that environmental
stringency measured by pollution abatement cost increased expenditures on total
research and development. Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003), instead of looking at
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the total research and development expenditures focus on green patents, and find
that regulations lead to an increase in environmental patenting. Carrion-Flores and
Innes (2010) explore the casual link between regulation and innovation using a
panel data of manufacturing firms and finds that strict regulation leads to
environmental innovation, and such innovation leads to reduced pollution.
Studies on the performance of firms, especially productivity, in response to
environmental regulations present mixed results. While Gollop and Roberts (1983)
show that U.S. productivity growth slowed down following the SO2 regulations,
Berman and Bui (2001) show that stringent air pollution standard increased the
productivity of oil refineries in Los Angeles compared to other oil refineries in the
U.S. Alpay et al. (2002) find increases in productivity in the Mexican food processing
industry in the face of stringent regulations. These studies, however, do not explore
the exact mechanism of such productivity gains. For a direct test of the Porter
hypothesis, productivity gains should result via innovation or innovation related
activities.

To my knowledge, the only two studies that explore the full link are studies by
Lanoie et al (2007) and Rassier and Earnhart (2010). Lanoie et al (2007) find that
environmental regulation enhances spending on research and development, but net
effect of such expenditures on a firm's performance is negative.

Rassier and

Earnhart (2010) study the effect of water regulation on the profitability of firms in
the chemical manufacturing industries and find that profitability drops, as costs
increase for a given level of sales.
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1.7

Conclusions

The rest of the dissertation consists of four chapters. Chapter 2 explores the
factors that determine media attention in the event of new pollution information
being made publicly available via the TRI database. It specifically explores whether
socio-economic variables like race and income status matter in pollution news,
apart from pollution variables. Chapter 3 explores the association between external
pressure, like TRI pollution-related media attention, and a firm's pollution behavior.
Chapter 4 presents four theoretical examples where improved internal awareness of
a firm in the face of a regulation can benefit firms. Chapter 5 presents extensions
and future directions of the current research.
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CHAPTER 2

NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS, MEDIA ATTENTION AND THE USENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION

AGENCY'S

TOXIC

RELEASE

INVENTORY

PROGRAM.

2.1

Introduction

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

eased its reporting

requirements under its Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) program in November 2006.
The TRI requires all polluting firms to publicly report their toxic releases annually.
The revised policy proposed to raise the threshold of releases that trigger
mandatory reporting and ease reporting requirements from annual reporting to
biennial. The EPA justified this change, arguing that it would save millions in

compliance costs in each non-reporting year. However, critics feared that this
change would weaken the effectiveness of the program, arguing that relaxed
reporting requirements would imply lesser accountability for the polluting firms,
lesser public scrutiny, and unfavorable environmental outcomes. Even though the

proposal was rescinded in 2009, the question still lingers as to what role public
scrutiny plays in this unconventional regulation.
In order to understand the implications of these reforms, a clear
understanding of how this program works is necessary. The general idea is that
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negative publicity imposes costs on polluting firms, which would provide incentives
to modify polluting behaviors (Khanna et al. 1998, Arora and Cason 1999). This
paper studies the role of the national print media activity in generating such
negative publicity. Specifically, it studies how the media historically responded to
the first wave of the TRI reports. With limited preconceived notions about the
polluting behavior of facilities around the early years of TRI reporting, media
responses to this report provide a rare opportunity to isolate and study the
behavior of the media to pollution news. The results may help explain some
findings associated with "environmental justice", the concept that environmental
costs and benefits should be equitably distributed regardless of race, color, income,
educational level or national origin. If the media are less likely to report about toxic
releases in such neighborhoods, and firms perceive negative publicity as a cost, then
firms in poor or minority neighborhoods have an incentive to pollute more (or abate
less). This understanding of the behavior of the media, therefore, goes beyond
environmental justice and sets the stage to explore firm responses to media
attention in Chapter 36.
While prior studies highlight the behavior of the firm in explaining
environmental justice outcomes, none to my knowledge explore the role of media as
a potential explanation for disproportionate environmental harms on poor and
minority neighborhoods. Media reporting plays an important role in providing

6 The link between media attention and incentives to pollute is explored in more details in Chapter 3.
The existing literature shows that media attention related to toxic releases does appear to impose
costs on firms. The fear of negative publicity can explain financial market outcomes (Hamilton
1995a, Konar and Cohen 1997] and influence corporate environmental decisions (Arora and Cason
1999, Khanna and Anton 2002, Anton et al. 2004, Gamper-Rabindran 2006).
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information to the public and thereby influencing both "individual and collective
decisions" (Baron 2006). If a lower probability of media attention provides
incentives to firms to pollute more in poor neighborhoods, then "environmental
justice" outcomes may partly be attributed to media practices. And there are
reasons to believe that media reports may have some bias in reporting. It could
arise from the supply-side and demand-side of news reporting.
There are a number of reasons to believe that neighborhood characteristics
like income or racial composition will affect the media's decision to report on a
particular polluting establishment. A number of authors (Bennett (1988], Wilson
and Gutiérrez (1995), Entman and Rojeck (2000) Baron (2006), and Groseclose and
Milyo (2005)) provide supply-side explanations of media bias where news content
reflects the preferences and worldviews of reporters, editors and the newspaper
owner. Bias may reflect ideological positions on public policy issues. Journalists
working for such profit maximizing newspaper companies may even bias their
stories to reflect the ideological beliefs of the news organization (Baron 2006). A
newspaper organization with a liberal stand on public policy issues may have
greater news coverage on issues related to the poor and racial minorities.
While ideological bias might make news organizations more likely to report
on poor or minority, neighborhoods, the motive of profit maximization might lead
them to report less on these neighborhoods. News organizations are profitmaximizing firms that cater to the demands of their clienteles. News is a business
that sells its audience to advertisers. A larger audience generates more television
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revenue via advertising. Since demographically the largest audience in the U.S. has
been the white and middle-class (Larson 2006, Shirley 1992), reporting about poor
and minority neighborhoods may not appeal to readers. Furthermore, the costs of
reporting about pollution in high-income neighborhoods might be lower. If higher
income neighborhoods are more vocal about their disamenities (and therefore more
responsive to reporters) and lower income neighborhoods attach less weight to
environmental quality, it is likely that pollution in higher income neighborhoods will
get more attention.

Based on these conceptual ideas, I hypothesize that apart from observable
firm-level characteristics like the volumes of toxic discharges; the industrial
classification and its geographical location, media attention is also a function of a
facility's neighborhood characteristics like income status and racial composition.
This paper uses national print media reports from 1989 to explore this idea. Even
though this first TRI report is now considered unreliable, this report created a
media buzz in response to such categorized pollution information7.

I take

advantage of this activity to study the response of the media to pollution
information.

The results suggest that the media reports disproportionately more about
pollution in higher income neighborhoods, and the results are statistically
significant. Neighborhoods with a higher percentage of non-white/non-Hispanic
population are also more likely to be included in media reports, and the results are
7 For more details on the limitations and drawbacks of the Toxic Release Inventory dataseis refer to
Chapter 1.
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statistically significant in two out of the four different measures of media attention.
Even though the percent of Hispanics residing in the neighborhood is positively
associated with media attention, they are never statistically significant.
In the following sections, I first present a background of the TRI program.
Second, I discuss the background of the environmental justice movement. Later
sections discuss the hypotheses, describe the data, lay out the empirical strategy,
analyze the results and finally, conclude.

2.2

TRI and the Media

The TRI program was formulated under the Emergency Planning &
Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA) of 1986, in the backdrop of a chemical
accident at a Union Carbide's chemical plant in Bhopal, India in 1984. The program
was designed to help "increase the public's knowledge and access to information on
chemicals at individual facilities, their uses, and releases into the environment.

States and communities, working with facilities, can use the information to improve
chemical safety and protect public health and the environment"8. It decreed that all
U.S. manufacturing facilities, with at least 10 employees and producing more than
500 lbs of each of the 320 listed chemicals, must annually report to the EPA. The
EPA collects this information and catalogs it for public dissemination via its TRI
database.

From the EPA website on EPCRA summary at

http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/content/lawsregs/epcraover.htm (as viewed in June 2010)
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The first wave of TRI reports were made publicly available on 19th June,
1989, which reported about pollution in 1987. Shortly thereafter, the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC 1989) and the National Wildlife Federation
(NWF) published two specialized reports on the top polluters in 1987. These
publications, along with the original TRI reports, generated some media activity
including articles in major newspapers like The Wall StreetJournal, USA TODAY, The
Boston Globe, The LA Times, The Washington Post and The New York Times. Much of
this activity appears closely linked to the publication of the specialized reports by
NWF and the NRDC. Of the 370 facilities in my dataset that received some sort of
media attention, 130 facilities come from the top 500 establishments reported in
NWF's "Toxic 500" (Dean 1989) report.
The exposure of polluting TRI facilities accompanied by the print media
activity impacted several local communities, interest groups, consumers and
shareholders. For example, The New York Times reports that citizens in New Jersey,
Ohio, California and Texas protested against the practices of polluting
establishments in order to reduce their risks of being in another chemical accident
like the Bhopal incident (Suro 1989). Herrmann et al. (1997) estimates a 40 to 60
percent drop in apple consumption due to concerns about Alar. Alar, a pesticide
used in prolonging the ripening of apples was found in the 1987 TRI reports, even
though EPA banned this chemical use for being a "probable human carcinogen".
Financial market reactions to the TRI reports show that publicly traded TRI firms
experienced negative abnormal returns on the day following the first TRI release
(Hamilton 1995a). Konar and Cohen (1997) further show that firms with largest
41

negative abnormal returns reduced their toxic emissions by a greater amount than
their industry peers.
2.3

Environmental Iustice

Environmental justice is related to the finding that disadvantaged
neighborhoods are exposed to disproportionately high environmental harms and
those harms should be equitably distributed across racial, income, regional and
educational classifications. Reports from the U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) in 1983 and later from the United Church of Christ (UCC) in 1987 showed a
correlation between siting of hazardous waste sites, and poor and minority
communities. Recurring evidence of such "environmental injustice" since the early
80's and the burgeoning of it since the inception of the TRl program, led EPA to
declare environmental justice a national priority.

EPA set up an Office of

Environmental Justice in 1993, with the mission to address these concerns.

According to the EPA, environmental equity is the "fair treatment and meaningful
involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with
respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental
laws, regulations, and policies9".
Hamilton (1995b) provides an economic explanation based on Coasian
bargaining, on why firms might locate in minority and poor communities. This
explanation posits that residents in poor neighborhoods attach less importance to
environmental quality, so firms find it profitable to locate to neighborhoods where
9 From the EPA website on Environmental Justice at http://www.epa.gov/environmentaliustice/index.htinl
(as viewed in June 20 1 0)
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the cost of collective bargaining is low. It is equally plausible that polluting firms
attract the poor. Lower income households migrate to neighborhoods with waste
sites in the hope to find suitable jobs or affordable housing (Cameron and
McConnaha 2006).

The empirical literature since the GAO and UCC reports has found mixed
evidence of "environmental injustice". Studies on the time of siting and prevalence
of "environmental injustice" find that racial composition of neighborhoods cannot
explain firm location decisions, but this decision is often influenced by the income
status and the political mobilization of the neighborhood (Wolverton 2009,
Davidson and Anderton 2000, Been and Gupta 1997, Kriesel et al 1996]. This
finding is also supported by Hamilton (1995b) and Gamper-Rabindran (2006) who
found that voter participation, and economic status, but not race influence broader
measures of environmental outcomes. Arora and Cason (1999), on the other hand,
found that both income status and racial composition might be an important factor
in determining emissions pattern. They found significant increases in toxic releases
in the South, and non-urban areas, with a pre-dominantly higher percentage of
ethnic minorities.

2.4

Data

This study uses pollution data from the TRI database, socio-economic
characteristics from the 1990 Census and media attention data from the LEXISNEXIS Academic Universe database.
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The TRI database contains detailed information about toxic releases of all U. S

manufacturing facilities eligible to report under the TRI regulation. There is a two
year gap between the data-reporting date and the date EPA publicly disseminates
this information.

The first TRI report was available on 19th June, 1989 and

contained information about the toxic releases of almost 24,000 polluting facilities
in 1987. This dataset was later found to be unreliable as many facilities were
unaware how to measure the toxic releases and the 1987 data were removed from

the TRI database. However, since this study focuses on media attention to reported
releases (regardless of the accuracy of the underlying reports), the 1987 data are
nonetheless most appropriate for this research. These data, while no longer
available in the TRI database, were collected from EPA's Office of Pollution

Prevention and Toxics library.
Media attention data are collected from the news archives at the LEXISNEXIS Academic Universe database. The LEXIS-NEXIS Academic Universe database

is the most extensive database on newspaper-related research. It archives a wide
variety of news sources: international and national newspapers, newswires,
magazines and trade journals, and broadcast media transcripts.

It archives

newspapers from the early 1970s and provides full coverage of more than 1000 U.S.
newspapers. It has several same day publications and fully archives major national
newspapers like The New York Times and The Washington Post which are archived
dating back to 1980 and 1977, respectively.

44

Although two other data sources, ProQuest and NewsLibrary could have also
been used for this study, LEXIS-NEXIS has several advantages. Comparing the
availability of top 30 U. S newspapers in the LEXIS-NEXIS database to NewsLibrary
and ProQuest, shows that more newspapers are covered in the LEXIS-NEXIS. Table
2.1 shows that of the top 30 newspapers in 2010 only two newspapers are not
archived in the LEXIS-NEXIS compared to NewsLibrary and ProQuest. Using LEXISNEXIS also allows comparisons to studies by Hamilton (1995a) and Konar and
Cohen (1997), which explore similar research questions (firm responses to TRI
news), and use the LEXIS-NEXIS database. LEXIS-NEXIS also has a wide collection of
newswires, which other competing news databases do not archive so extensively. In
the absence of regular indexing of smaller local and regional newspapers, these
newswires can be used as a proxy for local news coverage. LEXIS-NEXIS covers
respected wire services such as the Associated Press, Business Wire and PR Newswire,
which are updated several times a day, full-text articles are provided and have very
few vendor restrictions.

There are, however, drawbacks to the LEXIS-NEXIS data. Several major

newspapers, like The Los Angeles Times and The San Francisco Chronicle, have
vendor restrictions that require newspaper articles to be removed from the LEXISNEXIS database. As a result of such restrictions, several prominent newspapers
which reported about the TRI proceedings in the late 1980s did not show up in my
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database search.10

In addition to vendor restrictions, other news sources are not

archived back to 1989. Articles from newspapers, like The Chicago Tribune and The
Long Island Newsday, are provided to the LEXIS-NEXIS database by other newspaper
services like Global News Wire and Newstex Blogs, respectively, which in turn are
archived from a much later year than 1989. Regional and local newspapers have
low to no coverage archived back to 1989.
These limitations mean that LEXIS-NEXIS represents only a fraction of the
potential news coverage in 1989. To get a better sense for this limitation, I compare
the coverage dates of the top 30 newspapers that are currently in circulation in the
US in each of the competing databases: NewsLibrary, ProQuest and LEXIS-NEXIS, to
see which one covers most of my study period. NewsLibrary does not cover most of
the top 30 U. S newspapers. Between ProQuest and LEXIS-NEXIS, ProQuest is
preferred for news articles from The Houston Chronicle, The Philadelphia Inquirer,
The Plain Dealer, The Denver Post and The Orange County Register as these
newspapers are archived from an earlier year than 1989. However, they may have
the similar vendor restrictions like the LEXIS-NEXIS. Ten out of the top 30
newspapers in the LEXIS-NEXIS database cover my study period with varying
restrictions.

The media reported about 1987 TRI releases in June, 1989. To identify
newspaper articles related to the TRI, I used a combination of keywords for the

10 Other prominent newspapers, like The Wall StreetJournal, are archived by the LEXIS-NEXIS but

provide only abstracts through its database. Since the articles are still identifiable with keyword
searches, such papers are included in my dataset.
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database search: Toxic Release Inventory' or 'worst polluters' or 'pollution' or
'Toxic 500' or 'National Wildlife Federation' for the time period June, 1989 to April,
1990. The aim was to gather as much information as possible about the TRl
facilities that polluted in 1987.

The database search included major U.S.

newspapers as well as all U.S regional newspapers. This search identified around
1,000 articles from major newspapers and newswire reports. It, however, did not
identify any articles from regional newspapers.
To narrow search results further, I read each article. Given that the first TRl

report was closely followed by the publication of the "Toxic 500" by the National
Wildlife Federation and the "A Who's Who of American Toxic Air Polluters" by the
Natural Resources Defense Council, most of the newspaper and newswire reports
made references to these reports. In most cases, the newspapers covered the top
500 polluting facilities under the TRI program. Some articles, instead of reporting
about any particular facility talked mostly about the counties or the states in which
these facilities are located. News coverage on the TRI program are usually on toxic
releases, the toxic nature of the releases, the likely health effects of these releases on
children and the elderly, the relative ranking of the facilities in the TRI list, a
geographic analysis of the polluting facility, the regulatory fines imposed on
companies for non-reporting and the legal proceedings on the TRI firms. The
reports are, more often than not, negative in tone.
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Reading the articles allowed me to identify those that had specific
information about TRl facilities11. Because this study is at the facility level, articles
discussing TRI only at the parent company level or at the state and county levels
were dropped. This selection left me with 84 articles from major newspapers
including USA TODAY, The Boston Globe, The Washington Post, The Wall Street
Journal, The New York Times and newswires like The Associated Press, United Press
International, States News Service. These 84 articles identified 378 facilities that

polluted in 1987. Compared to prior research, this set of articles represents a
substantial increase in information about media responses to the initial wave of TRI
reporting in part because the search uses the full population of over 19,000 TRI
establishments. Hamilton (1995a), for example, found 50 out of the top 500
facilities received media attention for polluting in 1987. The distribution of media
reports in my dataset by facility is shown in Figure 2.1.
I collected data on the neighborhood characteristics of the TRI facilities from
the 1990 U.S Census at the U.S. zip code level12. After merging the datasets, my
dataset has 18,769 observations (TRI facilities) of which 311 facilities received
media attention in 272 zip codes. Note that in merging these datasets, I lost
information about 67 facilities with media attention. Zip codes reported by plants
in older TRI data and zip codes used in Census data on community characteristics
1 ' For The Wall Street Journal abstracts, I read the corresponding microfiche using the Wall Street Journal
indices. The articles did not provide any facility level information about the TRI companies.

12 The 1990 Census dataset did not have information about the population density at the zip-code
level, which is one of the control variables in my estimations. So I calculated it separately, using
information about total population from Census 1990 and land area in square miles from the 2000
Zip Code Tabulation Areas.
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suffer from mismatches due to frequent changes to the zip codes made by the postal
service (Gamper-Rabindran 2006). Most these missing zip codes are located in the
middle of a larger zip-code and represent locations where the U.S postal service
allocates a separate zip-code to a company for ease of delivering mail. Given that
media attention is a rare event, a loss of 67 facilities with media attention out of 378
is a substantial loss in the number of observations. I, therefore, recover information

about 59 such missing zip codes by replacing the existing zip code with zip code that
envelopes it.

Table 2.2 shows the distribution in the number of articles written per facility
with and without the zip code replacements. The table shows that with replacement
I retrieve information about several establishments that were rigorously reported
about, but would otherwise remain unaccounted for. For example, there are two
additional establishments that were covered by four different articles, or three more
establishments that were mentioned in eleven different newspaper articles. Being
reported in four or eleven different articles represents an intense level of media
reporting especially with the limited number of facilities that received media
attention in all. Replacing the missing zip codes help restore this invaluable
information in my dataset. One should, however, be aware that this replacement
strategy introduces some potential bias.

In replacing the missing zip code

information I concentrated only on those establishments that received media
attention. There are, however, several other TRI establishments with no media

attention located in zip codes which did not find a corresponding match in the
Census files and hence dropped out from my final dataset.
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For the rest of the analysis, both in this chapter and the next, I will use the
dataset where information about the missing zip codes has been replaced using the
above criteria.

The final dataset for this essay, therefore, contains 19,082

observations of which 370 facilities received media attention in 1989 for polluting
in 1987.

2.5

Measures and Empirical Strategy

This section describes the measures of pollution, income, race, control
variables, and media attention. It also outlines an empirical strategy using the
alternate measures of media attention. I estimate the following model:

MEDIA_ATTENTION = f(Xf,X¡,Xf,Xf) + s¡

(1)

In equation (1), Xf is the vector of pollution measures, X\ is the vector of
industry classification variables, Xf is the vector of regional dummy variables, and
Xf is the vector of socio-economic characteristics of the /-th facility. The pollution
vector includes variables AIR, WATER, UNDER, LAND, OFFSITE and FORMR. The

vector on industry classification includes CHEMICALS, PAPER, PRIMARY,
PETROLEUM, TRANSPORTATION and OTHERMANU. The regional vector introduces
NORTHEAST, SOUTH, MIDWEST and WEST as dummy variables. Lastly, the socioeconomic characteristics vector consists of INCOME, HISPANIC and NONWHITE. I

test the null hypothesis that media attention is non-discriminatory with respect to
income status [INCOME) and racial composition [HISPANIC and NONWHITE) of the
neighborhood.
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There is no standard measure or index for media attention, the dependent
variable in equation (1). So I construct four different measures to check for the
robustness of my results. These measures, which are summarized in Table 2.3,
include the number of articles mentioning a facility [ARTICLES], the number of
words {WORDS), weighted hits (WARTICLES), and weighted words [WWORDS].
ARTICLES measure the number of articles that identify each facility. The
distribution of ARTICLES is reported in Table 2.2. Given the large number of zero
counts and an over-dispersed distribution of ARTICLES, I use a zero-inflated
negative binomial regression, to estimate equation (1) (Demaris 2004). By using
the zero-inflated binomial regression, 1 assume that the excess zeroes in my dataset
may have been generated by two different processes. While some facilities received
no media attention due to low emissions, it is possible that some facilities with high
emissions, which could have received attention, eventually did not. This distinction
in the generation of excess zeroes is not accounted for in a standard negative
binomial regression. The choice of the zero-inflated negative binomial regression is
supported by Vuong likelihood ratio tests for model selection on the dispersion
parameter, which is significantly different from zero.
The second measure of media attention is the total number of words in

articles [WORDS] that mention a given facility. Since a facility can be mentioned in
more than one article, I added these word counts across articles. Given that WORDS

is a count variable and there is a large proportion of zeroes in my dataset, I use zeroinflated negative binomial regression again in estimating equation (1).
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The

assumption behind the generation of excess zeroes remains the same as ARTICLES.
This choice of model is again supported by Vuong likelihood ratio tests for model
selection on the dispersion parameter.
One issue with ARTICLES and WORDS as a measure of media attention is that

the measure attaches equal weight to all facilities.

If several facilities were

mentioned in one article the measure treats this as identical to an article reporting

exclusively about a single facility. In order to make sure that I do not treat these two
types of media reporting equally, I construct two weighted measures of media
attention, weighted hits [WARTICLES] and weighted words [WWORDS). If one
article lists ? different facilities, then each facility gets a weighted article measure
of [1/n). Similarly, if ? facilities are mentioned in one article with m words, then
each facility is assigned a weighted word measure of [m/ri) words per facility.
These two measures of media attention are continuous and strictly non-negative.
Hence, I use Tobit regression to estimate equation (1).
The key independent variables of interest are the income and race variables.
The logarithm of the median household income [INCOME) measures the
neighborhood income at the zip code level. I classify race into two major groups.
One is the percentage of Hispanics [HISPANIC) in the neighborhood and the other is
the percentage of non-whites who are not Hispanics [NONWHiTE). The omitted
category is non-Hispanic white.
A substantial proportion of the media reports in the dataset come from the
major daily newspapers, like The New York Times, and The Boston Globe. It is likely
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that the readership of these papers is disproportionately urban and relatively
wealthy. I include the logarithm of the population density [POPN) as a control
variable since facilities in densely populated neighborhoods might be subject to
increased reporting. I also include geographical classifications, NORTHEAST, SOUTH,
MIDWEST and WEST to allow for the possibility that location of the facility matters
in drawing media attention. WEST is treated as the omitted category in the
estimations.

The measures of pollution include the amount of toxic wastes (in pounds)
released in the air [AlR), water [WATER), injected underground [UNDER),
released on land [LAND), and transferred offsite [OFFSITE). Although several of
these measures are closely correlated (see Table 2.3), they are included separately
(rather than as an index) since media attention might be sensitive to the type of
pollution. The number of Form-R's [FORMR), a reporting form used to report about
a particular toxic chemical or toxic category, proxies for risks associated with
pollution. The greater the numbers of Form-R's, the more chemicals have been
released.

Indicator variables for industry control for the possibility that facilities may
draw attention by virtue of the industry to which they belong. The industry
classifications are CHEMICALS, PAPER, PRIMARY, PETROLEUM, TRANSPORTATION,

with "other manufacturing" [OTHERMANU) as the omitted category.
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2.6

Descriptive Statistics

The dataset contains 19,082 observations of which 370 facilities received media

attention in 1989 for polluting in 1987. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of these
facilities across different non-wire newspapers and newswires in my dataset. It
shows that most of the facilities mentioned in the news articles came from the wire

services. The most prominent among them is States News Service, which reported
about 182 out of the 370 TRI facilities with media attention13. Among the major

newspapers USA Today, which has a nationwide circulation, reported on 78 TRI
facilities out of the total 370. This daily reported disproportionately more than any
other newspaper in my dataset. As for the intensity of media attention, there are 37
facilities that were mentioned in both newspapers and newswires, and 274 facilities
were covered by either of these forms of print media.
Table 2.2, which highlights the frequency distribution of ARTICLES, shows the
limited variability in the dependent variable. There are only 370 facilities out of
19,082 TRI establishments that received media attention.

Of these, an ALCOA

facility at Port Comfort, Texas received the most media attention; 15 out of 84
different news articles from my database search reported about this particular TRI
facility. This lack of variability in the dependent variable highlights the usefulness of
a zero-inflated negative binomial regression.

Correlation coefficients between

ARTICLES, pollution, income and race variables are presented in Table 2.3. All types
of pollution have a positive but weak correlation with media attention. Correlation

13 States News Service is a national newswire service that provides Washington coverage and state and
local bills in Congress.
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between media attention and race is also weak, but while HISPANIC neighborhoods
are negatively correlated, NONWHITE populations correlate positively to media
attention. Income as an indicator of the economic status is very weakly correlated
and the sign on the correlation coefficient suggests a negative association.
Table 2.4 shows the relative share of the TRI facilities by industry classification
and region. Most facilities belong to the category, "other manufacturing," followed
by the chemicals, and primary metals. Among the facilities that received media
attention, 118 facilities belong to chemicals industry, and only 10 facilities belong to
the petroleum industry. By region, most TRI facilities in the dataset are from the
MIDWEST and SOUTH. Since the major newspapers in the dataset are located
primarily in the northeastern part of the US, it is plausible that the newspapers
report more on facilities located in this region.
Finally, Table 2.5 summarizes the income, race and population density variables
as described in the 1990 Census, the full sample of TRI facilities used in this analysis
and the subset of facilities that received media attention. Since INCOME is measured

as the logarithm of the median household income, the table provides the value of the
mean in equivalent dollars. The table shows that in 1990, an unweighted mean

(across zip codes) of median household income in the U.S was $27,274. At $27,735,
the average household income in the neighborhoods of the TRI establishments is a

little higher than the national average and the average income ($27,876) of the
neighborhoods that received media attention is higher still. It is suggestive that
higher income neighborhoods may receive greater media attention.
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Table 2.5 also highlights the distribution of the race measures, NONWHITE and
HISPANIC. While Census reports an average of 14% non-whites residing at the zipcode level in 1990, the TRI establishments are located in neighborhoods with 22%
of non-whites.

An even higher percentage of non-whites reside in the

neighborhoods that received media attention for polluting in 1987. As for the
Hispanics, on an average lesser percentage resides in the neighborhoods that
received any media attention. The average population density in the neighborhood
of TRI facilities and in the neighborhood of facilities that received media attention is
higher than the national average.

2.7 Results

Before presenting the regression results, it is worthwhile to discuss how the
regression results would have differed had I used the dataset with missing
information on a substantial number of facilities with media attention. Appendix
Table 2.1A reports a comparison between results obtained from using the two
datasets: one with missing zip codes and the other with the zip codes replaced with
information from the "envelope" zip code.

The table reports the coefficient

estimates (and not the marginal effects) of the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial
(ZINB) regression using ARTICLES as a measure of media attention. The main
difference is in the level of significance of the key variables of interest, INCOME,
NONWHITE and HISPANIC. While the signs on INCOME and NONWHITE remain the
same, the statistical significance of coefficient estimates improves significantly.
Even though the sign on HISPANICS change, they are never statistically significant.
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The stronger statistical significance along with an improved number of observations
(from 18,769 to 19,082) justifies the replacement of missing zip codes information.
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 report the regression coefficients and the marginal effects
of the Zero-inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) estimations. These tables report the
standard errors clustered by zip codes14. The variables of interest in these tables
are INCOME, NONWHITE and HISPANIC. The results show that facilities located in

higher income neighborhoods (INCOME) are more likely to receive media attention
and they are statistically significant across both measures of media attention,
ARTICLES and WORDS. The marginal effect of INCOME on media attention, as shown
in Table 2.8, is positive and statistically significant, but small in magnitude. If the
median household income in the neighborhood of a TRI facility doubles (that is,
increases by 100%) approximately one more article will be written about that
establishment. A similar increase in median household income will increase the

total number of words by approximately 733 words,. The marginal effects are very
small, but show that income is positively associated with media attention.
NONWHITE is also positive and highly significant (at 1% level) across all
measures of media attention in Table 2.6.

The marginal effects, as presented in

Table 2.7, are also positive and suggest that if the percentage of non-whites residing
in the neighborhood of a polluting facility double, then it is likely that 0.01 more
articles or 10 more words will be written about such a TRI facility. The marginal
effects are statistically significant for both WORDS and ARTICLES, are quantitatively
14 There are 6965 zip code clusters in the full dataset of 19,082 facilities. However, the 370 facilities that
received media attention were fairly dispersed among 272 zip code clusters (Table 2.5)
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very small in magnitude, but they show that there is a positive association with
media attention. The results on HISPANIC show a positive association with media
attention, but the results are never statistically significant across both measures of
media attention.

Table 2.8 reports the results of the Tobit regression, where the measures of
media attention are WARTICLES and WWORDS. The coefficients on the income and

race variables show that INCOME tends to be positively associated with media
attention, NONWHITE is negatively correlated but the results are never statistically
significant. The sign on HISPANICS is mixed with no statistical significance.
Across all regressions presented in the Tables 2.6 and 2.8, facilities located in
the NORTHEAST are more likely to draw media attention than any other regional
classifications. Since most newspapers in my dataset are disproportionately located
in this region, this regional bias is not surprising. It is likely that they report mostly
about their local polluting facilities in the TRI reports. Facilities in the petroleum
industry are less likely to receive media attention, while firms in the paper and
transportation industry are more likely to be reported. The coefficients on the
population density measure [POPN) have negative sign across all measures of media
attention and are never significant.
Across all regression models presented in Tables 2.6 and 2.8, measures of
pollution are statistically significant (at 1% level), and while AIR, LAND, UNDER and
OFFSITE are more likely to draw media attention, volumes of toxic chemicals
released in the WATER are less likely to attract media attention. These results are
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similar to prior findings on the determinants of media attention where different
mediums into which toxic wastes are released have a positive association with
media attention (Hamilton 1995a). FORMR, a measure used as a proxy for the
intensity of pollution has a positive sign on it and is statistically significant at 1%
level. It suggests that as the number of chemicals reported by the facilities increase,
it draws greater media attention.

2.8

Conclusions

This study tests the hypothesis that media attention is non-discriminatory
with respect to racial composition and income status of the neighborhood of a
polluting facility, while controlling for pollution and observable firm characteristics
like industry classification and location of the facility. Because other studies have
found that media attention can influence firm behaviors, the aim of this work is to

determine if income and race associate with media attention. If media reports less
on pollution in poor and minority neighborhoods, then it can create incentives to
polluting facilities to locate or pollute more in such neighborhoods, thereby
providing an additional explanation to "environmental injustice" outcomes.
Regression results, based on 1989 national newspaper reports that
corresponded to the first release of TRI data, suggest that neighborhoods with
either a higher percentage of non-white population or higher incomes are more
likely to be included in media reports, and the results are statistically significant.
These findings are consistent with those in the literature on environmental justice.
Wolverton (2009), Davidson and Anderton (2000), Been and Gupta (1997), Kriesel
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et al. (1996), Hamilton (1995b), and Gamper-Rabindran (2006) all fail to find
evidence of "injustice" in terms of the racial composition of the neighborhoods, but
these studies do show that the income status of the neighborhood matters in firm
location decisions.

This study sets the stage for the next research question. If neighborhood
characteristics associate with media attention, then it is worthwhile to investigate

how the behavior of media imposes any costs on the polluting firms. One measure is
to explore whether media attention leads to changes in future TRI emissions. This is
the goal of Chapter 3.

60

Figure 2.1: Distribution of Facilities by Newswires and Newspapers.
180 J,
140 H

* F^
Newswires: UPI = United Press International, AP = Associated Press, SNS = States
News Service, PRN= PR Newswire, BW = Business Wire

Newspapers: USA Today, WATimes = The Washington Times, WAPost = The
Washington Post, NYT = The New York Times, BG = The Boston Globe, SPT =
StPetersburg Times, ChWKLY = Chemical Weekly
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Table 2.1: Coverage Dates of the Top 30 US Newspapers in the Three
Databases: LEXIS-NEXIS, NewsLibrary and ProQuest.
Rank by
Circulation

Coverage

NewsLibrary
CoverageA

ProQuest
CoverageA

3-Jan-89#

l-Jul-87

l-Apr-87

l-May-73@

NA

2-Jan-84

l-Jun-80

NA

l-Iun-80

Los Angeles Times
The Washington Post
New York Daily News
The Chicago Tribune

l-Jan-85*

NA

l-Ian-85

l-)an-77

1977 onwards

4-Dec-96

l-Mar-95

16-Jan-95

21-Dec-92

l-Oct-98

2008 onwards

4-Dec-96

New York Post

5-Dec-97

21-N0V-99

3-Aug-98

Long Island Newsday

l-Jan-06

NA

NA

Top 30 U.S Newspapers
(by circulation in 2010]
USA Today

Lexis Nexis

The Wall Street Journal
New York Times

10

The Houston Chronicle

15-Sep-91

l-Jul-08

13-Feb-85

11

The San Francisco Chronicle

l-0ct-89*#

1985 Onwards

l-Jan-85

12

2-Ian-88*

NA

NA

]an-97#

NA

NA

14

New York Newsday
The Arizona Republic
The Chicago Sun-Times

l-]an-92#

24-Jan-06

NA

15

The Boston Globe

Jan-97

Dec-79

l-Jan-80

16

The Atlanta Journal-

NA

1985 onwards

l-Jan-95

l-Jan-96

NA

NA

l-Sep-91

12-Jun-08

NA

ll-Oct-96#

NA

l-Jan-95

13

Constitution

18

The Star-Ledger
Minneapolis Star Tribune

19

Detroit Free Press

20

24

The Philadelphia Inquirer
The Plain Dealer (Cleveland)
StPetersburg Times
Portland Oregonian
San Diego Union-Tribune

25

The Denver Post

17

21
22

23

26

Rocky Mountain News

27

The Miami Herald

28

The Sacramento Bee

l-Jan-94

l-Apr-08

l-Jan-83

l-Jan-92

1991 Onwards

27-Mar-89

l-Jan-87

1987 Onwards

30-Jun-86

Jan-97#

NA

NA

5-Dec-83*

4-Feb-04

2-Feb-92

l-Dec-93#

27-Mar-05

l-Jun-89

NA

l-Jan-90

l-Jan-97

ll-Oct-96

l-Aug-05

l-Dec-97

Jan-97#

1984 Onwards

ll-Nov-88

ll-Oct-96
l-Jan-87
15-Sep-86
The Orange County Register
Feb-81#*
1988 Onwards
30
l-Jan-92
St. Louis Post-Dispatch
? Information on coverage dates obtained from http://www.newslibrary.com
? Information on coverage dates obtained from http://www.proquest.com
* Due to vendor restrictions there is limited access to this newspaper in the Lexis-Nexis.
29

# Certain freelance articles previously available in this newspaper has been removed by LexisNexis.

@ Only abstracts available at the Lexis-Nexis.
NA stands for "Not Available"
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Table 2.2: Frequency Distribution in the Number ofARTICLES.
Number of Articles

Mentioning a Facility

~~~

6

Frequency

Frequency

With Missing Zip Codes

With Missing Zip Codes
replaced

18,458

18,712

229

270

43

54

19

20

10

11

11
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Table 2.3: Correlation Coefficients between Media Attention, Pollution,
Income and Race.
Variables

ARTICLES

AIR

0.377

AIR

LAND

UNDER

LAND

0.374

0.129

UNDER

0.142

0.014

0.001

WATER

0.129

0.034

0.004

0.962

OFFSITE

0.138

0.055

0.007

0.003

INCOME

HISPANIC

(-)O.OOl
(-30.013
0)0.001

NONWHITE

0.005

POPN

64

WATER

0.006

Table 2.4: Distribution of Facilities According to SIC Industry Classification
and US Regions.
Industry

TRI Facilities

Facilities with Media Attention

3,621
1,558

118

PAPER

659

31

PETROLEUM

325

10

TRANSPORTATION

966

27

11,953

136

TRI Facilities

Facilities with Media Attention

4,175
6,488
5,635
2,784

112

CHEMICALS
PRIMARYMETALS

OTHERMANU

Regions
NORTHEAST
MIDWEST
SOUTH
WEST

48

67
155
36

65
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Table 2.6: Zero Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) Regression Estimates.
VARIABLES

ZINB

ARTICLES
AIR

(in pounds)
WATER

(in pounds)
LAND

(in pounds)

0.0716***

(0.016)

(0 .005)

(-)0.5882***
(0 .061)
(00.0119
(0.007)

0.0113***

(01.0631*
(0 .545)
(00.1125
(0.162)

0.0036***

(0. 001)

(00.2191*"
(0 .034)

0.0027

(00.0951***

(0. 002)

(0.027)

(00.4948*"
(0 .154)
(00.0466
(0.029)

0.01791**

0)0.2011**
(0 .031)

(0.004)
(0 .004)

(Number of Form-Rs)

0.0246***

(00.0008
(0.001)

(in pounds)

FORMR

inflate

(-)0.1045*
(0 .062)

0.0107**

(in pounds)

(06.0532*
(2.007)

WORDS

(-)0.0036*
(0.002)

UNDER

OFFSITE

ZINB

inflate

0.0579***

(0 .017)
0.0329***

(0.011)

CHEMICALS

0.0084

(Dummy Variable)

(0.168)

(0. 007)
0.0017

(0. 004)
(00.0386
(0. 093)

PRIMARYMETALS

0.1913

0.0936

(Dummy Variable)

(0.213)
(00.1623
(0.234)
(01.2302**
(0.381)

(0. 115)
(00.2341*
(0. 132)

(00.1437
(0.238)

(00.1968

(00.0057
(0 .041)

(00.0101
(0. 023)

0.3956*

0.4766***

(0 .221)

(0. 124)

0.0018

0.0016

PAPER

(Dummy Variable)
PETROLEUM

(Dummy Variable)
TRANSPORTATION

(Dummy Variable)
POPN

(Logarithm of Population Density)

(00.0866*"
(0 .008)

(00.1567
(0. 225)
(0. 132)

INCOME

(Logarithm of Median Household
Income)
HISPANIC

(Percentage of Total Population)
NONWHITE

(Percentage of Total Population)
NORTHEAST

(0 .005)

(0. 003)

0.0091***

0.0065***

(0.003)

(0. 002)

0.9413***

(00.1046
(0. 147)

(Dummy Variable)

(0 .236)

MIDWEST

-0.3345

(Dummy Variable)

(0.241)

SOUTH

0.1341

(Dummy Variable)

(0.223)

(00.0161
(0. 153)
(00.0104
(0. 138)

19,082
19,082
19,082
19,082
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table reports the ZINB regression coefficients. Robust (clustered by zip
code) standard errors in parentheses. There are 6,965 zip code clusters. WEST and OTHERMANU are the
Observations

base categories for the regional and industry vectors, respectively.
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Table 2.7: Marginal Effects of ZINB Estimations for ARTICLES and WORDS.
ARTICLES

WORDS

0.0119***

1.1679***

(in pounds)

Ç0.0047")

(0.1431)

WATER

0.0006*

0.0735

VARIABLES
AIR

(in pounds)

(0.0004)

(0.0523)

LAND

0.0019**

0.3895***

(in pounds)

(0.0011)

(0.0667)

UNDER

(in pounds)
OFFSITE

(in pounds)
FORMR

(Number of Form-Rs)
CHEMICALS

(Dummy Variable)

0.0003

0.2341***

(0.0004)

(0.0689)

0.0008***

0.3158***

(0.0003)

(0.0515)

0.0046***

4.8661***

(0.0012)

(0.5482)

0.0001

(-)0.5862

(0.0028)

(1.4053)

PRIMARY METALS

0.0035

1.4979

(Dummy Variable)

(0.0042)

(1.9158)

PAPER

(-)0.0025

(-)3.2366

(0.0034)

(1.6771)

(-)0.0122***

(-)2.2376

(0.0026)

(2.9762)

(-)0.0023

(-)2.7764

(0.0036)

(1.7457)

(-)O.OOOl
(0.0007)

(-)0.1559
(0.3545)

INCOME

0.0067*

7.3313***

(Logarithm of Median Household Income)

(0.0037)

(2.0304)

(Dummy Variable)
PETROLEUM

(Dummy Variable)
TRANSPORTATION

(Dummy Variable)
POPN

(Logarithm of Population Density)

HISPANIC

(Percentage of Total Population)
NONWHITE

(Percentage of Total Population)

0.0001

0.0247

(0.0001)

(0.0446)

0.0001***

0.1005***

(0.0001)

(0.0332)

0.0216***

(Dummy Variable)

(-)1.5636

(0.0077)

(2.1569)

MIDWEST

(-)0.0054

(-)0.2475

(0.0038)

(2.3345)

0.0023

(-)0.1599

(0.0041)

(2.1217)

NORTHEAST

(Dummy Variable)
SOUTH

(Dummy Variable)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses. Marginal effects for the
dummy variables are discrete changes from 0 to 1. Marginal effects are computed at the mean.
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Table 2.8: Tobit Regression Results for WARTICLES and WWORDS.
Tobit

Tobit

WARTlCLES

WWORDS

AlR

0.0713***

471.6000*

(in pounds)
(in pounds)

(0.027)
(-)O.OOOl
(0.008)

(243.501)
(04.9521*
(4.303)

LAND

0.0097***

71.3321***

VARIABLES

WATER

(in pounds)
UNDER

(in pounds)
OFFSITE

(in pounds)
FORMR

(0.002)

(16.821)

0.0052***

26.1140**

(0.002)

(10.531)

0.0520***

291.8715***

(0.011)

(83.657)

0.0401***

199.0491***

(Number of Form-Rs)

(0.008)

(58.510)

CHEMICALS

0.0414

242.3238

(Dummy Variable)

(0.057)

(341.096)

PRIMARYMETALS

0.1101*

449.2725

(Dummy Variable)

(0.066)

(394.529)

0.2931***

1518.1450***

(Dummy Variable)

(0.081)
(00.4631**
(0.220)

(512.136)
(02422.9150*
(1258.067)

TRANSPORTATION

0.2121**

1065.2497**

(Dummy Variable)

(0.085)
(00.0011
(0.014)

(501.115)
(05.9111
(76.977)

PAPER

(Dummy Variable)
PETROLEUM

POPN

(Logarithm of Population Density)
INCOME

0.0261

233.2221

(429.898)

(Percentage of Total Population)

(0.077)
(00.0002
(0.002)
(00.0002
(0.001)

NORTHEAST

0.2690***

1561.7150**

(Dummy Variable)

(0.096)
(00.1090
(0.078)

(635.938)
(0508.6580
(439.134)

SOUTH

0.1351

871.4876

(Dummy Variable)

(0.083)

(532.794)

(Logarithm of Median Household Income)
HISPANIC

(Percentage of Total Population)
NONWHITE

MIDWEST

(Dummy Variable)

Observations

0.3281

(9.424)
(00.9156
(6.533)

19,082
19,082
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The table reports the Tobit regression coefficients. Robust
(clustered by zip code) standard errors in parentheses. There are 6,965 zip code clusters. WEST
and OTHERMANU are the base categories for the regional and industry vectors, respectively.
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APPENDIX

Table 2.1A: Comparing Zero Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) Regression
Results With and Without Replacing Missing Zip-Codes.
VARIABLES

ZINB
HITS
0.0699***

AIR

(in pounds]
WATER

(in pounds)
LAND

(in pounds)
UNDER

(in pounds)
OFFSlTE

(in pounds)
FORMR

ZINB
HITS

0.0716***

(0.018)
(-)0.0737*!
(0.019)
(-)0.0605*:
(0.017)
(-)0.0590**
(0.017)

(0.016)
(00.0036*
(0.002)

0.0568***

0.0579***

0.0113***

(0.004)
0.0107**

(0 .004)

(0.018)

(0 .017)

0.0339**

0.0329***

(Number of Form-Rs)

(0.015)

(0.011)

CHEMICALS

0.1461

0.0084

(0.168)

(Dummy Variable)

(0.188)

PRIMARY METALS

0.2555

(Dummy Variable)

(0.229)

PAPER

0.0086

(Dummy Variable)

(0.225)
(01-2945*
(0.557)

TRANSPORTATION

0.0759

(Dummy Variable)

(0.247)
(00.0192
(0.045)

(Dummy Variable)
PETROLEUM

POPN

(Logarithm of Population Density)
INCOME

0.1913

(0.213)
(00.1623
(0.234)
(01-2302*!
(0.381)
(00.1437
(0.238)
(00.0057
(0 .041)

0.3361

0.3956*

(0 .221)

(Percentage of Total Population)

(0.258)
(00.0041
(0.007)

NONWHITE

0.0081**

0.0091***

(Logarithm of Median Household Income)
HISPANIC

0.0018

(0 .005)

(0.004)

(0.003)

NORTHEAST

0.8430***

0.9413***

(Dummy Variable)

(0.271)
(00.2612
(0.291)

(0 .236)
(00.3345
(0.241)

(Percentage of Total Population)

MIDWEST

(Dummy Variable)
SOUTH

0.1891

0.1341

(Dummy Variable)

(0.283)

(0.223)

Observations

18,769

19,082
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CHAPTER 3

FIRM'S RESPONSE TO MEDIA ATTENTION UNDER U.S-ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY'S TOXIC RELEASE INVENTORY PROGRAM

3.1

Introduction

The United States Environmental Protection Agency's (US-EPA) Toxic
Release Inventory (TRI) program is viewed as a complement to the standard
command and control, and market-based environmental regulations. Implemented
in 1988 following a chemical spill in Union Carbide's chemical plant in Bhopal, India,
this program aims to keep the public aware of the chemical hazards in their
neighborhoods via a publicly available database known as the Toxic Release
Inventory database15. In addition to providing information about toxic chemicals to
the public, the TRI also creates incentives that may affect firm behavior via active
involvement of the general public, government agencies, advocacy groups,
stakeholders and the media. The logic of the reporting requirement under this
program is that negative publicity imposes a cost on polluting firms and provides
incentives to modify polluting behaviors (Khanna, et al. 1998, Arora and Cason
1999, Terry and Yandle 1997).

15 Manufacturing plants that emitted 500 lbs or more of the 320 listed chemicals under the TRI had to
report to the US-EPA annually. Since its inception in 1988, the list of chemicals has doubled, some
new industry sectors have been added and the reporting thresholds of some chemicals have changed
overtime in order to accommodate information requirements from the public.
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This essay focuses on the firm's response to media attention. Specifically, it
studies the role the media played when the TRI program was implemented for the
first time in the late 1980s. With limited preconceived notions about the polluting
behavior of facilities around the early years of TRI reporting, media responses at
this time provide a rare opportunity to isolate and study how firms responded to a
sudden wave of media attention. If media attention imposes costs on the firm, the
firm may have an incentive to change its subsequent behaviors.
A number of articles in the literature using the TRI data study firm behaviors.
Some study how firms responded to TRI reporting requirements, while others focus
on how stock market returns affect pollution behaviors (Hamilton 1995, Khanna
1998). While some study how the regulation may induce enrollment in voluntary
environmental management programs (Arora and Cason, 1995, 1996, Khanna 2002,
1999), others study how the regulation may affect the location decisions of the firms
(Wolverton 2009, Anderton et al. 1994, Boer et al. 1997, Sadd et al. 1999, Davidson
and Anderton 2000). But none so far has comprehensively explored the relationship
between TRI-related media attention and firm responses. This essay focuses on
how media attention is associated with changes in toxic releases and explores the
causal relationship between media attention and subsequent toxic releases.
Three different approaches are employed to understand this relationship.
First, a difference-in-differences approach is used to study whether firms with
media attention behave differently from those that do not. Results show that
establishments receiving media attention reduce pollution more than those without.
These results, however, should not be interpreted as causal due to the non-random
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nature of media attention. Second, in order to explore causality, a two stage
instrumental variable approach has been adopted.

Using three different

instrumental variables for media attention, I find that the treatment effects are

mixed in sign and the coefficient estimates are not statistically significant. Third, to
check the consistency of the 2SLS results and to reduce the selection bias in our
control group, I use propensity score matching to estimate the treatment effect of
media attention. Results show that average treatment effect for the treated firms is
negative but statistically insignificant, in general. Based on these results, 1 argue
that although firms with media attention clearly behave differently, we cannot
isolate the causal effect of media attention on changes in toxic releases.
The next three sections will first review the literature on firm responses to
TRI regulations, followed by a description of the data used and the empirical
strategies employed to estimate the treatment effect of media attention. The last
two sections discuss the results and conclude.

3.2

Literature Review

Public disclosure programs like the Toxic Release Inventory program intend
to impose costs on the polluting firms via public scrutiny, investor reactions in the
capital markets, and peer-pressure. It is expected that such pressures have an
adverse impact on a firm which might translate into improved environmental
performance.
Studies by Hamilton (1995a), Konar and Cohen (1997), Afsah et al. (1997),
Khanna et al. (1998), Lanoie et al. (1998), Dasgupta et al. (2001, 2006a), Doonan et
73

al. (2006) explores the capital market reaction of firms to public disclosure of
pollution information. These studies have shown that capital markets are sensitive
to environmental information of firms or news about their environmental

performances. Capital markets respond positively or negatively depending on
whether the environmental performances of the companies were superior or poor.
Khanna et al. (1998) examine investor reactions to environmental information of
firms in the chemical industry and finds that repeated disclosure of environmental
information results in significant losses to these firms and that they subsequently
change the way they dispose toxic chemicals. Konar and Cohen (1997) finds similar
evidence that TRI firms with significant abnormal returns following the first wave of
TRI reports experienced improvements in their environmental performances.
Doonan et al. (2005), unlike other prior studies, finds that managers of Canadian
paper and pulp industries are not affected by capital market shocks.
While the stock market reactions are important factors in affecting a firm's
output decisions, prior studies pay limited attention to the role of the print media in
enhancing firm outcomes.

Hamilton (1995a) shows that media attention is

associated with firm characteristics and that media attention may generate stock
market shocks. According to Hamilton's (1995a) study, TRI firms experienced an
estimated loss of $4.1 million on the day the TRI figures were published for the first
time. Dasgupta et al. (2006b) studies the role of media attention on a firm's
environmental performance. Using survey data from industrial facilities in South
Korea, they show that environmental news and a firm's awareness of such media
attention are important predictors of a firm's performance.
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The literature on firm responses to TRI program, apart from studying capital
market reactions, has also explored other aspects of the program. An increasing
number of studies focus on the association between local and community
characteristics and patterns in toxic releases. While Arora and Cason (1999) finds
that disproportionately high volumes of toxic chemicals are released in minority
neighborhoods, Gamper-Rabindran (2006] and Wolverton (2009) find evidence
otherwise. Another line of research that uses TRI data focus on specific instruments

of the program that might influence environmental performances. Khanna and
Damon (1999), Arimura et al. (2008), Anton et al. (2004), Vidovic and Khanna
(2007) and Brouhle et al. (2009) all study the association between environmental
management programs and firm performances. They find that either environmental
assistance programs or a mix of regulatory threats and assistance programs can
improve environmental outcomes.
This essay contributes to the existing literature on firm responses to
information-based environmental regulations. My study extends the TRI literature
by providing a comprehensive study of the relationship between media attention
and firm responses. I, first, explore what determines TRI-related media attention
(in Chapter 2), then show how differently firms with media attention may behave in
releasing toxic chemicals, and lastly, investigate the causality between media
attention and subsequent toxic releases. For this I use a dataset which allows me to
control for several firm-level and neighborhood characteristics that influence toxic
releases, thereby making my data more extensive than any prior work.
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3.3

Data

This study uses media attention data from the LEXIS-NEXIS Academic
Universe database, pollution data from the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) database,
company level information about the TRI establishments from Standard and Poor's
COMPUSTAT North America database and socio-economic characteristics from the

1990 U.S. Population Census.

Data on the structure of the media markets is

collected from the 1989 Standard Rates and Data Services' (SRDS) Newspaper
Circulation Analysis reports published by the Audit Bureau of Circulation.
Media attention data is collected from the news archives at the LEXIS-NEXIS

Academic Universe database. The aim of the database search was to gather as much
information as possible about the first time TRI related media attention in 1989 16.
This search identified around 1000 articles from major national newspapers and
newswires. A thorough reading of these newspaper articles to identify specific
information about TRI establishments (and not the parent company), generated 84
articles which contained information about 378 establishments that polluted in
1987.

These major newspapers includes USA TODAY, The Boston Globe, The

Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times and newswires like
The Associated Press, United Press International, States News Service. After merging

16 I used a combination of keywords for the database search: 'Toxic Release Inventory' or 'worst
polluters' or 'pollution' or 'Toxic 500' or 'National Wildlife Federation' for the period June, 1989 to
April, 1990, media reported about 1987 TRI releases in June, 1989. For a more detailed discussion on
the database search, refer to the data section in Chapter 2.
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the 1987 TRI dataset with the 1990 Census data and adjusting for the missing zip
code information, I am left with 370 establishments with media attention17.
The TRI database contains detailed information about toxic releases of all U. S

manufacturing facilities eligible to report under the TRI regulation. There is a two
year gap between the data-reporting date and the date EPA publicly disseminates
this information.

The first TRI report was available on 19th June, 1989 and

contained information about the toxic releases of almost 24,000 polluting facilities
in 1987. I ranked the 1987 TRI facilities by their overall onsite and offsite toxic
releases. I, then, limit my focus to the top 500 facilities and follow their emissions
for every year starting from 1987 to 1995. It is important to note that the 1987
dataset was later found to be unreliable as many establishments were
inexperienced in measuring their toxic releases18. I, therefore, disregard the 1987
toxic releases, as the focus is on firm responses and accuracy of the releases matter.
The study, therefore, uses the top 500 polluting establishments of 1987, but follow
their emissions data from 1988 to 1995 as the response variable.
Like prior literature, I limit my focus to the top 500 polluting establishments.
Out of the 370 establishments that received media attention in 1989, 138

establishments are in the top 500 list. The remaining 232 establishments with
media attention are distributed haphazardly in low polluting establishments. Figure
3.1 shows the distribution of media attention among the TRI establishments. There

17 For more details on the missing zip code adjustments, refer to the data section of Chapter 2.
18 For more details on the limitations of the TRI data, refer to Section 1.3.2 in Chapter 1.
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are 53 establishments in the top 100 TRI establishments that received media
attention. In the following sets of 100 establishments, establishments with media
attention steadily decrease. Between 500 and 1000 establishments there 54 media
hits and an additional 500 establishments (between 1000 and 1500 establishments)
adds only 31 establishments with media attention. The frequency of media attention
becomes sparse in low polluting establishments. I am aware that by limiting the
dataset to the top 500 I lose important information about media attention, but this
subset contains larger number of media hits than those identified in a prior study by
Hamilton (1995) 19. Also limiting the focus to the top 500 establishments allows me
to analyze the polluters who are comparable in all other aspects except media
attention20.

While this intuition to limit the dataset to the top 500 establishments is
necessary to be able to accurately merge establishment and parent company level
data it, nonetheless, raises concerns of sample selection bias. Limiting our analysis
to the top 100 or top 200 polluters only generates estimates that have larger
coefficients in absolute value. My final dataset, therefore, uses the top 500
establishments which contain 138 establishments with media attention in 1989.

The treatment year is 1989, the first year of media reports. 1988 is the pretreatment year and years 1990 to 1995 are the post-treatment years.

19 Hamilton (1995a) identified 50 facilities with media attention in the top 500 list.
20 I have experimented with other sets of treatment and control groups based on the industry and
geographic classifications. In all cases, there is very little to no variability in media attention within
those subsets and a large amount of valuable information about media attention is lost in such
categorizations.
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I use the COMPUSTAT North America from Standard and Poor's database to

collect financial information about TRl facilities21.

1 collected data on the

neighborhood characteristics of the TRI facilities from the 1990 U.S Population
Census at the U.S. zip code level. The 1990 Census dataset did not have information
about the population density at the zip-code level, which I calculated separately,
using land area in square miles from the 2000 Zip Code Tabulation Areas.
I collected data on the structure of the media markets from the 1989 SRDS

Newspaper Circulation Analysis reports published by the Audit Bureau of
Circulation. These reports contain data on the market penetration rates of major
newspapers at the U.S. county level and maps that depict the number of radio
stations, television stations and newspaper companies in each county.

3.4

Empirical Strategy

This section describes the measures of pollution, socio-economic control
variables, and media attention used for the empirical analysis in this chapter. It also
outlines the empirical strategies used in estimating how firm responses associate
with media attention. I use a difference-in-differences approach, a two stage least
squares (2SLS) estimation method and propensity score matching [PSM) to explore
the relationship between media attention and firm responses. This section explains
them in details.

21 Even though the TRI database provides information about the parent company, there is no unique
identifier common to the TRI files and the COMPUSTAT database to merge the datasets digitally. So
the data was manually entered.
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I estimate a difference-in-differences model with year effects to isolate how
firms that received media attention pollute differently from those that did not.
7995

RELEASES1, =a+ ¡=1990
£ ß).* YEAR1 + ß2 * MEDIA _ A TTENTION1 +

LlJ

ß3 * AFTERt * MEDIA _ A TTENTION1 +Xß + slt
In equation (1), the dependent variable, RELEASESit , is the logarithm of i-th facility's toxic

releases in period t. YEARj1 is an indicator variable for each post-treatment year to
capture which one of them has a greater effect on reducing toxic releases22.

MEDIA _ ATTENTION¡ is the binary treatment variable. The pre and post-treatment years
are captured by the dummy variable AFTERt . The coefficient of the interaction term fjfo),
captures the treatment effect of media attention on future toxic releases.

The vector X, is a set of control variables that includes industry classification
variables {CHEMICALS, PAPER, PRIMARY, PETROLEUM, and TRANSPORTATION) and
the establishment's geographical location {NORTHEAST, SOUTH, MIDWEST and
WEST). It also includes socio-economic characteristics like INCOME, the logarithm
of the median household income at the zip code level, HISPANIC, the percentage of
Hispanics in the neighborhood and NONWHITE, the percentage of non-whites who
are not Hispanics.

I also include the logarithm of the population density

{POPULATION DENSITY) since facilities in densely populated, urban neighborhoods

22 Typically, the AFTER variable is used to capture the time trend in the control group in a differencein-differences estimation. Following Dave and Kaestner (2009), I have introduced, YEAR, a dummy
variable for each post treatment year to capture this time trend.
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may be more cautious about their annual toxic releases than sparsely populated
neighborhoods.
In addition, vector X also includes measurable firm characteristics.

Logarithm of the average cost of goods and services is used as a proxy for the input
prices and other costs incurred by the firm [AVG. COST OF INPUTS); logarithm of
total sales is used as a proxy for the output of the firm {SALES), and logarithm of
research and development expenditures per unit sales {RND INTENSITY] proxies for
the firm's innovativeness.

Ideally we want our treatment variable,

MEDIA _ ATTENTION¡ ,

to be

randomly assigned and the treatment to be an unexpected shock to the facilities. In
our case, media attention is clearly not randomly assigned. Prior studies like
Hamilton (1995a] and my prior essay have shown that media attention is closely
associated with neighborhood and establishment level characteristics, thereby
making media attention more deterministic in nature. Non-randomness of media
attention raises the possibility that there might be some unobservables that are
correlated to both media attention and future toxic releases. Hence the results of

the difference-in-differences estimations should not be interpreted as causal. The
estimates are descriptive that will simply show the degree of association between
media attention and future emissions.

While non-random, I argue that the treatment variable used in this analysis is
likely to capture an unexpected shock to the establishments. Prior studies have
shown that there was a significant drop in the stock prices of TRI companies and
stockholders experienced abnormal negative returns following the first wave of the
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TRI reports. Hamilton (1995a) translates this average loss to $4.1 million in stock
values for TRI firms. If shareholders had expected the media attention following the
first publication of the TRI reports and the negative publicity costs associated with
it, then stock markets would not have experienced such abnormal negative returns
on a single day and stock prices would not have dropped significantly. The news
coverage and media attention took investors by surprise. This unexpected shock
created by media attention is required so that its causal effect on toxic releases in
not anticipated by the firms.
I use two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation to address the endogeneity
with media attention. Arora and Cason (1996) and Wolverton (2009) show that
socio-economic characteristics like the distribution of non-whites and Hispanics, the
income distribution of the neighborhood are associated with toxic releases of a TRI
facility. And these characteristics are found to be closely associated with media
attention as well. So there are some observables that not only influence media
attention but are also correlated with toxic releases. While some of these factors

can be controlled for, several others may remain unobserved and if left unaccounted
for, would not allow me to isolate the direct effect of media attention on future toxic

releases. An ideal instrumental variable would be strongly correlated to media
attention, but would not influence future toxic releases. I have identified three such

candidates23. Using these instruments, I estimate the following equation:

I also considered a fourth candidate for the instrumental variable, but it is not used in the

estimations due to lack of sufficient number of observations. Media tend to report more about
companies that spend heavily on advertising as a company's advertising expenditures are revenues
for the media houses. It is less likely that such expenditures would influence the output decisions of
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ARELEASESn+1 = a + ß,* MEDIA _ A TTENTlONn +Xß + e?

(2)

Where, MEDIA _ A TTENTIONn =? + ?d + f?

(3)

The dependent variable in equation (2), ARELEASESn+1, measures the change in
the logarithm of the toxic releases between 1990 and 1988. MEDIA _ ATTEN TIONn
is the instrumented media attention as expressed in equation (3). The vector, X, in
equation (2) contains the same list of variables as in equation (1) above. The vector,
/, in equation (3) contains three instrumental variables.
The three instruments used in estimating equation (3) are based on the
structure of the media markets. If a polluting facility is in close proximity to a media
market that is very competitive, then newspapers or other types of media (like radio
and television) would be competing with each other for readership or viewership or
airtime. Such a competitive atmosphere would attract media attention irrespective
of the establishment's toxic releases. According to Lacy (1989), the intensity of
newspaper competition influences "the percentage of space in a newspaper given to
news coverage and coverage of news in the city in which the newspaper is located."
The structure of the media market is unlikely to directly affect decision-making
about changes in toxic releases. News coverage in this case is not necessarily meant
to impose a negative publicity cost on the polluting establishments, but to sell news.
In order to capture competitiveness in the media markets, I gather data to create
three variables which serve as instrumental variables.

the company and hence its toxic releases. Advertisement expenditure figures collected from
COMPUSTAT have substantial amount of missing observations.
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The first one is a dummy variable, RADIO DUMMY, for the presence of radio
stations and television stations in a given county. The idea here is that there will be
a greater sense of competition in a particular county if it has at least one of the two
other types of media offices apart from newspaper. These other types of media are
expected to compete for airtime or viewership. Such competition may correlate
with the likelihood of TRI-related media attention but may not directly affect the
volumes of toxic chemicals released by the TRI establishments located in that
county. So I expect that there will be a positive correlation between RADIO DUMMY
and MEDIA ATTENTION. This data for RADIO DUMMY is collected from the maps in

the 1989 SRDS Newspaper Circulation Analysis reports published by the Audit
Bureau of Circulation.

The next instrumental variable is constructed based on a different concept of
competitiveness in media markets. In media economics, competitiveness in the
media markets is explained with the help of a model known as "umbrella
competition24" (Lacy et al. 2002). "Umbrella competition" refers to newspapers
headquartered in different cities with different publication cycles competing for
circulation areas for news, readership and advertising (Lacy et al., 2002).
Competition here is defined by the degree of substitutability between the different
layers or cycles of newspapers circulated in a given area. For example, newspapers
in different layers, like metropolitan dailies and suburban dailies, are substitutes of

24 "Umbrella competition" refers to newspapers headquartered in different cities with different
publication cycles competing for circulation areas for news, readership and advertising (Lacy et al,
2002)
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each other in a household in a particular county. Such substitutability is usually
measured by the market penetration of a newspaper in a given area.
Market penetration is typically expressed as a percentage of households that
receive a copy of the newspaper against the total number of households in the
paper's market area. Several newspapers are circulated in each county and the
SRDS's publications report market penetration of each of these newspapers. But 1
am interested in one composite measure of competiveness that would be
representative of the media market surrounding the polluting establishment. So, I
use the market penetration, MARKET PENETRATION, of the largest newsgroup as
identified by the Audit Bureau of Circulation's Newspaper Circulation Analysis of
1989/90, as my instrumental variables. I expect that the there will be a positive
correlation between this instrument and media attention.

The last instrumental variable is the average distance of a facility from the
newspaper headquarters that covered the TRI reports. One would expect that the
farther away the polluting establishment is from the newspaper headquarters, the
less likely it is going to be reported about. So the average distance may determine
whether the establishment is reported about or not, but this distance does not
influence the output decisions of the firm. So I expect that the correlation between
average distance and media attention would be negative. There are 12 newspapers
and newswires in my dataset. I identified the zip codes of the 7 newspaper offices
(excluding newswires) and calculated the average distance, AVERAGE DISTANCE, of
each TRI establishment from these media houses as an instrumental variable.
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For a causal interpretation, the difference-in-differences approach requires
that media attention is randomly assigned. I try to address the endogeneity issue
with media attention by using two stage instrumental variables estimation. But I
find that the instruments are underidentified and weak, thereby making my
estimates inconsistent. The literature provides solutions that can help overcome
the problem with weak instruments.

One solution is to look for more valid

instruments and/or to adopt use lagged values of the instruments to overcome the
problem with weak instruments25. But given the nature of the data used in this
study, these solutions cannot be adopted. Another solution is to adopt an estimation
technique that might help reduce the selection bias in the sample. Such a bias is a
common problem when using observational data where the treatment and control
groups are not randomly assigned.
Matching is an estimation technique that is useful when treatment and
control groups are not randomly assigned. In order to measure the treatment effect
of media attention on changes in future emissions I employ propensity score
matching (PSM). By using propensity score matching I can create a counterfactual
control group based on the predicted probabilities of getting a treatment. The
predicted probabilities, or propensity scores, are created using several
characteristics that are common between treatment and control groups.
Propensity scores are typically obtained from Logit regressions that predict
the likelihood of being treated, in our case, getting media attention.

These

25 For more discussion on ways to deal with weak instruments refer to Murray (2006), Dufour (2003), and
Staiger and Stock (1997).
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propensity scores are then used to split the sample into several equally spaced
blocks. These blocks should be created in such a way that the average propensity
scores between groups in each block do not differ. It is also necessary that the
blocks pass the balancing test before estimating the average treatment effect. To
check that the blocks are balanced, we test whether the mean of each of the

characteristics that are used to generate the propensity scores do not differ between
groups within each block. Once the balancing properties are met, various matching
techniques are used to estimate the average treatment effect of the treated. I use
nearest neighbor matching, radius matching and kernel matching to estimate the
average treatment effect of media attention on changes in future toxic releases
between 1988 and 1990.

The Logit specification used to generate the propensity scores is shown in
equation (4). Here I assume that the probability of getting media attention depends
on the volumes of toxics released into the air (AIR), water {WATER), underground
{UNDER), landfills {LAND), and offsite transfers {OFFS1TE). I also include their
square terms and some neighborhood characteristics as determinants of media
attention. I estimate the following equation:

Pr Ob(MEDIA _ ATTENTIONt ) = a + X?ßpl + (X¡ f ß?2 + ?\ß?
+ (X,l)2ßl2+XfßR+Xfßs+ei

(4)

In equation (4) the pollution vector in the above specification is denoted by. Xf
The vector X¡ includes socio-economic characteristics like the percentage of
Hispanics {HISPANIC) and non-whites {NONWHITE) residing in the neighborhood,
the logarithms of median income levels and the population density. Equation (4)
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also uses the squares of all variables, except income and population density. Vectors

Xf and Xf used in equation (4) represent the region and industry classifications
as described in equation (1).

3.5

Media Attention and Firm Response

3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics

The dataset used for estimating equation (1) contains 500 establishment
level observations, of which 138 received media attention. Facilities are distributed

in 426 zip codes clusters, 125 of which include facilities with media attention. In
constructing the dataset, I have limited my focus on the top 500 polluters of 1987
and followed there pollution patterns up to 1995. While none of the establishments
with media attention dropped out of the list of the top 500 polluters, their relative
ranks have changed over the years. For example, the rank of the largest TRI

polluting facility in 1987 with media attention, Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation's
Trona facility in California, dropped to 245 in 1988, 257 in 1989, 222 in 1990, and
finally 316 in 1995.
Figure 3.2 plots the annual mean emissions of the top 500 TRI firms between
1988 and 1995. It shows the annual emissions pattern between firms with media
attention and those without. The vertical line indicates the treatment year, 1989.
Annual toxic releases for both types of establishments have been steadily decreasing
and visually there seems to be no distinctive change in the rate of decline in toxic
releases for facilities with media attention after 1989. The graph shows that
emissions for establishments with media attention started declining even before the
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treatment shock in 1989. Even though graphically there seems to be no evidence of
the treated establishments to significantly change their rate of decline in toxic
releases following the first wave of media reporting, a well-controlled regression
like equation (1) may capture such a change.
Figure 3.3 shows the annual trends in the toxics releases of TRI
establishments by regions. Establishments located in the Northeast and Midwest
experienced steady declines toxic releases over the years. While establishments
located in the South demonstrate a significant decrease in toxic releases in the posttreatment years, establishments in the West tend to experience an increase in toxic
releases following the first wave of media attention in 1989.
Figures 3.4 takes a closer look at the annual release patterns by industry
classification of the TRI establishments. All industries show mild declines in toxic

releases between 1988 and 1995. Chemicals, primary metals and petroleum
industries show rapid declines in the pre-treatment periods. These industries are
generally highly polluting and heavily regulated than any other industries.
The rapid decline in toxic releases in chemicals, primary metals and
petroleum between 1988 and 1989 may well reflect direct regulation correlated to
the TRI or technological progress. However, it is also possible that establishments
in these industries were expecting some form of attention to their volumes of
pollution even before the first TRI reports came out, and this may help explain part
of the pre-treatment year declines in toxic releases that we notice in Figure 3.1. The
distribution of media attention by industry classification, as shown in Figure 3.5,
shows that establishments in the chemical industry indeed received the most
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number of media hits. Of the 138 media hits that are present in the top 500

polluting TRI facilities, 72 belong to the chemical industry, followed by petroleum,
paper and primary metals. This justifies why we need to control for industry
classification in our regression analysis.
3.5.2 Results of Difference-in-Differences (DID) approach
Table 3.1 presents the estimates of the difference-in-differences model as
described in equation (1). The variable of interest here is the interaction term
[MEDIAATTENTION * POST1989). This term measures the difference in the changes
in toxic releases over time.

Results show that there has been a statistically

significant decrease in the toxic releases of facilities with media attention in the
years following the first publication of the TRI report. Compared to the pretreatment years, facilities with media attention have experienced a 40.3% decrease
in releases over and above the decrease experienced by facilities without media
attention. These estimates, which are surprisingly large, clearly show that facilities
with media attention behave differently from the ones that did not receive any
media attention. Since I was concerned about the sample size, I also report the
difference-in-differences results using different sample sizes in Appendix Table
3.1A.

In addition to the declines in toxic releases, Table 3.1 also highlights which
post-treatment year had a greater decline in toxic releases. It shows that decline in
releases were more pronounced in later years than the years immediately following
the treatment. Reducing toxic releases involves adjustments to the production
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processes and it may take some time. The year dummies exhibit this effect of time
on reduction in toxic releases. Toxic releases decline incrementally till 1994, after
which the declines seem to be less pronounced.
Table 3.1 also shows that neighborhoods with a higher percentage of nonwhite and Hispanics populations have experienced greater reductions in toxic
releases. Richer neighborhoods and neighborhoods with high population density
have also experienced reductions in toxic releases over the period of time 1988 to
1995. The magnitudes of these reductions are not large, but the estimates are
statistically significant. These results give a reason to think that firms in non-white
areas may respond more to media coverage because such coverage could more
easily result in other non-profitable actions such as law suits.

Hence, I try

interacting MEDIA ATTENTION with the different measures of race, NONWHITE and
HISPANIC. The results (only the variables of interest) are presented in Appendix
Table 3.2A. It shows that facilities with media attention are more likely to decrease
toxic releases in Hispanic neighborhoods, but are less likely to decrease releases in
non-white/non-Hispanic neighborhoods.

3.5.3. Results of Two Stage Least Squares (2 SLS) Estimation
Tables 3.2 - 3.4 present the results of the 2SLS estimations. Table 3.2 shows

the first stage coefficients of the 2SLS estimations. The first three columns show the
results of individually using market penetration of the major newspaper [MARKET
PENETRATION], presence of radio stations [RADIO DUMMY] and average distance of
the establishment from the media headquarters [AVERAGE DISTANCE] as
91

instruments. The last column uses all the three instruments to estimate media

attention.

The coefficients on the instrumental variables show a very weak

correlation and in the case of RADIO DUMMY, the sign on the coefficient is not as
expected.
Table 3.3 reports the tests of underidentification and weak instrument
identification, weak instrument robust inferences and the over-identification test

(when all instruments are used).
underidentification.

The second column reports the tests of

The null hypothesis under this test is that the excluded

instruments are not relevant. I report the Kleibergen-Paap rk WaId statistic along
with the p-values in the first column. In all cases, I fail to reject the null hypothesis,
which suggests that the instruments are underidentified. The third column reports
the results of the weak instrument identification tests. Instruments are considered

weak when their correlation with the endogenous regressors is insufficient to allow
inference on the variable of interest. The null hypothesis of the weak identification
test is that the equation is weakly identified.

The third column reports the

Kleibergen-Paap WaId rk F statistic from the first stage and I fail to reject the null
hypothesis. My instruments are weak. Table 3.3 also reports the Anderson and
Rubin (1949) test of structural parameters, which tests the joint significance of our
endogenous regressor, MEDIA ATTENTION, given that the instruments are weak.
The results show that none of the estimates reported in Table 3.4 are statistically
significant.
Table 3.4 reports the second stage of the 2SLS estimations, along with robust
standard errors. The sign on our variable of interest, MEDIA ATTENTION, is mixed
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and never are statistically significant. Across all regressions, except when using
RADIO DUMMY and all instruments, media attention may reduce toxic releases in
1990 compared to 1988, but the results are still not significant.
The 2SLS regression approach tried to address the endogeneity issue of
media attention. The regression results do not find definitive evidence that media
attention may affect a firm's polluting behavior. One explanation for such results is
that the instruments used for the estimations are weak and underidentified, both of

which lead to inconsistent estimates. It is also likely that the large effects suggested
by the difference-in-differences in part reflect the influence of some unobserved
characteristics that correlate with media attention and have not been fully captured
by the instruments used here. There may be some other regulatory tools or
unobservables that are strongly correlated with media attention. Such strong
correlation with media attention hinders isolating the treatment effect of media
attention on changes in toxic releases. 1 have controlled for some obvious firm-level
characteristics, like industry and regional classifications.

For example, the

chemicals, primary metals and petroleum industries which show rapid declines in
toxic releases could have been heavily regulated at the same time that the media
was reporting about them. Even though I controlled for the industry classifications,
there are still some unobserved factors that make it unlikely to tease out the
treatment effect of media attention.
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3.5.4 Results of Propensity Score Matching
The last sets of results are the propensity score estimates. In order to
implement the matching technique, the first step is to obtain the propensity scores.
For the propensity scores, I estimate equation (4) using a simple Logit specification.
The Logit specification uses the squared terms of pollution and socio-economic
variables26. Table 3.5 presents the results of the Logit regression. In generating
these propensity scores, 5 final blocks are created to ensure that the mean
propensity scores in each block do not differ for the control and treated groups in
each block. A descriptive summary of the propensity scores in the 5 blocks are
presented in Table 3.6.
Table 3.7 presents results of the across group t-tests of each of the five blocks
created. It tests whether there is any difference in the mean propensity scores in
each block. The balancing property requires that there is no difference in the mean

of the propensity scores within groups in each block. The groups are labeled as
"With Media Attention" and "Without Media Attention" in the table. The table shows

that across all blocks, we have failed to reject the null hypothesis thereby ensuring
that the blocks are balanced in terms of the propensity scores. The balancing

property of each characteristic within each block is also satisfied. A synopsis of the
test results is presented in Table 3.8, where the null hypothesis of no difference

26 In generating the propensity scores, I have experimented with the interaction terms between the several

socio-economic and pollution variables. The results show that general the average treatment effect is
negative but not significant. A summary of the results are presented in Appendix Table 3.3A and Appendix
Table 3.4A.

94

between the means of each characteristic between groups in each block is never
rejected.

Finally, Table 3.9 reports the average treatment effect for the treated
establishments with media attention using three common matching techniques: the
nearest neighbor matching, radius matching (with a radius of 0.05) and kernel
matching. Nearest neighbor matching finds 83 matches out of the 138 treated firms
and 40 matches out of the 362 controls in my dataset. The estimate of the average
treatment effect of media attention shows that these firms would tend to reduce

their future toxic releases. The results are not statistically significant. For the
nearest neighbor matching, there are only 63 matches found from the treatment
group and 144 matches from the control group. The average treatment effect using
this matching technique suggests that establishments with media attention would
on an average reduce their future toxic releases by almost 25% between 1988 and
1990 and this result is significant at the 5% level. Results of the kernel matching
technique show statistically insignificant reduction in future emissions by the
treated establishments. In general, the average treatment effects for the treated
show that media attention has a negative effect on the future toxic releases, and the
results are not consistently statistically significant.

3.6

Conclusions

The unconventional nature of the TRI program and the success attributed to
it in reducing toxic emissions over two decades have made it a popular complement
to traditional environmental regulations. Nonetheless, the proposals to change the
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reporting requirements of the TRI program remind us that we don't fully
understand how the program works. This essay adds to that understanding by
providing a comprehensive study on the role of media attention under this program,
and allows us to investigate the role played by TRI-related media responses in
affecting firm behavior.
The difference-in-differences results reported here show that firms with
media attention reduce toxic releases far more than the similar untreated firms.

The reductions are more so in minority and poor neighborhoods. However, results
on the causality between media attention and future emissions do not show any
definitive evidence that media attention may impose costs on firms to affect their
future emissions. A two-stage instrumental variable estimation does not generate
statistically significant results. Propensity score matching results support decreases
in future toxic releases, but the results are not consistently significant across all
matching techniques.
There could be several plausible explanations for not finding any definitive
evidence on the causality of media attention on firm behavior. There was a drop in
the TRI emissions even before the treatment year and it could be due to the
combined effect of several unobserved factors. First, for example, figure 3.4 which
plots the distribution of media attention among industry classifications shows that
more than half of the establishments with media attention belong to the chemical
industry. The chemical industry also tends to be heavily regulated. So it is possible
that a certain subsection of establishments in the chemical industry were subject to
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regulatory stringency that was also subject to media attention. Although industry
classifications have been controlled for, other unobservables may be correlated with
media attention.

Second, it is possible that once firms submitted their first TRI reports, they
anticipated a negative publicity even before they received media attention. So they
started reducing their emissions even prior to 1989, the treatment year. Third, it is
possible that firms may have overstated their toxic releases prior to 1989. In fact,
firms under public disclosure type programs like the TRI have often been found to
voluntarily over-comply (Arora and Gangopadhyay 1995, Wu 2009). So it is also
plausible that firms were overstating their toxic releases in the pre-treatment
period, even before they received media attention. While instruments are used to
isolate the treatment effect of media attention, these unobserved factors among
others could not be controlled for to estimate the direct effect of media attention on
future emissions.

The results of this study provide useful insights for both the supporters and
critics of changing the reporting requirement under the TRI program. Those who
support more rigorous reporting requirements might appreciate the fact that
facilities with media attention are more likely to decrease toxic releases in some
minority neighborhoods, like Hispanic neighborhoods, than those without media
attention. While this paper does not find a causal link between media attention and
future emissions, these results suggest that the EPA should carefully consider
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potential impacts on environmental justice before scaling back TRI reporting
requirements.

Those who support more lax reporting requirements would, however,

appreciate that media attention in itself does not impose significant external
pressure on the firm to influence its polluting behaviors. So the reductions in toxic
releases over a period of two decades may have been the result of other significant

regulatory costs imposed on the firm, or the complementary effect of several other
regulatory tools experienced by these firms. It is plausible that media attention may
have an indirect effect on the polluting behavior of the firm. For example, media
attention may provide incentives to enroll in voluntary environmental management

programs, which in turn might affect subsequent toxic releases (Arora and Cason
1995, 1996, Arimura 2008, Brouhle 2009). Therefore, the fear raised by critics that

lax reporting requirement may weaken the effectiveness of the program, it may lead
to lesser accountability, lesser public scrutiny, and unfavorable environmental
outcomes does not seem all that serious. In fact, such a policy reform may save
some administrative costs for the EPA and information gathering costs for the firms,

and also provide flexibility to the firms to choose alternate ways of reducing toxic
releases.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of Media Attention in the Top 500 TRI Facilities.
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Figure 3.2: Annual Mean Emissions of Top 500 TRI Facilities by Media
Attention (MA), 1988-95.
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Figure 3.3: Annual Mean Emissions of Top 500 TRI Facilities by REGION, 198895.
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Figure 3.4: Annual Mean Emissions of Top 500 TRI Facilities by INDUSTRY,
1988-95.
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of Media Attention in the Top 500 TRI Facilities by
INDUSTRY classification.
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Table 3.1: Difference-in-Differences Estimation Results.
RELEASES

VARIABLES

(Log of Total Releases")

MEDIAATTENTION

1.605***

(Dummy Variable)

(0.142)
H0.310
(0.115)
(-30.443*'
(0.115)
(-)0.579***
(0.116)
(-)0.809***
(0.116)
H0.943***
(0.115)
(-)0.826***
(0.115)
(-)0.403**
(0.162)
(-)O.Oll**
(0.002)
(-)0.002
(0.003)
H0.303**
(0.124)
(-)0.180***
(0.021)

YEAR1990

(Dummy Variable)
YEAR1991

(Dummy Variable)
YEARl 992

(Dummy Variable)
YEAR1993

(Dummy Variable)
YEAR1994

(Dummy Variable)
YEAR1995

(Dummy Variable)
MEDIA ATTENTION * POSTI 989

(P0ST1989: Dummy variablej
NONWHITE

(Percentage of Total Population)
HISPANIC

(Percentage of Total Population)
INCOME

(Log of Median Household Income)
POPULATION DENSITY

(Log of Population Density)
CHEMICALS

0.699***

(Dummy Variable)

(0.096)

PRIMARY METALS

0.941***

(Dummy Variable)

(0.121)
0.969***

PAPER

(Dummy Variable)

(0.112)

PETROLEUM

1.543***

(Dummy Variable)

(0.159)

TRANSPORTATION

0.867***

(Dummy Variable)

(0.268)
(-)0.702***
(0.136)

NORTHEAST

(Dummy Variable)
MIDWEST

0.184

(0.118)

(Dummy Variable)

0.400***

SOUTH

(Dummy Variable)

(0.109)
0.134***

SALES

(Log of Total Sales per year)

(0.029)

AVG. COST OF INPUTS

0.433**

(Log of Average Cost of Goods and Services per year)

(0.198)
0.082

RND INTENSITY

(Log of R&D expenditures per unit sales per year)

(0.052)

Observations

3920

R-Squared

0.207

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.2: First-stage of 2SLS Estimation with Mean Substitution for Missing
Values.

Dependent Variable: MEDIA ATTENTION (Dummy Variable)
Excluded Instrumental Variable
MARKET

RADIO

AVERAGE

All

¡PENETRATION]

DUMMY

DISTANCE

Instruments

NONWHITE

0.002**

0.002**

0.002**

0.002**

(Percent of Total Population)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.001

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

0.040

0.038

0.039

0.044

(0.073)

(0.072)

(0.074)

(0.074)

HISPANIC

(Percentage of Total
Population )
INCOME

(Log of Median Household
Income)
POPULATION DENSITY

(Log of Population Density)

(-)0.042*** (-)0.040*** (-)0.042*** (00.041***
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.014)

CHEMICALS

0.112**

0.111*

0.114**

0.109**

(Dummy Variable)

(0.056)

(0.056)

(0.055)

(0.056)

PRIMARY METALS

0.186***

0.185**

0.186**

0.184**

(Dummy Variable)

(0.072)

(0.072)

(0.072)

(0.072)

0.023

0.024

0.024

0.025

(Dummy Variable)

(0.065)
(00.068*
(0.087)

(0.065)
(00.758
(0.087)

(0.065)
(00.064*
(0.088)

(0.066)
(00.077
(0.088)

TRANSPORTATION

0.248

0.247

0.252

0.247

PAPER

(Dummy Variable)
PETROLEUM

(Dummy Variable)
NORTHEAST

(Dummy Variable)
MIDWEST

(Dummy Variable)
SOUTH

(Dummy Variable)
SALES

(Log of Total Sales per year)
AVG. COST OF INPUTS

(Log of Average Cost of
Goods and Services per year)
RND INTENSITY

(Log of R&D expenditures
per unit sales per year)

(0.162)

(0.162)

(0.162)

(0.163)

0.265***

0.261***

0.238*

0.233*

(0.078)

(0.079)

(0.137)

(0.135)

0.056

0.053

0.035

0.032

(0.063)

(0.063)

(0.107)

(0.105)

0.093

0.089

0.074

0.072

(0.062)

(0.062)

(0.099)

(0.097)

0.023

0.024

0.024

0.024

(0.021)

(0.021)

(0.019)

(0.021)

(00.139
(0.141)

(00.133
(0.141)

(00.143
(0.141)

(00.137
(0.141)

(00.030
(0.034)

(00.028
(0.034)

(00.032
(0.034)

(00.029
(0.034)
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MARKET PENETRA TION

0.000

0.000

(Instrumental Variable)

(0.001)

(0.001)
(00.072
(0.085)

(00.069
(0.085)

RADIO DUMMY

(Instrumental Variable)
¡AVERAGE DISTANCE

(Instrumental Variable)
CONSTANT

Observations

0.000

0.000

(01.151
(0.818)

(01.015
(0.808)

(0.000)
(01.105
(0.805)

(0.000)
(01.077
(0.822)

500

500

500

500

Notes: Robust (clustered by zip code) standard errors in parentheses. There are 426 zip code clusters.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4: Second Stage of the 2SLS Estimations.
Dependent Variable:

MEDIA
ATTENTION

(Dummy Variable)
NONWHITE

(Percentage of
Total Population)
HISPANIC

(Percentage of
Total Population)

Excluded Instrumental Variables
MARKET
RADIO
AVERAGE
All
DUMMY
DISTANCE
Instruments
PENETRATION
0.679
(-310.868
(01.136
2.343

(25.455)

(4.595)

(14.451)

(3.594)

0.029

0.015

(0.061)

(0.011)

(00.002
(0.034)

(0.009)

0.003

(0.032)

(00.007
(0.008)

(00.009
(0.015)

(00.005
(0.007)

0.665

0.231

0.168

0.299

(1.226)

(0.304)

(0.611)

(0.291)

(00.514
(1.074)

(00.031
(0.211)

0.038

(0.608)

(00.107
(0.167)

0.779

(00.527

(00.716

(00.322

(2.895)

(0.542)

(1.672)

(0.439)

0.854

(01.307

(01.619

(00.967

(4.774)

(0.944)

(2.759)

(0.726)

0.292

0.025

0.067

(0.902)
(01.494

(0.254)
(00.703

(00.012
(0.426)
(00.589

(0.243)
(00.827

(2.153)

(0.439)

(1.042)

(0.433)

2.332

(00.056

(00.976

(00.105

(6.596)

(1.208)

(3.693)

(0.973)

3.091

0.045

0.524

(6.661)

(1.273)

(00.393
(3.829)

(0.981)

0.913

0.276

0.184

0.376

(1.497)

(0.384)

(00.008

(2.372)

(0.465)

(0.827)
(00.161
(1.357)

(0.334)

1.046

0.286

0.011

0.053

(0.643)

(0.136)

(00.029
(0.363)

0.006

INCOME

(Log of Median
Household

Income)
POPULATION
DENSITY

(Log of Population

Density)
CHEMICALS

(Dummy
Variable)
PRIMARY METALS

(Dummy

Variable)
PAPER

(Dummy Variable)
PETROLEUM

(Dummy
Variable)
TRANSPORTATIO
N

(Dummy

Variable)
NORTHEAST

(Dummy Variable)
MIDWEST

(Dummy Variable)
SOUTH

(Dummy Variable)

0.157

(0.384)

SALES

(Logarithm of
Total Sales per

year)
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(0.117)

AVG. COSTOF
INPUTS

(Log of Average
Cost of Goods and

0.009

(01.841
(3.926)

(00.223
(0.743)

(2.131)

(00.478
(0.627)

(00.431
(0.908)

(00.076
(0.161))

(00.025
(0.472)

(00.132
(0.146)

(016.199
(29.067)

(03.469
(5.778)

(01.635
(16.246)

(05.471
(4.847)

500

500

500

500

Services per year)
RND INTENSITY

(Log of R&D
expenditures per
unit sales per

year)
CONSTANT
Observations

Notes: Robust (clustered by zip code) standard errors in parentheses. There are
426 zip code clusters. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5: Results of the Logit regression for the Propensity Scores.
MEDIA ATTENTION
AIR

Coefficients
5.21e-08

(2.81e-08)
3.00e-16

AlRJQUARE

(2.30e-16)
(-)2.59e-08
(3.21e-08)
(-)6.94e-16
(3.87e-16)
(-)9.49e-09
(5.56e-08)

WATER

WATERJQUARE
UNDER

UNDER_SQUARE

4.90e-16

(8.9Oe-Io)
LAND

1.53e-07***

LAND_SQUARE

(4.97e-08)
(-)7.31e-16
(4.72e-16)

OFFSITE

5.85e-08

(8.02e-08)
OFFSITE_SQUARE

3.12e-15

(4.00e-15)
0.013

FORMR

(0.035)
0.001

FORMR_SQUARE

(0.001)
NONWHITE

0.017

NONWHITE_SQUARE
HISPANIC

(-)O.OOO
(0.000)
0.002

HISPANIC_SQUARE
INCOME

POPULATION
DENSITY
NORTHEAST

(0.028)
(-)O.OOO
(0.000)
(00.204
(0.476)
(00.083
(0.084)
2.326***

(0.617)
MIDWEST

0.729

(0.603)
0.898

SOUTH

(0.579)
0.006

CHEMICALS
PRIMARY METALS

(0.317)
(00.332
(0.475)

(01.759*"

PETROLEUM

(0.713)
TRANSPORTATION

1.169

(0.849)
CONSTANT

(02.151

(5.115)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: Description of Estimated Propensity Scores and Distribution of
Treated and Control across Each Block.

The region of common support is [0.0025, 1]
Mean propensity score: 0.276
Standard Deviation: 0.235
Number of observations: 500

Blocks of the pscore for

MEDIA ATTENTION
Total

treatment,
MEDIA ATTENTION
1

Total

227

31

258

109

36

145

18

27

45

14

19

30

28

138

500

362
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Table 3.7: Two-sample t-test with Equal Variances for Each Block.
Blocks

Groups'l'

Mean

Observations

Difference6

_____CD
WOMA

0.113

227

(0.003)

Block 1
WMA

31

WOMA

109

0.138

(0.009)
0.289

(0.005)

Block 2
WMA

36

WOMA

18

0.311
0.462

(0.012)
0.464

27

0.635

(0.014)

Block 4

0.689

14

(00.053
(0.024)

(0.013)
0.864

WOMA

(0.026)

Block 5
WMA

(00.002
(0.015)

(0.009)

WOMA
WMA

(00.020
(0.011)

(0.008)

Block 3
WMA

(00.024
(0.009)

0.952

30

(00.087
(0.031)

(0.011)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in brackets.
? Groups are labeled as WOMA: Without Media Attention and WMA: With Media Attention.
B Difference = Mean (WOMA) - Mean (WMA).
Ho: Difference = 0;
Ha: Difference < 0; Ha: Difference != 0; Ha: Difference > 0
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Table 3.8: Testing the Balancing Property for Each Variable in All Five Blocks.
Fail to

Block

Variables in each block"

Number

Groups

reject null

within
each

for all
variables
in each

variable

block?c

AIR, A1R_SQUARE, WATER,
WATER_SQUARE, UNDER,
UNDER_SQUARE, LAND, LAND_SQUARE,
OFFSITE, 0FFS1TE_SQUARE, FORMR,
FORMR_SQUARE, NONWHITE,
NONWHITE_SQUARE, HISPANIC,
HISPANIC _SQUARE, INCOME,
POPULATION DENSITY, NORHTEAST,
MIDWEST, SOUTH, CHEMICALS, PRIMARY
METALS, PETROLEUM, TRANSPORTATION

WOMA

Yes

WMA

WOMA

Same as above

Yes

WMA
WOMA

Same as above

Yes

WMA
WOMA

Same as above

Yes

WMA
WOMA

Same as above

Yes

WMA

Notes: ± Groups are labeled as WOMA: Without Media Attention and WMA: With Media
Attention

c Difference = Mean (WOMA) - Mean (WMA).
Ho: Difference = 0;
Ha: Difference < 0; Ha: Difference != 0; Ha: Difference > 0
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Table 3.9: Estimates of the Average Treatment Effect of the Treated.
Matching
Algorithms

Number
treated
used

Number
controls used

Nearest Neighbor

83

40

(00.067

63

144

(00.249**

83

144

Matching
Radius Matching
(Radius = 0.05)
Kernel Matching

(Bandwidth =

Average
treatment effects
on the treated

(0.234)
(0.146)

(00.169
(0.222)

0.06)
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX

Table 3.1A: Difference-in-differences Results for Different Sample Sizes.
VARIABLES
MEDIAATTENTION

Top 100

Top 200

Top 300

Top 400

1.910***

1.970***

1.704***

1.679***

(0.299)

fO.191)

(0.172)

(0.153)

-0.188

-0.189

-0.242

-0.252*

(0.288)

(0.182)

(0.156)

(0.131)

-0.194

-0.264

-0.316**

-0.344***

(0.293)

(0.183)

Í0-157)

(0.131)

YEAR1992

-0.316

-0.354*

-0.403**

-0.455***

(0.293)

(0.183)

(0.157)

(0.131)

YEAR1993

-0.531*

-0.596***

-0.647***

-0.700***

(0.291)

(0.183)

(0.157)

(0.131)

-0.562*

-0.657***

-0.731***

-0.822**

(0.290)

(0.182)

(0.156)

(0.130)

-0.434

-0.523***

-0.635***

-0.733***

(0.287)

(0.182)

(0.156)

(0.131)

-0.845***

-0.669***

-0.554***

-0.504***

(0.319)

(0.215)

(0.194)

(0.174)

NONWHITE

0.003

-0.002

-0.012**

-0.012***

(0.004)

(0.003)

(0.002)

(0.002)

HISPANIC

-0.005

-0.006

-0.003

-0.002

(0.007)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.003)

-0.056

0.069

-0.231

-0.276*

(0.318)

(0.201)

(0.178)

(0.145)

-0.131**

-0.165***

-0.155***

-0.148***

(0.054)

(0.034)

(0.028)

(0.024)

CHEMICALS

-0.743

0.369*

0943**=

0.697***

(0.731)

(0.195)

(0.153)

(0.118)

PRIMARY METALS

-1.227

0.439*

1.065***

1.008***

(0.757)

(0.231)

(0.181)

(0.143)

-0.464

0.694***

0.971***

0.976***

(0.721)

(0.197)

(0.157)

(0.131)

-0.467

1.307***

1.756***

1.606***

(0.818)

(0.281)

(0.226)

(0.186)

Dropped

Dropped

Dropped

1.679***

YEAR1990

YEAR1991

YEAR1994

YEAR1995

MEDIA ATTENTION <
P0ST1989

INCOME

POPULATION DENSITY

PAPER

PETROLEUM

TRANSPORTATION

(0.503)
NORTHEAST

-1 992***

-1 491***

-0.893**

(0.384)

(0.226)

(0-187)
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-0.940***

MIDWEST
SOUTH

SALES

AVG. COST OF INPUTS

RND INTENSITY

Observations

R-Squared

0.173

-0.821***

0.052

(0.281)

(0.184)

-0.952***

-0.105

0.046

(0.244)

(0.157)

(0.141)

(0.122)

0.103

(0.136)
0.218*

0.625

0.525*

0.256

0.085

(0.791)

(0.296)

(0.259)

(0.219)

0.158**

0.173***

0.175***

0.135***

(0.068)

(0.045)

(0.039)

(0.034)

0.563***

0.330***

0.0962

0.056

(0.144)

(0.084)

(0.068)

(0.057)

760

1552

2320

3120

0.165

0.214

0.193

0.194

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3. 2A: Results of the Interaction between MEDIA ATTENTION and
NONWHITE and HISPANICS.

Variables of interest
MEDIA ATTENTION * POSTI 989

(P0ST1989: Dummy variablej

Coefficients

(-)0.403**

(Percentage of Total Population)

(0.162)
(-)0.0139***
(0.002)

MEDIA ATTENTION * NONWHITE

0.0104***

HISPANIC

0.00593*

NONWHITE

(0.003)

(Percentage of Total Population)

(0.003)

MEDIA ATTENTION * HISPANIC

(-)0.0265***
(0.006)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.3A: Description of Estimated Propensity Scores, and Distribution Of
Treated and Control across Each Block.

The region of common support is [0.00093678, 1]
Mean propensity score: 0.276
Standard Deviation: 0.268
Number of observations: 500

Blocks of the pscore

MEDIA ATTENTION
Total

for treatment,
MEDIA ATTENTION

Total

240

20

260

91

38

129

23

21

44

19

25

40

42

138

500

362
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Table 3.4A: Estimates of the Average Treatment Effect of the Treated.
Average

Matching
Algorithms

Number
treated
used

Number
controls used

Nearest Neighbor
Matching

83

37

Radius Matching

63

107

treatment

effects on the
treated
0.056

(0.3561

(-)O.lOl

(Radius = 0.05)
(0.563]
Kernel Matching
(00.004
83
107
(Bandwidth = 0.06)
(0.295)
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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CHAPTER 4

DISTRIBUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS AND BENEFITS, ADDITIONAL
DISTORTIONS AND THE PORTER HYPOTHESIS.

4.1

Introduction

Michael Porter and Claas van der Linde argue that, "properly designed
environmental standards can trigger innovation that, may partially or more than

fully offset the costs of complying with them" (Porter and van der Linde 1995, 98).
They claim that regulations can lead to innovation and those innovations can
generate profits. This is the Porter Hypothesis. Leading environmental economists
reject this idea, arguing that regulations do impose costs and that those costs should
be weighed against the benefits of improved environmental quality. Portney, for

example, states, "I disagree fundamentally with a message... [that] we can avoid
painful choices..." (Portney 1994, 22), while Smith and Walsh maintain that "there
are no painless environmental policies" (Smith and Walsh 2000, 74).

This paper derives a series of theoretical examples that are consistent with
the Porter Hypothesis. Our main point is that the debate surrounding the Porter
Hypothesis has ignored the distribution of benefits and costs and has largely viewed
markets as being initially undistorted with perfect competition, perfect information,
purely private goods and no externalities, apart from pollution itself. The examples

presented here include some of these elements in order to add new insights into
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the contrasting views that surround the hypothesis. Each example highlights either
the distribution of costs and benefits or the introduction of a market failure, other

than pollution itself, in order to add new insights into the contrasting views that
surround the hypothesis.

Collectively, the examples make a number of

contributions. First, by highlighting the distribution of environmental costs and
benefits, they show that Porter's hypothesis, that firms benefit from regulation, does
not necessarily contradict the idea that regulations have costs. Second, the paper
argues that inclusion of an additional market failure in a standard economic model
can lead to results consistent with the hypothesis. Numerous such scenarios are
possible. Third, Porter argues that firms will benefit from regulation only when they
innovate. Each of the examples here shows such a scenario. In some cases, it is also
possible that regulations can benefit firms even without fostering innovation. This
clarifies a distinction that needs to be addressed in empirical work. Fourth, the
paper makes a policy point. In several of the examples, benefits arise because the
policy addresses two distortions. The implication, therefore, is that it would be
preferable to use different policies to separately correct for each distortion.
The different examples presented here also help to organize much of the
existing literature on the Porter Hypothesis; previously published research inspires
the examples in this paper. In fact, our point is that while the mechanics of each
example is well understood, the concepts have either not been linked to the Porter
Hypothesis, or been presented as narrowly defined special cases. For instance, our
first example discusses scarcity rents, using a framework similar to Fullerton and
Metcalf [2001) and Fullerton (2001). These papers show that environmental
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regulations might benefit existing firms, but they do not link this idea to the Porter
Hypothesis. Similarly, our next example, a production externality, is also well
understood (Yin 2003) but not previously discussed in the context of the Porter

Hypothesis. The existing literature also provides several specific illustrations of
regulation correcting two distortions, simultaneously benefiting firms and
improving environmental quality.

These papers, which discuss the Porter

Hypothesis explicitly, cannot individually show that numerous such possibilities
exist.27 Our third example discusses imperfect information, the market failure
central to Ambec and Baria (2001) and Rege's (2000) discussions of the Porter
Hypothesis. Our final example, which argues that new environmental technologies

might have non-excludible benefits, generalizes an idea first presented by Mohr
(2002).

The examples presented here also generalize another result from several

previously published articles: some models produce results that may be empirically
difficult to distinguish from the Porter Hypothesis, even though the mechanisms of
the models do not support Porter's argument. Brown and Wilcoxen (2003) and

Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) show that strict regulation may lead to premature
restructuring of a firm's capital stock producing a productivity increase. Popp
(2005) shows that even if R&D efforts have a negative expected return, innovation
induced by regulation might increase profits with significant frequency. These
results are inconsistent with Porter's argument - here regulations do have real costs

27 Hart (p,1079, 2004) indicates in a footnote that models consistent with the Porter Hypothesis may
generally require more than one market failure.
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- but would require careful empirical work to distinguish from the hypothesis that
innovation offsets exceed the cost of the regulation.

The next section of this paper describes the model that critics used to refute the
Porter Hypothesis and identifies several possible outcomes of regulation. Section II
presents four examples that produce results consistent with the Porter Hypothesis.
The final section concludes by discussing how these examples might inform the
existing debate on the Porter Hypothesis.

4.2

Theoretical Framework

The most considered criticism of the Porter Hypothesis comes from Palmer,
Oates and Portney (1995), who use a simple model to show that increasing the
stringency of incentive-based environmental regulations results in reduced profits
for the firm.28 This section presents that model. Its figure 1 (Palmer, Oates and
Portney 1995, 123), partially reproduced here, explains the basic framework. The
horizontal axis measures pollution abatement, the vertical axis measures costs, and
the model makes the common assumption that marginal abatement costs [MAC)
are increasing. The horizontal lines through P and P' represent two possible
choices of emission fees imposed by regulators on the polluting firms. Given MAC
and effluent charge P, the firm's optimal level of abatement is A. The model also
assumes that the firm has information about a potential innovation that would allow
it to innovate and reduce the MAC for any given level of abatement. Graphically,

28 Their model is based on an extensive literature in the tradition of Magat (1978), Downing and
White (1986), and Milliman and Prince (1989).
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this is represented by MAC*, which lies everywhere below MAC. Innovation
requires some fixed cost, so the firm's decision depends on comparing the fixed cost
of innovation to the benefits of reduced abatement costs.

Figure 4.1: Incentive to Innovate under Regulation

MAC
Q

MAC*
H

B

f

Abatement Level

The model shows that while a regulation may encourage innovation, it does
not increase profits. To see this, suppose that the firm faces an emissions charge of
P, chooses MAC, and therefore abates A. The firm has chosen not to innovate, which
would allow it to abate at lower marginal cost, reduce its effluent charges by
increasing abatement, and thus reducing its costs by the area of triangle AOBC .
This implies that the fixed cost of innovation exceeds AOBC, and that the firm
earns higher profits without innovation. Letting B and C represent combinations
124

of abatement level and technology and p represent profits, this means that
7T(5)>;r(C).29
The model allows for the possibility that a firm innovates in response to a
stricter environmental regulation. Suppose the emission fee is raised to P'. If the
firm continues to operate on MAC, technology remains unchanged and abatement
costs rise, which implies that profits fall, so p(?) > p{?) . It is also possible that the
firm innovates in response to regulations, as the Porter Hypothesis suggests, and
therefore chooses the technology described by MAC*. However, even if the firm
does innovate, it still prefers a lax standard to a stricter one, so n(C) > n{D) .
Palmer, Oates and Portney use this insight to highlight the logical inconsistency in
Porter's argument. If p(?) > n{C) (given that the firm does not innovate when the
charge is P), and n(C) > p(?) , then p(?) > p(?) (by transitivity). If innovations
have a net cost with low emission charges, they must still have a net cost with strict
regulations.
While the model highlights a logical inconsistency in the Porter Hypothesis, it
is also useful for carefully defining the hypothesis. One condition for results
consistent with the Porter Hypothesis is

p(?) < p(?) .

That is, the Porter

Hypothesis says that the combination of innovation and tightened regulations
generates higher profit. In our view, this condition is consistent with the Porter

Like Palmer, Oates and Portney [1995], we treat higher abatement costs as synonymous with
lower profits when discussing the model. While this is true in a partial equilibrium setting with no
distortions other than environmental externality, our examples will highlight cases where these
assumptions are relaxed and profits increase even though regulations increase abatement costs.
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Hypothesis, but not sufficient. The three profit points identified in our discussion of
the model highlight this. Recall that p(?) denotes the level of profit when the firm
faces a low level of regulation and does not innovate, p(?) denotes the level of
profit when the firm faces a strict environmental regulation but does not innovate,
and

p(?)

denotes the level of profit where the firm faces both a strict

environmental regulation and innovates. Porter's hypothesis has two separate
criteria: fostering innovation and increasing profits. A situation fully consistent
with Porter's hypothesis requires that profits arise because of innovation, so
p(?)<p(?)<p(?).

The profit points also allow us to consider the possibility that tightening
environmental regulation may prove beneficial to the firm, even without innovation,
so p{?) < p(?). Finally, it is also possible that regulation induces innovation and
that the firm earns higher profits, but that the firm would have benefited even
without adopting the cleaner technology. In this case, p{?)<p(?)<p{O). Table
4.1 summarizes all of these possible linkages between environmental regulation,
innovation and profits.
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Table 4.1: Possible Links between Environmental Regulation, Innovation and
Profits.

Statements

Links

Interpretations

"Static" model

p(?) < p(?)

Firm does not innovate, and

(without innovation]

regulations impose costs on the
firm.

Insight from model presented
by Palmer, Oates and Portney
(1995)

Firms benefit, but not through
the mechanism (innovation)
that Porter suggests

p{?) < p(?) &

p{?) > p(?) , but
n(D) < p(?)

p(?) < p(?)

Regulation itself is beneficial even
without innovation. Firms may

or

get additional benefit from

p(?) <p(?) < p{?)

Porter Hypothesis

Regulations impose costs on firms,
and firms can offset only a portion
of those costs through innovation.

p{?) < p(?) < n{D)

innovation.

Regulations impose costs that can
be fully offset via induced
innovation.

p(?) denotes profit when the firm faces lax regulation and does not innovate.
p(?) denotes profit when the firm faces a strict regulation but does not innovate.
p(?) denotes profit where the firm strict regulation and innovates.

4.3

Four examples consistent with the Porter Hypothesis

Having defined both Porter's hypothesis and other conditions where firms
benefit from regulation, we now turn to explaining these additional sources of
profits within a standard economic framework. To do so, we develop a series of
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examples that highlight either the distribution of environmental benefits and costs
or the presence of some additional market failure, other than pollution.

To

emphasize that numerous such scenarios exist, we organize our examples according
to a typical list of market failures: imperfect competition, externalities, asymmetric
information and public goods. Adding any one of these features to a simple
economic model creates the possibility that environmental regulations induce
innovation and benefit firms.

In order to maintain continuity between our examples, we retain the same
underlying assumptions and notations. In each case, we start with N identical,
competitive firms. Each firm has rising marginal costs and views itself as too small
to affect market price.30 To model emissions as simply as possible, we assume that
emissions, e, are directly proportional to output, y, so that e = yy , where ? is a
parameter. Lowercase letters represent variables at the level of the firm, whereas
capital letters represent aggregate measures, so

Y = Ny

represents aggregate

output and E represents the externality from aggregate emissions31. We assume
that firms have knowledge about two alternate technologies that differ in ? . For
the "dirty" technology, we define our units so that ? = \. For the "clean" technology,

30 Allowing firms to treat price as exogenous significantly simplifies the exposition of the model and
ensures that the highlighted outcomes are not necessarily a consequence of imperfect competition.
Each of the examples could also be supported in a model with imperfect competition.
31 The externality from aggregate emission, under restrictive circumstances, can be assumed to be
the sum total of all the individual firms' emissions, so that we can define aggregate emissions as
E=Ne. But, it is possible that aggregate emissions are less than Ne, due to differential concentrations

of the pollutant between the source of pollution and the recipient of pollution. For example, carbon
dioxide released by an upstream firm may get diluted by the time it reaches a firm located
downstream. But this change in concentration affecting externality is not central to our present
question.
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? <\ , but technology is available to the firm only with a fixed cost, /. Regulations
come in the form of an emissions tax, t, where a portion, a, of per-firm tax
revenues are refunded to the firm.

Individual refunds depend on the average tax payment of all firms and are
not directly linked to the emissions of a particular firm. This assumption, that
refunds are based on average tax payments and not individual tax payments, allows
the firm to treat these refunds as exogenous when choosing its output and
emissions. If a single firm were to increase emissions, that would raise its tax
payment but would not (noticeably) raise the average tax of all firms and hence not
the rebate. The refund allows consideration of different distributional scenarios. A

full refund (a=l) would have the same distributional consequences as a permit
policy where permits are "handed out to the firm" and no refund (a=0) would be
equivalent to auctioned permits (see Fullerton, 2001 for a discussion). With
identical firms, who make identical output decisions, the result is that each firm
receives a refund directly proportional to its tax payment.
These features are fully consistent with the model outlined earlier. Here, the
marginal cost of abatement is the opportunity cost of forgone production, which is
increasing in abatement for each technology. Innovation, as represented by ?,
means that for any level of abatement, this opportunity cost is lower for the clean
technology. Furthermore, modeling innovation in this way is very general; it only
requires reduced emissions per unit of output. This might be accomplished either
with an "end of pipe" change that filters a larger proportion of effluents, or it might
be accomplished through a process change where potentially-damaging production
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byproducts are instead reused to increase productivity. While Porter and van der
Linde argue that benefits from environmental regulation come only from the latter
form of innovation, our results suggest that such a restriction is not necessary for
constructing a model where firms benefit from regulation.
In order to highlight the intuition behind our examples, we also add some
restrictions to the model, all of which could be relaxed without any loss of
generality. We assume that the number of firms is fixed at N and that all firms
initially use the dirty technology. Limiting the number of firms ensures that we do
not assume away even the possibility of profits by having both identical firms and
easy entry. However, the intuition supporting our examples does not rely on a fixed
number of firms and could be generalized.

For example, with grandfathered

permits, scarcity rents benefit existing firms, even when entry and exit is possible.
Because profits accrue only once for the N firms (or in a model with generations of
firms, profits accrue only to the initial set of grandfathered firms], one can also think
of these profits as a short run benefit.
The firm, therefore, chooses output and emissions so that c' (y) = P + t and
e = y, where c'(y) and P respectively represents marginal cost and market
price. In the first three examples, we assume that the tax is initially set at zero. In
these cases, we can also assume that the fixed cost of adopting clean technology, /,
is arbitrarily small. In such a scenario, environmental regulation must induce
innovation, so the model produces an outcome consistent with one criterion of
Porter's hypothesis. We can therefore focus on the second, more controversial
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aspect of Porter's argument: that because of this innovation, regulation benefits the
firms.

For each of the examples, we also follow the same analytical steps. Porter
and van der Linde argue that firms benefit only after they innovate. Therefore we
analyze the response to regulation in two distinct steps. We start by looking at the
response of an individual firm before it has the opportunity to innovate. Next, we
allow the firm to innovate and therefore reduce its marginal cost of abatement. In

some cases we also highlight how this differs from the effect of the entire industry
innovating. For each of the examples, we construct a scenario fully consistent with
the Porter's hypothesis, as defined in the last row of Table 1. In other words, if the
regulated firm does not innovate, profits decline. However, the firm benefits when
regulations induce innovation.

4.3.1 Example 1: Scarcity Rents
Regulations might benefit firms by creating scarcity rents. We start with this
example for several reasons. First, it is familiar. Policy discussions on the allocation
of pollution permits often point out that resistance to environmental regulations
might be mitigated by giving away permits to existing polluters, free of charge.
Permit recipients benefit from the acquisition of scarce, and therefore valuable,
permits. Therefore, this example provides an important link between the literature
on the Porter Hypothesis and the literature in firm appropriation (or granting to
firms) of scarcity rents created by environmental regulation. Second, the example
highlights the importance of distributional outcomes. When Palmer, Oates and
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Portney and others reject the Porter Hypothesis, they do so on the basis of the
assertion that regulations have costs. However, if those costs can be distributed
away from firms, it is possible that firms nonetheless benefit from environmental
regulations. A claim that firm's benefit from regulation is not necessarily a claim
that regulations have no costs. Third, this example highlights the distinctions made
in Table 1. With scarcity rents, it is possible to develop a scenario where regulations
induce innovation and where firms are better off. The outcomes would appear to

support Porter's hypothesis, but the mechanism is different. It is the ability to shift
costs to the consumer, rather than innovation, which drives profits.
In order to illustrate scarcity rents, we add a downward-sloping market
demand curve, P(Y), to our framework. If taxes are initially set to zero and firms
are perfectly competitive, then c'(y) = P, and — =
dt

NP'(Y) - c"(y)

< 0. Given that

the individual firm uses the dirty technology, its profit function is described by:

n{t) = P(Y(t))y(t) - C(V(O) - 0 - a)te(t)

(1)

Since each firm chooses y = e, the introduction of an emissions' tax results in
reduced individual output, decreased market supply and a higher market price.
Evaluating

at the competitive output when / = 0 produces:
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3p(?
dt

= [NF(Y)y'(l)-(\-a)]y(l)

(2)

I=O

The first term in the brackets is the scarcity rent; it reflects the benefits from rising
prices.32 The second term measures the marginal cost of unrefunded tax liabilities.
If the firm receives a full tax refund, so a = 1 , the second term drops out and

dn(t)\
dt

> 0 . Regulation makes the firm better off: p(?) < p(?) .
t=0.a=\

It is also possible that the firm does not immediately benefit from scarcity
rents, unless it innovates. If tax revenues are not fully returned to the firm, so a < 1 ,
then the sign of (2) is ambiguous. Regulation can hurt firms if scarcity rents do not
offset its entire tax burden. Consider the case where

dt

— < 0 , but the magnitude

of the effect is very small. Recall that the clean technology is almost free of cost to
the firm (/ is assumed to be arbitrarily small). As the regulation binds, the firm's
willingness to pay for the alternate technology increases and, for the individual firm,
innovation becomes profitable. The clean technology allows the firm to increase
output and reduce its tax burden, so it may be that p(?) < n(D) . Such a scenario is
consistent with the Porter's prediction. When scarcity rents don't fully offset the
cost of unrefunded taxes, regulations initially impose costs. These remaining costs
can be fully offset via induced innovation.

32 In a setting with perfect collusion, where a single agent maximizes joint industry profits the term
W(Y]y'(t) would then be eliminated from equation 2.
133

Our example has generated a scenario that is empirically identical to the

Porter Hypothesis. Regulations generate innovation, firms benefit, and it is possible
that the increased profits would not have occurred without the innovation. While
the outcome matches Porter's hypothesis, the mechanism is quite different: scarcity
rents, not innovation offsets, drive the result. The regulation does have a cost; it is
just passed along to the consumer in the form of a higher price. To see this more
clearly, consider the consequences when not just one firm, but the entire industry
innovates. With widespread innovation, output of each firm increases, raising
market supply and hence lowering the market price back towards the initial

competitive level. Extensive technology adoption reduces industry profits relative
to limited adoption.

4.3.2 Example 2: Negative Production Externality
The prior example shows that results consistent with Porter's hypothesis can
arise if costs are distributed away from firms. This example makes an analogous
point about the distribution of environmental benefits. We now assume that total
industry emissions impose a negative externality on the individual firm's costs. One
example is the prophylactic use of antibiotics in livestock. Such usage protects
individual herds from disease, but may produce antibiotic-resistant bacteria that

may be transmitted to other farms (McEwen and Fedorka-Cray 2002).33 In such
cases, where firms are imposing negative externality on one another rather than on

31 Common access resource problems, like fisheries, can also be thought of as a form of production
externality. The harvest of a single fishing vessel affects the costs of all other vessels.
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the public, regulation can reduce the externality and yield a benefit to individual
firms. This result is important to understand as the example can be constructed to
produce an outcome that appears fully consistent with the Porter Hypothesis. For
some regulations, firms can achieve a net benefit only through innovation.
In order to rule out the scarcity rents discussed in the prior example, we now
assume that the market demand curve is horizontal. The externality is measured by
the total emissions of the N identical firms in the industry and each firm is so small
that it considers this externality to be exogenous, unaffected by its own emissions.
Letting E denote the external cost, which depends on aggregate emissions, we now
define the individual firm's cost function as c(y,E), where c'(E)>0. We make no
further assumptions about how the external cost relates to individual emissions,
except that the use of an emission's tax will reduce the externality, so that E\t) < 0.
34 Assuming that the individual firm initially uses the dirty technology, the profit
function is described by:

T(O = MO - c{y{t), E(t)) - (1 - a)ly(t)

(3)

Differentiating with respect to the tax rate, t, applying an envelope condition, and
evaluating at t = 0 produces:

dp(?)
dt

= -c\E)E\t)-(\-a)y{t)

(4)

1=0

With perfect mixing, E=Ne.
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If tax revenues are refunded

(a = 1),

then

?p(?)
dt

= -c'(E)E'(t)>0,

so

i=0.a=ì

p{?) > p(?). As the tax increases, each firm reduces emissions, which reduces the
total external cost, and increases profits. When firms bear the external cost of
pollution, they benefit from environmental regulation.
It may be that environmental regulation benefits the firm only if it innovates,
consistent with the Porter Hypothesis. If taxes are not fully refunded, the sign on
Ot

is ambiguous. Just like in the prior example, it is possible that a tax and

partial rebate initially leaves each firm with small costs that can be fully offset
through innovation. If environmental benefits cannot fully offset the tax burden of
the regulation, then the firm is hurt by the regulation as long as it does not innovate.
However, once the tax is imposed, the clean technology offers an opportunity for the
individual firm to reduce emissions and hence its tax burden. With innovation, the

firm benefits. As in the prior section, the effect of regulation differs in the case
where only one firm innovates, from the case where the entire industry innovates.
If all firms adopt the clean technology, the profits of each firm will be even larger, as

adoption will both offset tax burdens and further reduce the overall externality cost.
4.3.3 Example 3: Asymmetric Information
This example assumes that consumers have a preference for goods that are
produced using "green" production techniques and are willing to pay a premium for

such goods, but cannot observe the production process.
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For example, U.S.

consumers cannot easily distinguish genetically modified organisms and advocates
suggest avoiding entire groups of crops.

For example, advocates recommend

avoiding all Hawaiian grown papaya, even though approximately half of Hawaiian
papayas are not genetically modified, (cite 1, cite 2)35 Similarly, the health of a
fishery depends on the location, method, and even season of harvest. This level of
detail may not be easily available.36 In such cases, conservation groups therefore
recommend that consumers avoid entire species offish (cite). In the notation of our
model, this suggests that consumers rely on total industry emissions as a proxy for
environmental quality.

Regulation can reduce industry emissions while firms

benefit from the premium paid for such goods. Here, we define market demand as
P(E) = P- h(E) , so industry emissions negatively affect market price. The market
demand curve is otherwise horizontal. Using the dirty technology, the firm's profit
function is:

p(?) = P(E(t))y(t) - c(y(t)) - (1 - a)ty(t)

(5)

Differentiating with respect to the tax rate, applying an envelope condition, and
evaluating at t = 0 produces:
?p(?)
dt

= -y(f)IÏ(E)E'(t)-(l-a)y(t)

(6)

(=0

35 This does not suggest that papaya farmers would benefit from regulation; it only illustrates the
type of market failure studied in this example.
36 In other cases, only inaccurate information may be available. Consumer Reports and the New York
Times report that farm-raised salmon is frequently mislabeled as wild. (Consumer Reports,
"Mislabeled Salmon: The Salmon Scam" (2006),cite 2).
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Equation 6 is similar to equations 2 and 4 from the prior examples. More stringent
regulation combined with a full refund of tax payments unambiguously improves
the firm's profitability. Just as with scarcity rents, a tax encourages each firm to
emit less, which in turn raises output price. The policy helps firms by solving the
informational problem. If tax revenues are only incompletely refunded (a < 1), the
effect on profits is ambiguous. Once again, it is possible to construct a scenario
where regulation hurts the firm, unless it innovates. The example, too, can be
consistent with the Porter Hypothesis.

Note that while the notation and mechanics of this example are similar to the
scarcity rents example (in both cases the regulation creates profits by increasing
price), the two scenarios are conceptually different. Scarcity rents reflect a purely
distributional change. With asymmetric information, prices rise because consumers

have a higher willingness to pay for goods produced with less emissions. The
contrast between the two examples is clearer when comparing profitability of a
single firm that innovates to industry-wide innovation.

With scarcity rents,

widespread innovation mitigates the initial gains, whereas in this example industrywide innovation further increases profitability and simultaneously generates
greater consumer surplus.

4.3.4 Example 4: Public Good
This example considers the case where adoption experiences with the clean

technology are a public good. The fixed cost of adoption for the /"' firm, fXJ_¡),
now depends on, j_¡, the total number of other firms (not /) using the clean
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technology, where f¡ (/_,) decreases with more adopting firms. In cases where
patent protections and other forms of intellectual property rights are imperfect,
knowledge about the clean technology is a public good. As this knowledge increases
with more users, the fixed cost of adopting the clean technology declines. In such a
scenario, there may be a Nash Equilibrium where no individual firm adopts,
although all firms would benefit through universal adoption of the technology.
To describe such a scenario, we must assume that the emissions' tax is

initially positive, so /0>0. Let yc(t,j_¡) denote the firm's optimal choice of output
when using the clean technology, let yd{t,j_¡) denote the firm's optimal choice of
output when using the dirty technology, and redefine N to count the number of
other firms (hot /). If all of the following three conditions hold, then we can create a
scenario consistent with Porter's hypothesis:

if t = t0, and j_,. =0,

n(yc(t0,0))<n(yd(to,0))

(7a)

for any t > t0, and j_. = N,

n{y€ (/, TV)) > n(yd (/, N))

(7b)

There exists some ?? >t0, so that,

n{yc (tt] ,0)) > n{yd (?,; ,0))

(7c)

The first condition indicates that if tax is Z0 , no individual firm has the incentive to
adopt the clean technology. The second condition indicates that if all firms were to
adopt the technology, then they would each garner higher profits. For any level of
emissions tax greater than or equal to t0 , correcting the market failure represented
by the public good benefits the industry. The final condition indicates that if taxes
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are sufficiently high, a tax policy induces technology adoption and can correct the

market failure. Any tax level higher than /;; induces all firms to adopt the clean
technology.

As always, we first consider the effect of an increase in the emission tax rate
on the profits before the firm has the opportunity to innovate. In this case, it is
trivial to show thatan increase in taxes must unambiguously lower profits:
——— < 0, so: p(?) < p(?). Next, we consider the case where the policy induces
dt

innovation. If t>t , then all firms adopt the clean technology. From (7c), this
lowers each firm's marginal cost of abatement and reduces its cost of complying
with the regulation, making the action individually rational. From (7b), adoption
also provides a public good, which benefits all other firms. If this second effect is
sufficiently large, then regulated firms might find themselves better off than they
were, even prior to the initial tax. In such a case:

p{?e{??,?))>p{?a{???

(8)

A simple numerical example can verify that (7a) - (7c) can be met simultaneously
and satisfy Porter's hypothesis.37

2

37 Assume that P=30, N=I00, c(y) =Z_
+ te + f , f= y'-,+?
10 , ? = 0.77, or = 0 andtaxesrise
2
from t0 = 5 to / = 5.2 . In this case, all three conditions are met: at t0 = 5 , no firm adopts, at
/ = 5.2 all firms adopt and profits per firm rise from 312 to 318.
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4.4

Conclusions

The four examples are simple to understand and build upon basic concepts.
Nonetheless, each adds important insight to the debate surrounding the Porter
Hypothesis. Palmer, Oates and Portney acknowledge only two possible situations
where regulations may benefit regulated firms: strategic behavior and overlooked
opportunities for profitable innovation (Palmer, Oates and Portney 1995, 125). 38
While both are important, this list is too narrow. They might have instead used a
variety of scenarios to clarify how standard economic models might yield results
consistent with Porter's observations. For example, Porter and van der Linde
explicitly ignore social benefits and focus on "private costs" (Porter and van der
Linde 1995, 98). They then use a series of case studies to highlight instances where
individual firms benefit from environmental innovation. This focus on firms gives
the impression that private costs are only those that accrue to the firm, and social
benefits accrue only outside of the affected industry. Palmer, Oates and Portney
clearly understand that private costs might be distributed away from firms or that
the social benefits might be seen in production, but pass up the opportunity to
highlight this point.39 The distribution of costs or benefits can produce outcomes

38 Simpson and Bradford (1996), Greaker (2003) and McAusland (2004) all explore the role of
strategic behavior in generating results consistent with Porter's Hypothesis. Popp (2005) argues
that with uncertainty, rational firms might overlook opportunities, which are profitable ex-post with
a considerable frequency.
39 In a footnote they point out that increased environmental stringency will induce firms to decrease
output (Palmer, Oates and Portney 1995, 124), as in the example of scarcity rents. Production
externalities are featured in the numerous textbooks, including Baumöl and Oates (1988).
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that appear similar to Porter and van der Linde's observations: regulations benefit
firms, but only if they innovate.
The discussion of market failures introduces a second avenue through which
a simple model can yield results consistent with Porter's observations. If the
environmental regulation corrects two distortions, it might simultaneously benefit
firms and improve environmental quality. While the existing literature provides
several specific illustrations of this point, we argue that the results are general and
can be derived even from a very simple model. Finally, the examples also point out
that Porter's argument of innovation offsets leading to increased profits may be
hard to distinguish empirically from other reasons that regulation might be
correlated with increasing profits or productivity. In several examples firms might
benefit, even without innovation.

While we have shown several reasons why firms may benefit from
environmental regulations, we make no suggestion about the likelihood that such
outcomes will actually be observed following the implication of policy.

The

empirical question remains: to what degree do firms experience higher profits after
environmental regulations are imposed and innovation occurs? While this paper
suggest some reasons that such outcomes are possible, it also highlights a reason
that they may be unlikely. Even if an environmental regulation helps enforce a joint
action that makes firms better off, neither Porter nor these examples fully explain
why firms don't collectively make more of an effort to impose voluntary industry
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Standards or actively advocate for regulation.40 This insight remains central to the
debate about the Porter Hypothesis. We only argue that if discussions about the
Porter Hypothesis are reframed in this way, they will be considerably more nuanced
than simple statements that the Porter Hypothesis is inconsistent with most
economic models or merely about measuring costs. Such a more nuanced debate, in
fact, requires empirical work. For example, the definitions (in Table 4.1) classify
different routes in which regulations may generate profits. This implies that
empirical work should clearly define their question. Are they looking for increased
productivity, or increased profitability? Do regulations lead to innovation, but not
profits, or regulation leading to innovation and profits? These distinctions, in turn,
suggest that policy implications from the empirical studies should be interpreted
carefully, as it depends on the type of distortion, under consideration. If the
distortion arises from imperfect competition and inter-firm externalities, then a cost
and benefit analysis should provide a picture of the benefits generated. This,
however, doesn't imply that regulations do not have costs. There are costs involved,
but they are either distributed away from the producers or borne by the consumers.
Therefore, the results of a cost-benefit analysis will remain unaffected. But if the
distortion arises from market failures like asymmetric information or public goods,
then a policy that addresses both these distortions should realize/acknowledge that
these benefits arise from correcting two distortions simultaneous, with one policy.

40 Porter (1991) suggests that firms have a "Chicken Little mindset," meaning that they fail to have
the foresight to take advantage of such opportunities.
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The examples are straightforward, but make important points. First, the
existing debate has largely ignored distributional effects or the possibility of
distortions, other than pollution itself. Second, the examples presented here provide
concrete examples of the distinctions made in Table 1.

Regulations may

simultaneously benefit firms and foster innovation. However, in some cases that are
empirically difficult to distinguish from the Porter Hypothesis, regulations benefit
firms for reasons other than innovation. Third, the examples contribute through
their simplicity; a variety of intuitive scenarios might produce outcomes consistent
with the Porter Hypothesis.
Finally, the examples highlight the general applicability of the results to not
just market incentive based instruments, like emission taxes, grandfathered or
tradable permits, but also to other forms of flexible environmental policies. The key
here is that the regulation should be flexible enough to allow firms to internally
adjust its production processes in order to mitigate regulatory costs. Informationbased environmental policies, like the U.S. Toxic Release Inventory, are a good
candidate. Porter argues that "information gathering often leads to environmental
improvements without mandating pollution reductions, sometimes even at lower
costs" (p. 100, Porter and van der Linde 1995). Hence this essay ties to the general
theme of the dissertation which is to explore the unintended consequences of newer
and non-traditional forms of environmental policies.
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CHAPTER 5

EXTENSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

5.1

Introduction

The dissertation presents three essays that highlight how external pressures
and internal awareness generated under information-based environmental policies
may influence a firm's polluting behavior and improve its environmental
performance. Chapters 2 and 3 assess the role of the print media in influencing a
firm's pollution behavior. Chapter 2, specifically, shows that there is an association
between media attention and socio-economic characteristics. Media reports are

more likely to write about pollution in minority neighborhoods. Media attention
also has a positive and statistically significant association with household income
level. Chapter 3 shows that there is an association between media attention and a
firm's toxic releases.

But the results do not produce evidence of a causal

relationship between the two. If media attention imposes reputation costs on the
firm, then it may provide incentives to change their pollution behavior. But it was
difficult to isolate this causal effect of media attention on subsequent changes in
toxic releases.

Chapter 4 presents four different scenarios where a strict

environmental regulation can lead to outcomes consistent with the Porter
hypothesis.

The chapter concludes that there are different routes in which
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regulations may generate profits and that the results should be carefully interpreted
in an empirical study.

The results are applicable to information-based

environmental policies, like the Toxic Release Inventory.
Collectively, the findings presented in chapters 2 to 4 highlight opportunities
for many new areas of research. Among these, two merit particular attention. One
research agenda is to extend our understanding of the role of the media in
information-based regulations. The second agenda is to empirically extend the
literature on the Porter hypothesis. This chapter provides a sketch of these two
research avenues.

One avenue is to extend the empirical analysis of chapters 2 and 3. Chapter
2 uses cross-sectional data to study the association between media attention and
socio-economic characteristics and makes inference about environmental justice

based on income and racial composition at the zip code level. Some researchers

argue that the geographic scale used is critical to the of study environmental justice
.Zip codes are larger than Census tracts and it is preferable that environmental
justice analysis be conducted at the Census tract or smaller spatial units. Anderton
et al. (1994), for example, uses Census tracts data and finds no evidence of racial
differences in the siting of hazardous waste facilities. Similar studies conducted at
the zip-code level, however, found results contrary to the Anderton, et al. study. One

way to extend Chapter 2 would be to analyze the association between media
attention and socio-economic characteristics at the Census tracts level and compare
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the results to see whether geographical units of space matter in environmental
justice studies.
Recall from Chapter 2 that the media attention data was collected for one
year following the first publication of the TRI reports. Most of the media hits were
received in the weeks immediately following the first announcement, after which
the attention fades out in later months or weeks. The TRI reports were published
along with the National Wildlife Federation's report on the Toxic 500 companies
and the National Resources Defense Council's report on the top carcinogenic
polluters in the TRI list. They were published in the same month, only a couple of
days apart. It would be interesting to explore in future projects whether the timing
of the TRI reports or other major national reports on the TRI firms play an
important role in determining media attention. This, however, cannot be explored
with the dataset that I have used in chapter 2 as number of media hits is not
sufficient. It can be explored appropriately by expanding my current dataset to a
panel where media attention is recorded for each facility for several years.
Chapter 3 explores the relationship between media attention and subsequent
changes in toxic releases.

The results did not produce evidence of a causal

relationship between the two. One conclusion is that there might be some
unobservables that are very strongly correlated with the treatment variable, media
attention.

Some of these unobservables could be time-invariant.

Fixed-effects

estimation model using panel data can help isolate the effect of these time invariant
unobservables from media attention. In order to study the causal relationship
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between media attention and future toxic releases more rigorously, one option is to

create a panel data where media attention and control variable information for each
facility is recorded for each subsequent year. Constructing this panel would require
conducting database searches, similar to the one in Chapter 2, to collect media
attention measures for each year. The parent company-level information can be
similarly collected from the COMPUSTAT database.
Beyond studying the causal relationship between media attention and a
firm's pollution behavior, it would be worthwhile considering other channels
through which media attention may affect firm behaviors. Three such channels are
discussed in the following sections. The next four sections present new ideas that
can be explored in future research. The first three sections present various firm
responses to media attention, while the fourth section proposes how to empirically

expand the theoretical exposition on the Porter hypothesis presented in Chapter 4.

5.2 Media Attention and Participation in Voluntary Agreements
The cost associated with negative publicity may provide firm's with
incentives to enroll in voluntary agreements to reduce toxic releases. The literature
on eco-labeling and green rating has a couple of studies (Afsah, et al, 2000, Liu,
2010) where firms have enrolled in targeted emission reduction programs to

protect their reputation, and their relationship with stakeholders in the supply
chain. In the context of the TRI program, a voluntary agreement policy that was
introduced in 1990 is the 33/50 program. The aim was to systematically reduce
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toxic releases of participating firms by 1995. The literature on the 33/50 program
shows that firms that participated in the program reduced their emission well
beyond the standards set by the program and met their targets ahead of the
deadline (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995). The literature also has evidence that
investor's reaction to the public disclosure of toxic releases is an important factor in
determining participation in the TRI program (Khanna and Damon, 1999). It would,
therefore, be interesting to explore whether media attention determines
participation in a voluntary agreement type program like the EPA's 33/50 program
under TRI.

5.3 Media Attention and Analyst's Earning Forecasts
The TRI report generated media activity whereby national and regional
newspapers reported about the pollution behaviors of companies listed in the TRI
report. Prior research has shown that such media activity took TRI companies by
surprise and was reflected in negative abnormal returns. Prior literature has also
explored the effect of TRI-related media attention on stock prices. A step forward in
investigating how public disclosure type programs work could be to study financial
markets forecasts. More specifically, future studies can investigate the effect of
media attention on analyst's earning forecasts of TRI firms, as media coverage of
companies may affect analysts' estimates of environmental costs on the firm. In
particular, analysts may adjust down their earnings forecasts for firms that receive
media attention. Using analysts' earnings forecasts from Institutional Brokers'
Estimate System (IBES) provided by Compustat North America and media attention
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information from the dataset that I have created for this dissertation, one can test

the above hypothesis.
5.4

Media Attention and Firm Closure Decision

In a recent study, Kassinis and Vafeas (2009) explore the relationship
between pressures from stakeholders and environmental performance of firms and
how it translates into firms deciding to close their plants. Using data from U.S.
manufacturing facilities, they find that closing facilities face strong community and
regulatory pressures compared to surviving ones and that the closing facilities
reduce their toxic release more than the surviving establishments. In line with this
research, One can explore the effect of media attention as an external pressure on a
firm's decision to close some of its polluting establishment. In other words, media
attention may cause attrition from the TRI list. To do so, one may use duration or
survival analysis that is used extensively in economics to model time to an event,
which in our case is dropping out of the TRI list.
5.5 Voluntary Agreements and 'Green' Patenting
One way to contribute to the empirical literature on the Porter hypothesis
would be to study the effect of flexible policies like the EPA's 33/50 program on the
firm's innovative activities. The literature on EPA's 33/50 program shows that a
firm's research and development intensity, measured by the R&D expenditures per
unit of toxic emission, is an important factor in determining participation in the
program (Khanna and Damon 1999). But one can hypothesize that participation in
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the program can also lead to activities like investing in R&D to meet the pollution
targets.

This bi-directional relationship between participation in the 33/50 program
and innovation is worth exploring in future research. Interestingly, one can analyze
the effect of participation in the program on a firm's green patenting, rather than a
broader measure like R&D expenditures (which captures all kinds of innovative
activities at the firm level). This research will shed light on the distinctions that
empirical studies on the Porter hypothesis should emphasize on.

For a scenario

consistent with the Porter hypothesis, a regulation should be flexible like the
voluntary agreement under the 33/50 program, and the first step towards realizing
benefits would be through innovation in the face of regulation. So a research project
that studies the effect of participation in the 33/50 program on successful
application for green patents would be an ideal test of the Porter hypothesis.
5.6

Conclusions

All of these additional avenues for research highlight the general theme in
this dissertation. Voluntary, collaborative and information based environmental
regulations have become popular in the last two decades as complements to the
traditional regulatory tools. But the effectiveness of these new policies is not well
understood. This dissertation fills this gap by focusing on the information based
environmental regulations. The TRI program has been touted as one of the most
successful environmental policies because toxic releases have declined significantly
since its inception. This dissertation explored the role of media attention in
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explaining such declines and did not find evidence on the causal relationship
between media attention and declining toxic releases. In fact, toxic releases had
been declining even before media attention focused on emissions. Therefore, one
has to be careful in evaluating the effectiveness of the TRl program in reducing
toxics.

To my knowledge, environmental justice has not been explored through the
behavior of the media. This dissertation presents results which show that media
activities are associated with socio economic characteristics and that socio

economic characteristics are associated with significant reductions in toxic releases
in some minority neighborhoods. While we cannot define causality definitively,
policy proposals on scaling back the reporting requirements should take into
account the potential implications it may have on the distribution of toxic releases in
minority neighborhoods.
Finally, this work sheds light on the controversy surrounding the Porter
hypothesis; my research sets the stage for interesting future projects in the area of
environmental regulation and competitiveness. It presents a classification of what
a direct test of the Porter hypothesis must or must not include. This classification
will serve as a guideline for any future empirical work in this area.

152

LIST OF REFERENCES

Afsah. S., A. Blackman and D. Ratunanda. 2000. "How Do Public Disclosure Pollution

Control Programs Work? Evidence from Indonesia." Resources for the Future
Discussion Paper 00-44.

Afsah. S., B. LaPlante and D. Wheeler. 1997. "Regulation in the Information Age:
Indonesian Public Information Program for Environmental Management."
Research Paper. Washington, DC: World Bank, Development Research
Institute.

Alpay, E., S. Buccola and J. Kerkvliet. 2002. "Productivity Growth and Environmental
Regulation in Mexican and U.S. Food Manufacturing." American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, 84(4): 887-901.
Ambec, S., and P. Baria. 2002. "A Theoretical Foundation of the Porter Hypothesis."
Economics Letters, 75 (3): 355-360.

Ambec, S., and P. Lanoie. 2008. "Does It Pay to Be Green? A Systematic Overview."
Academy ofManagement Perspectives, 22(4): 45-62.
Anderton, D., A. Anderson, J. Oakes and M. Fraser. 1994. "Environmental Equity: The
Demographics of Dumping." Demography, 31(2): 229-248.
André, F. J., P. González and N. Porteiro. 2009. "Strategic Quality Competition and
the Porter Hypothesis." Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 57(2):182-194.
Anton, W. R. Q., G. Deltas and M. Khanna. 2004. "Incentives for Environmental SelfRegulation and Implications for Environmental Performance." Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 48: 632-654.
Arimura, T. H., A. Hibiki and H. Katayama. 2008. "Is A Voluntary Approach An
Effective Environmental Policy Instrument? A Case for Environmental
Management Systems." Journal ofEnvironmental Economics and Management,
55:281-295.

Arora, S., and T. N. Cason. 1995. "An Experiment in Voluntary Environmental
Regulation: Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program." Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 28:271-286.
153

Arora, S., and T. N. Cason. 1996. "Why Do Firms Volunteer To Exceed Environmental
Regulations? Understanding Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program." Land
Economics, 72 (4): 413-432.
Arora, S., and T. N. Cason. 1999. "Do Community Characteristics Influence
Environmental Outcomes? Evidence from the Toxics Release Inventory."
Southern EconomicJournal, 65 (4): 691-716.
Arora, S., and S. Gangopadhyay. 1995. "Toward A Theoretical Model of Voluntary
Over-Compliance." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 28(3]: 289309.

Asch, P., and J. L. Seneca. 1978. "Some Evidence on the Distribution of Air Quality."
Land Economics, 54(3):278-297.
Baumöl, W. J., and W. E. Oates. 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy"
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press.

Been, V. 1994. "Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods':
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?" Yale Law Journal, 103(6):
1383-1422.

Been, V. 1995. "Analyzing Evidence of Environmental Justice." Journal of Land Use
and Environmental Law, 11(1): 1-36.
Been, V., and Gupta, F. 1997. "Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A
Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims." Ecology Law
Quarterly, 34: 03-56.
Beierle, T. 2003. "Environmental Information Disclosure: Three Cases of Policy and
Politics." Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 03-16.

Bennear, L. S., and S. M. Olmstead. 2008. "The Impacts of the "Right To Know":
Information Disclosure And the Violation of Drinking Water Standards."
Journal ofEnvironmental Economics and Management, 56 (2):117-130.
Bennett, W. L. 1988. "News: The Politics of Illusion." New York; Longman Press.
Berry, B. J. L. 1977. "The Social Burdens of Environmental Pollution: A Comparative
Metropolitan Data Source." Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Press.
Berman, E., and L. T. M. Bui. 2001. "Environmental Regulation and Productivity:
Evidence from Oil Refineries." The Review of Economics and Statistics,
a?(3):498-510.
154

Beruhe, M., J. Nash, J. Maxwell and J. Ehrenfeld. 1992. "From Pollution Control to
Zero Discharge: How the Robbins Company Overcame the Obstacles."
Pollution Prevention Review, 2(2):189-207
Bizat, E. K. 2006. "EMS and ISO 14001: Selected Topics for Discussion." Mimeo, HEC
Montreal.

Blackman, A. 2009. "Alternative Pollution Control Policies in Developing Countries."
Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 09-14.

Boer, J. T., M. Pastor, Jr., J. L .Sadd and L. D. Snyder. 1997. "Is There Environmental
Racism? The Demographics of Hazardous Waste in Los Angeles County."
Social Science Quarterly, 78(4): 793-810.
Bowen, W. M., M. J. Sailing, K. Haynes and E. J. Cyran. 1995. "Towards Environmental
Justice: Spatial Equity in Ohio and Cleveland." Annals of the Association of
American Geographers, 85(4):641-663.
Brehm, J., and J. T. Hamilton. 1996. "Noncompliance in Environmental Reporting:
Are Violators Ignorant or Evasive of the Law?" American Journal of Political
Science, 40(2): 444-477.
Brooks, N., and R. Sethi. 1997. "The Distribution of Pollution: Community

Characteristics and Exposure to Air Toxics." Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 32:233-250.
Brouhle, K., C. Griffiths and A. Wolverton. 2009. "Evaluating the Role of EPA Policy
Levers: An Examination of a Voluntary Program and Regulatory Threat in the
Metal-Finishing Industry." Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 57(2): 166-181.
Brown, J. B., and P. J. Wilcoxen. 2003. "Environmental Regulation: Does Federally
Mandated Pollution Abatement Investment Lead to Less Productive

Investment?" Mimeo, Syracuse University.

Bruijn, T., and V. Norberg-Bohm. 2005. "Industrial Transformation: Environmental
Policy in the United States and Europe." Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Brunnermeier, S. B., and M. A. Cohen. 2003. "Determinants of Environmental

Innovation in US Manufacturing Industries." Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 45: 278-293.

155

Bryant, B., and P. Mohai. 1992. "Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards:
A Time for Disclosure." Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
Bullard, R. D. 1983. "Solid Waste Sites and the Houston Black Community."

Sociological Inquiry, 53(Spring): 273-288.
Bullard, R. D. 1995. "Residential Segregation and Urban Quality of Life:
Environmental Justice: Issues, Policies and Solutions." Washington, DC:
Island Press.

Burtraw, D. 2000. "Innovation under the Tradable Sulfur Dioxide Emission Permits

Program in the U.S. Electricity Sector." Resources for the Future Discussion
Paper 00-44.

Cable, S., and T. Shriver. 1995. "Production and Extrapolation of Meaning in the
Environmental Justice Movement." Sociological Spectrum, 15(4): 419-442.
Cameron, A. C, and P. K. Trivedi. 1998. "Regression Analysis of Count Data"
Cambridge Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press.
Cameron, T. A., and I. McConnaha. 2006. "Evidence of Environmental Migration."
Land Economics, 82: 273-290.

Cañón-de-Francia, J., C. Garce' s-Ayerbe and M. Rami'rez-Aleso'. 2008. "Analysis of
the Effectiveness of the First European Pollutant Emission Register (EPER)."
Ecological Economics, 67: 83-92.
Capek, S. M. 1993. "The 'Environmental Justice' Frame: A Conceptual Discussion and
an Application." Social Problems, 40(l):5-24.
Carrión-Flores, C. E., and R. Innes. 2010. "Environmental Innovation and

Environmental Performance." Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 59(l):27-42.
Chakraborty, J., and M. P. Armstrong. 1997. "Exploring the Use of Buffer Analysis for
the Identification of Impacted Areas in Environmental Equity Assessment."
Cartography and Geographic Information Systems, 24(3): 145-157.
Cole, W. L., and S. R. Foster. 2001. "From the Ground Up: Environmental Racism and
the Rise of the Environmental Justice Movement." New York: New York
University Press.

Cutter, S.L., D. Holm and L. Clark. 1996. "The Role of Geographic Scale in Monitoring
Environmental Justice." Risk Analysis, 16 (4): 517-526.
156

Daniels, G., and S. Friedman. 1999. "Spatial Inequality and the Distribution of
Industrial Toxic Releases: Evidence from the 1990 TRI." Social Science

Quarterly, 80(2):244-261.

Dasgupta, S., B. Laplante and N. Mamingi. 2001. "Pollution and Capital Markets in
Developing Countries."Journal ofEnvironmental Economics and Management,
42(3): 310-335.
Dasgupta, S., J. H. Hong, B. Laplante and N. Mamingi. 2006a. "Disclosure of
Environmental Violations and Stock Market in the Republic Of Korea."
Ecological Economics, 58(4): 759-777.
Dasgupta, S., J. H. Hong, B. Laplante, and N. Mamingi. 2006b. "Firms' Environmental
Performance: Does News Matter?" World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper 3888. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Dave, D., and R. Kaestner. 2009. "Health Insurance and Ex Ante Moral Hazard:

Evidence from Medicare." International Journal of Health Care Finance and
Economics, 9(4): 367-390.
Davidson, P., and D. Anderton. 2000. "Demographics of Dumping II: A National
Environmental Equity Survey and the Distribution of Hazardous Materials
Handlers." Demography, 37(4): 461-466.
Dean, N. 1989. "The Toxic 500: The 500 Largest Releases of Toxic Chemicals in the
United States" National Wildlife Federation.
Demaris, A. 2004. "Regression with Social Data: Modeling Continuous and Limited
Response Variables" Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics. WileyInterscience Publication.

Doonan, J., P. Lanoie and B. Laplante. 2005. "Determinants of Environmental
Performance in the Canadian Pulp and Paper Industry: An Assessment From
Inside the Industry." Ecological Economics, 55(1): 73-84.
Downing, P. B., and L. J. White. 1986. "Innovation in Pollution Control." Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 13 (1): 18-29.
Dufour, J. 2003. "Identification, Weak Instruments, and Statistical Inference in
Econometrics." Canadian Journal ofEconomics, 36:767-808.
Entman, R. M., and A. Rojecki. 2000. "The Black Image in the White Mind: Media and
Race in America." Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
157

Freeman, A. M., III. 1972. "The Distribution of Environmental Quality" in A.V. Kneese
and B.T. Bower (edited) Environmental Quality Analysis: Theory and Method
in the Social Sciences. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Frey, W. H. 1987. "Migration and Depopulation of the Metropolis: Regional
Restructuring or Rural Renaissance?" American Sociological Review, 52:240257.

Fricker, R. D., and N. W. Hengartner. 2001. "Environmental Equity and the
Distribution of Toxic Release Inventory and Other Environmentally
Undesirable Sites in Metropolitan New York City." Environmental and
Ecological Statistics, 8:33-52.
Frisbie, W. P., and J. D. Kasarda. 1988. "Spatial Processes." in Neil J. Smelser, (edited)
Handbook of Sociology. Newbury Park, New Jersey: Sage Publication.
Fullerton, D. 2001. "A Framework to Compare Environmental Policies." Southern
EconomicJournal, 68 (2): 224-248.

Fullerton, D., and G. E. Metcalf. 2001. "Environmental Controls, Scarcity Rents, and
Pre-Existing Distortions." Journal ofPublic Economics, 80 (2): 249-267.

Fung, A., and D. O'Rourke. 2000. "Reinventing Environmental Regulation from the
Grassroots Up: Explaining and Expanding the Success of the Toxics Release
Inventory.". Environmental Management, 25:115-127.
Gamper-Rabindran, S. 2006. "Did The EPA's Voluntary Industrial Toxics Program
Reduce Emissions? A GIS Analysis of Distributional Impacts and By-Media

Analysis of Substitution." Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 52(1): 391-410.
Gianessi, L. P., H. M. Peskin and E. Wolff. 1979. "The Distributional Effects of Uniform

Air Pollution Policy in the United States." Quarterly Journal of Economics,
94(2): 281-301.
Glachant, M. 2007. "Non-Binding Voluntary Agreements." Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 54:32-48.
Glickman, T. S., D. Golding and R. Hersh. 1995. "GIS-Based Environmental Equity
Analysis: A Case Study of TRI Facilities in the Pittsburgh Area." in G.E.G.
Beroggi and W.A. Wallace (edited), Computer Supported Risk Management.
Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publication.

158

Gollop, F.M., and M.J. Roberts. 1983. "Environmental Regulations and Productivity
Growth: The Case of Fossil-fuelled Electric Power Generation." Journal of
Political Economy, 91:654-674.
Graham, M. and C. Miller. 2001. "Disclosure of Toxic Releases in the United States."

Environment, 43(8): 11-35.
Greaker, M. 2003. "Strategic Environmental Policy: Eco-Dumping or a Green
Strategy?" Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 45 (3): 692707.

Greenwood, M. A., and A. K. Sachdev. 1999. "A Regulatory History of the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986: Toxic Release
Inventory." Washington, DC: Chemical Manufacturers Association.
Groseclose, T., and J. Milyo. 2005. "A Measure of Media Bias." Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 120(4):1191-1237.

Hamilton, J. T. 1995a. "Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market Reactions to the
Toxic Release Inventory Data." Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 28: 98-113.

Hamilton, J. T. 1995b. "Testing for Environmental Racism: Prejudice, Profits,
Political Power?" Journal ofPolicy Analysis and Management, 14 (1): 107-132.
Hamilton, J. T. 1999. "Exercising Property Rights to Pollute: Do Cancer Risks and
Politics Affect Plant Emission Reduction?" Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 18
(2): 105-124.
Hamilton, J. T., and W. K. Viscusi. 1999. "Calculating Risks? The Spatial and Political
Dimensions of Hazardous Waste Policy." Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Hart, R. 2004. "Growth, Environment and Innovation - A Model with Production

Vintages and Environmentally Oriented Research." Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 48 (3): 1078-1098.
Hart, S. L. 1997. "Beyond Greening: Strategies for a Sustainable World." Harvard
Business Review, 75 (1): 66-76.
Herrmann, R. 0., R. H. Warland and A. Sterngold. 1997. "Who Reacts to Food Safety
Scares? Examining the Alar Crisis." Agribusiness, 13 (5): 511-520.

159

Hird, J. A. 1993. "Environmental Policy and Equity: The Case of Superfund."/ou/7?a/
ofPolicy Analysis and Management, 12(2): 323-343.
Hurley, A. 1995. "Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and Industrial Pollution
in Gary, Indiana, 1945-1980." Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North
Carolina Press.

Jaffe, A. B. and K. Palmer. 1997. "Environmental Regulation and Innovation: A Panel
Data Study." The Review ofEconomics and Statistics, 79:610-619.
Jaffe A.B., S. R. Peterson, P. R. Portney and R. N. Stavins. 1995. "Environmental
Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the
Evidence Tell Us?" Journal of Economic Literature, XXXIII, 132-163.
Jaffe A. B., R. G. Newell and R. N. Stavins. 2002. "Environmental Policy and
Technological Change." Environmental and Resource Economics, 22: 41-69.
James, H., and M. W. Watson. 2006. "Introduction to Econometrics." Addison Wesley.
Karkkainen, B. 2001. "Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI And
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor To A New Paradigm?" Georgetown
LawJournal, 89:257-265.
Kassinis, G., and N. Vafeas. 2009. "Environmental Performance and Plant Closure".

Journal ofBusiness Research, 62:484-494.
Khanna, M., W. R. H. Quimio and D. Bojilova. 1998. "Toxic Release Inventory: A
Policy Tool for Environmental Protection." Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 36:243-266.
Khanna, M., and L. A. Damon. 1999. "EPA's Voluntary 33/50 Program: Impact on
Toxic Releases and Economic Performance of Firms." Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 37:1-25.
Khanna, M., and W. R. Q. Anton. 2002. "Corporate Environmental Management:
Regulatory and Market-Based Incentives." Land Economics, 78(4): 539-558.
Kohlhase, J. E. 1991. "The Impact of Toxic Waste Sites on Housing Values." Journal of
Urban Economics, 30:1-26.

Konar, S., and M. A. Cohen. 1997. "Information as Regulation: Effect of Community
Right-To-Know Laws on Toxic Emissions." Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 32: 109-124.

160

Krieg, E. J. 1995. "A Socio-Historical Interpretation of Toxic Waste Sites: The Case of
Greater Boston." The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 54(1):114.

Kriesel, W., T. J. Centner and A. G. Keller. 1996. "Neighborhood Exposure to Toxic
Releases: Are there Racial Inequities?" Growth and Change, 27: 479-499.
Lacy, S. 1989. "A Model of Demand for News: Impact of Competition on Newspaper
Content." Journalism Quarterly, 66: 40-48.
Lacy, S., D. C. Coulson and H. Cho. 2002. "Competition for Readers Among U.S.
Metropolitan Daily, Nonmetropolitan Daily, and Weekly Newspapers." The
Journal ofMedia Economics. 15(1): 21-40.
Langford, M., and D. J. Unwin. 1994. "Generating and Mapping Population Density
Surfaces within a Geographical Information System." Cartographic Journal,
31:21-26.

Lanoie, P., B. Laplante and M. Roy. 1998. "Can Capital Markets Create Incentives for
Pollution Control?" Ecological Economics, 26: 31-41.
Lanoie, P., N. Johnstone, J. Lucchetti and S. Ambec. 2007. "Environmental Policy,
Innovation and Performance: New Insights on the Porter Hypothesis". INRAGAEL Working Paper 2007-07. University of Grenoble, France.
Laplante, B., and P. Lanoie. 1994. "Market Response to Environmental Incidents in
Canada." Southern EconomicJournal, 60:657-672.
Larson, S. G. 2006. "Media and Minorities: The Politics of Race in News and

Entertainment." Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
Lee, M-J. 2005. "Micro-econometrics for Policy, Program, and Treatment Effects."
Oxford University Press.

Lester, J. P., D. W. Allen and K. M. Hill. 2001. "Environmental Injustice in the United
States: Myths and Realities." Colorado: Westview Press.
Liu, B., Y. Qinqin, J. B. Bing Zhang, J. Ge, Z. Yuan and Y. Yu. 2010. "Does the
GreenWatch Program Work? Evidence from a Developed Area in China."
Journal of Cleaner Production, 18(5): 454-461.
Magat, W. A. 1978. "Pollution Control and Technological Advance: A Dynamic Model
of the Firm." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 5 (1): 125.

161

Marchi, S., and J. T. Hamilton. 2006. "Assessing the Accuracy of Self-Reported Data:
An Evaluation of the Toxics Release Inventory." Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty, 13:57-76.

Markham, W. T., and E. Rufa. 1997. "Class, Race, and the Disposal of Urban Waste:
Locations of Landfills, Incinerators, and Sewage Treatment Plants."
Sociological Spectrum, 17(2): 235-248.
Massey, D. S., and N. A. Denton. 1993. "American Apartheid: Segregation and the
Making of the Underclass." Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press.

McAusland, C. 2004. "Environmental Regulation as Export Promotion: Product
Standards for Dirty Intermediate Goods." Contributions to Economic Analysis
and Policy, 3(2): 1-39.
McEwen, S. ?., and P. J. Fedorka-Cray. 2002. "Antimicrobial Use and Resistance in
Animals." Clinical Infectious Diseases, 34(Supplement 3): S93-S106.
McMaster, R. B., H. Leitner and E. Sheppard. 1997. "GIS-Based Environmental Equity
and Risk Assessment: Methodological Problems and Prospects." Cartography
and Geographic Information Systems, 24(30): 172-189.
Mennis, J. 2002. "Using Geographic Information Systems to Create and Analyze
Statistical Surfaces of Population and Risk for Environmental Justice
Analysis." Social Science Quarterly, 83(1): 281-297.
Michaels, R. G, and V. K Smith. 1990. "Market Segmentation and Valuing Amenities
with Hedonic Models: The Case of Hazardous Waste Sites." Journal of Urban
Economics, 28:223-242.

Milliman, S. R., and R. Prince. 1989. "Firm Incentives to Promote Technological
Change in Pollution Control." Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 17(3): 247-265.
Mohr, R. D. 2002. "Technical Change, External Economies, and the Porter
Hypothesis." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 43 (1):
158-168.

Morgenstern, R. D., and W. A. Pizer. 2007. "Reality Check: The Nature and
Performance of Voluntary Environmental Programs in the US, Europe, and
Japan." Washington, D. C: Resources for the Future Press.

162

Murray, M. P. 2006. "Avoiding Invalid Instruments and Coping with Weak
Instruments." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(4): 111-132.
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). 1989. "A Who's Who of American Toxic
Air Polluters." New York: Natural Resources Defense Council.

OECD. 2003. "Voluntary Approaches for Environmental Policy: Effectiveness,
Efficiency and Usage in Policy Mixes" Paris: OECD.
Palmer, K., W. E. Oates and P. R. Portney. 1995. "Tightening Environmental
Standards: the Benefit-cost or the No-cost Paradigm?" Journal of Economic
Perspectives 9 (4): 119-132.
Perlin, S.A., R. W. Setzer, J. Creason and K Sexton. 1995. "Distribution of Industrial
Air Emissions by Income and Race in The United States: An Approach Using
the Toxic Release Inventory." Environmental Science and Technology, 29 (1):
69-80.

Poje, G. V., and D. Horowitz. 1990. "Phantom Reductions: Tracking Toxic Trends."
Washington D.C.: National Wildlife Federation.
Pollock, P. H., and M. E. Vittas. 1995. "Who Bears the Burdens of Environmental

Pollution? Race, Ethnicity, and Environmental Equity in Florida." Social
Science Quarterly, 76(2):294-310.
Popp, D. 2005. "Uncertain R&D and the Porter Hypothesis." Contributions to
Economic Analysis & Policy, 4 (1): 01-16.
Portney, P. 1994. "Does Environmental Policy Conflict with Economic Growth?"
Resources, 115(Spring): 19-23.
Portney, P., and R. N. Stavins. 2000. "Public Policies for Environmental Protection."
Washington, DC/ Resources for the Future Press.
Porter, M. E. 1991. "America's Green Strategy." Scientific American, 264 (4):168.
Porter, M. C, and C. V. D. Linde. 1995. "Toward A New Conception of EnvironmentCompetitiveness Relationship." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4): 97118.

Pulido, L. 1996. "A Critical Review of the Methodology of Environmental Racism
Research." Antipode, 28{2):142-159.
Pulido, L., S. Sidawi and R. O. Vos. 1996. "An Archaeology of Environmental Racism
in Los Angeles." Urban Geography, 17(5):419-439.
163

Rassier, D. G., and D. Earnhart. 2010. "The Effect of Clean Water Regulation on
Profitability: Testing the Porter Hypothesis." Land Economics, 86(2): 329344.

Reinhardt, F. 2000. "Down to Earth: Applying Business Principles to Environmental
Management". Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press.
Rege, M. 2000. "Strategic Policy and Environmental Quality: Helping the Domestic
Industry to Provide Credible Information." Environmental and Resource
Economics, 14 (3): 279-296.

Responsible Care. 2010. http://www.responsibIecare.org/ as viewed in March,
2010.

Ringquist, E. J. 1997. "Equity and the Distribution of Environmental Risk: The Case
of TRI Facilities." Social Science Quarterly, 78(4): 811-829.
Sadd, J., M. Pastor, T. Boer and L. Snyder. 1999. "'Every Breath You Take...' The
Demographics of Toxic Air Releases in Southern California." Economic
Development Quarterly, 13(2): 107-123.
Shirley, C. B. 1992. "Where have you been?" Columbia Journalism Review, 31(2): 2526.

Scott, M., S. L. Cutter, C. Menzel, M. Ji and D. Wagner. 1997. "Spatial Accuracy of the
EPA's Environmental Hazards Databases and their Uses on Environmental

Equity Analyses." Applied Geographic Studies, 1910: 45-61.
Simpson, R. D., and R. L. Bradford, III. 1996. "Taxing Variable Cost: Environmental
Regulation as Industrial Policy." Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 30(3): 282-300.
Smith, V. K., and R. Walsh. 2000. "Do Painless Environmental Policies Exist?" Journal

ofRisk and Uncertainty, 21(1): 73-94.
Smith, V. K., and W. H. Devousges. 1986. "The Value of Avoiding a LULU: Hazardous
Waste Disposal Sites." Review ofEconomics and Statistics, 68(2): 293-299.
Sparrow, B. H. 1999. "Uncertain Guardians: The News Media and a Political
Institution." Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Stafford, H.A. 1985. "Environmental Protection and Industrial Location." Annals of
the Association ofAmerican Geographers, 75(2): 227-240.

164

Staiger, D., and J. H. Stock. 1997. "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak
Instruments." Econometrico, 65:557-586.

Sunstein, C. 1999. "Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and
Beyond." University ofPennsylvania Law Review, 147: 613-675.
Suro, R. 2nd July, 1989. "Grass-Roots Groups Show Power Battling Pollution Close to
Home", The New York Times, Page 1: Column 1.
Szasz, A. 1994. "EcoPopulism: Toxic Waste and the Movement for Environmental
Justice." Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Szasz,, A. and M. Meuser. 1997. "Environmental Inequalities: Literature Review and
Proposals for New Directions in Research and Theory." Current Sociology,
45(3): 99-120.
Terry, J. C, and B. Yandle. 1997. "EPA's Toxic Release Inventory: Stimulus and
Response." Managerial and Decision Economics, 18:433-441.
Tietenberg, T. 1995. "Design Lessons from Existing Air Pollution Control Systems:
The United States." In S. Hanna and M. Munasinghe (edited), "Property Rights
in a Social and Ecological Context: Case Studies and Design Applications."
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Tietenberg, T. 1998. "Disclosure Strategies for Pollution Control." Environmental and
Resource Economics, 11:587-602.

United Church of Christ (UCC). 1987. "Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States"
UCC: Commission for Racial Justice.

US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA). 1990. "Assessment of Data Quality
in the 1987 Toxic Release Inventory: Site Visit Program." Study prepared by
Radian Corporation for US EPA Office of Toxic Substances, Washington DC.
US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA). 1996. "Pollution Prevention at
Custom Print." Washington DC: Environmental Protection Agency.
US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA). 1997. "1995 Toxic Release
Inventory Public Data Release Report". Washington DC: Environmental
Protection Agency.

US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA). 1998a. "1994 and 1995 Toxic
Release Inventory Data Quality Report." Washington DC: Environmental
Protection Agency.
165

US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA). 1998b. "1996 Toxic Release
Inventory Data Quality Report." Washington DC: Environmental Protection
Agency.

US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA). 2000. "1998 Toxic Release
Inventory." Washington DC: Environmental Protection Agency.
US General Accounting Office (US GAO). 1983. "Siting Hazardous Waste Landfills and
their Correlation with Racial Status of Surrounding Communities"
Washington DC: General Accounting Office.
Vachon, S. and R. D. Klassen. 2008. "Environmental Management and Manufacturing
Performance: The Role of Collaboration in the Supply Chain." International
Journal ofProduction Economics, 111:299-315.
Vidovic, M., and N. Khanna. 2007. "Can Voluntary Pollution Prevention Programs
Fulfill Their Promises? Further Evidence from the 33/50 Program." Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 53: 180-195.
Wilson, C. C, and F. Gutiérrez. 1995. "Race, Multiculturalism and the Media: From
Mass Communication to Class Communication." Thousand Oaks, California:

Sage Publications.
Wolverton, A. 2009. "Effects of Socio-Economie and Input-Related Factors on
Polluting Plants' Location Decisions" The B.E.Journal of Economic Analysis &
Policy, 9(l):Advances, Article 14.
Wooldridge, J. M. 2003. "Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach" Southwestern Publication.

Wu, J. 2009. "Environmental compliance: The Good, the Bad, And the Super Green."
Journal ofEnvironmental Management, 90(11):3363-3381.
Xepapadeas, A., and A. D. Zeeuw. 1999. "Environmental Policy and Competitiveness:
The Porter Hypothesis and the Composition of Capital." Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 37(2): 165-182.
Yin, X. 2003. "Corrective Taxes under Oligopoly with Inter-Firm Externalities."
Environmental and Resource Economics, 26(2): 269-277.
Zimmerman, R. 1993. "Social Equity as Environmental Risk." Risk Analysis,
13(6):649-666.

166

Zupan, J. M. 1973. "The Distribution of Air Quality in the New York Region."
Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.

167

